similar to: CerbNG v1.0-RC2 is now avaliable!

I suspect this has been asked before but I'll ask anyway. Q1: Is it possible for a non-root process to perform a chroot? My interest is this: I have a typical ISP hosting account (verio; on a FreeBSD 4.4 server.) I'd like to install and run various CGI packages, yet protect myself (and my email, and my .ssh keys) from bugs being exploited in those CGI packages. Chroot at the start

I'm porting the most recent version of Neil Provos' systrace to FreeBSD 5.1. I'm sending him the diffs to integrate into his distribution. I'd also like to submit them to someone with FreeBSD for consideration, and hopefully inclusion as a port or whatever you prefer. Who could I send them to, or what would you prefer me to do with regard to FreeBSD? Thanks, Rich Murphey

I'm setting up a server where I plan to use Jails to improve security I also have installed and am configuring ipfilter. Here are my questions: Because I'm using Jails, I will have to have multiple ip aliases on the network interface. I will use ipfilter to specify what can go to each of the addresses. (e.g., allow only incoming to port 80 on the jail running apache). Another

There is malware that names the files .crypt A novel solution here https://isc.sans.edu/diary/Novel+method+for+slowing+down+Locky+on+Samba+server+using+fail2ban/20805 though it seems locky specific I use this non-samba solution in cron.hourly. Pretty awful, but it works for malware that I know about. I have fast drives, so updatedb only takes a few seconds. #!/bin/sh updatedb wait 20 if

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 All, are there any plans to allow FreeBSD jails to bind to more than one IP address? My scenario (virtual hosting) : 3 front-end hosts with 2 interfaces each, one on the public network, the other on a private subnet. 1 back-end host, providing NFS mounts for the front-ends. This scenarion is not uncommon in ISP environments, usually with a big

Hi. geli(8) from FreeBSD-CURRENT is now able to perform data integrity verification (data authentication) using one of the following algorithms: - HMAC/MD5 - HMAC/SHA1 - HMAC/RIPEMD160 - HMAC/SHA256 - HMAC/SHA384 - HMAC/SHA512 One of the main design goals was to make it reliable and resistant to power failures or system crashes. This was very important to commit both data update and HMAC

I can''t find anything using those functions. Can they be removed? -- Pawel Jakub Dawidek http://www.wheel.pl pjd at FreeBSD.org http://www.FreeBSD.org FreeBSD committer Am I Evil? Yes, I Am! -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type:

Hi. I noticed that when non-64bit variable is given as a second argument to atomic_add_64() function, the result is invalid. I found few places where such situation occurs. I wonder how this got unnoticed with ztest, which fails on me within a few seconds (after I started to use Solaris atomic operations) on assertions. Maybe this only doesn''t work when compiled with gcc? Not sure, but

Hi. I''ve almost all file system functions working. I started to run some heavy file system regression tests. They work. fsx wasn''t able to break my port, but the test you can find here: http://people.freebsd.org/~kan/fsstress.tar.gz broke it. My kernel panics on this assertion (zfs_dir.c): 749: mutex_exit(&dzp->z_lock); 750: 751: error =

I''m CCing zfs-discuss at opensolaris.org, as this doesn''t look like FreeBSD-specific problem. It looks there is a problem with block allocation(?) when we are near quota limit. tank/foo dataset has quota set to 10m: Without quota: FreeBSD: # dd if=/dev/zero of=/tank/test bs=512 count=20480 time: 0.7s Solaris: # dd if=/dev/zero of=/tank/test bs=512 count=20480 time: 4.5s

Hi. I've no response from so@ in this topic, probably because leak of time, so I'll try here. Here is a patch that I'm planing to commit: http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/restricted_hardlinks.patch It adds two new sysctls: security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid security.bsd.hardlink_check_gid If sysctl security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid is set to 1, unprivileged users are not

Hi. We''re testing the most recent ZFS version from OpenSolaris ported to FreeBSD. Kris (CCed) observed strange situation. In function arc_read() he had a panic on assertion that we try to unlock a lock which is not beeing held: rw_enter(&pbuf->b_hdr->b_datalock, RW_READER); err = arc_read_nolock(pio, spa, bp, done, private, priority, flags, arc_flags, zb);

Hi. I'd like to commit this patch: http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/vfs_mount.c.9.patch It currently should change nothing, but will be needed once we allow to grant privileges for jails. I'd like to commit it now, so I can experiment easier with my ZFS improvements. -- Pawel Jakub Dawidek http://www.wheel.pl pjd@FreeBSD.org

On Sun, Jul 24, 2005 at 04:06:02PM +0200, Poul-Henning Kamp wrote: +> In message <20050724135738.GM46538@darkness.comp.waw.pl>, Pawel Jakub Dawidek writes: +> +> >We should probably test entropy quality on boot. +> >I've somewhere userland version of /sys/dev/rndtest/ which implements +> >FIPS140-2 tests for (P)RNGs. We can use put it into rc.d/ and warn users.

Hi. I''m happy to inform that the ZFS file system is now part of the FreeBSD operating system. ZFS is available in the HEAD branch and will be available in FreeBSD 7.0-RELEASE as an experimental feature. Commit log: Please welcome ZFS - The last word in file systems. ZFS file system was ported from OpenSolaris operating system. The code in under CDDL license. I''d

There is a Slashdot discussion today titled "Cambridge Researcher Breaks OpenBSD Systrace". Slashdot anonymous member has a comment "Even Sun''s Dtrace might be vulnerable." I don''t think it is. Comments? Exploiting Concurrency Vulnerabilities in System Call Wrappers http://www.watson.org/~robert/2007woot/2007usenixwoot-exploitingconcurrency.pdf Abstract

Hi. I''m working on getting the most recent ZFS to the FreeBSD''s CVS. Because of the huge amount of changes, I decided to work on ZFS regression tests, so I''m more or less sure nothing broke in the meantime. (Yes, I know about ZFS testsuite, but unfortunately I wasn''t able to port it to FreeBSD, it was just too much work. I''m afraid it is too

Hi. I have a series of patches to sandbox dhclient using Capsicum (capability mode and capability rights for descriptors). As usual, because chroot and setgid/setuid are not sandboxing mechanisms, there are many problems with the current sandboxing: - Access to various global namespaces (like process list, network, etc.). - Access to RAW UDP socket. - Read/write access to bpf. - Access to RAW

Hi. Here you can find patches with changes to gmirror(8) and graid3(8): http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/gmirror.7.patch http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/graid3.patch The patches does the following: - Significant synchronization speed improvement. Now many parallel synchronization I/O requests can be used instead of only one before. Many people requested this. - Close race

Hello, What do you recommend for keeping track of user activities? For preserving bash histories I followed these recommendations: http://www.defcon1.org/secure-command.html They include using 'chflags sappnd .bash_history', enabling process accounting, and the like. My goal is to "watch the watchers," i.e. watch for abuse of power by SOC people with the ability to view