similar to: jails, ipfilter & stunnel

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 All, are there any plans to allow FreeBSD jails to bind to more than one IP address? My scenario (virtual hosting) : 3 front-end hosts with 2 interfaces each, one on the public network, the other on a private subnet. 1 back-end host, providing NFS mounts for the front-ends. This scenarion is not uncommon in ISP environments, usually with a big

I have searched around the lists and Google and found this HYPERLINK "http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/jail_2004120901.patch"http://people. freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/jail_2004120901.patch I was wondering if anyone know of a multiple IP patch that works with FreeBSD 5.4 I really do not understand why this is not included in the standard jail I mean sure jail is handy for

Although RAW sockets can be used when specifying the source address of packets (defeating one of the aspects of the jail) some people may find it usefull to use utilities like ping(8) or traceroute(8) from inside jails. Enclosed is a patch I have written which gives you the option of allowing prison-root to create raw sockets inside the prison, so

I'm thinking of using jails to improve security on a server I am setting up. Specifically, I would like to put Apache/PHP in a jail, but I might like to set up 2-3 different jails for different purposes. I've found several examples showing how to set the jails up. My questions involve system requirements. Assuming plenty of disk space, 1GB ram and a dual processor PIII 1.13Ghz

Hello, What do you recommend for keeping track of user activities? For preserving bash histories I followed these recommendations: http://www.defcon1.org/secure-command.html They include using 'chflags sappnd .bash_history', enabling process accounting, and the like. My goal is to "watch the watchers," i.e. watch for abuse of power by SOC people with the ability to view

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-07:01.jail Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Jail rc.d script privilege escalation Category: core Module: etc_rc.d Announced:

Hello, I'm wondering about closing some information leaks in FreeBSD jails from the "outside world". Not that critical (depends on the application), but a simple user, with restricted devfs in the jail (devfsrules_jail for example from /etc/defaults/devfs.rules) can figure out the following: - network interfaces related data, via ifconfig, which contains everything, but the

I read this (http://www.petur.eu/blog/?p=459) blog post today. It's about that a remote user with root privilegs to a FreeBSD jail & user privileges to the jails host machine can obtain root privileges on the host machine. Can someone confirm if this bugg/exploit works?

Hi. I've no response from so@ in this topic, probably because leak of time, so I'll try here. Here is a patch that I'm planing to commit: http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/restricted_hardlinks.patch It adds two new sysctls: security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid security.bsd.hardlink_check_gid If sysctl security.bsd.hardlink_check_uid is set to 1, unprivileged users are not

Hi. I'd like to commit this patch: http://people.freebsd.org/~pjd/patches/vfs_mount.c.9.patch It currently should change nothing, but will be needed once we allow to grant privileges for jails. I'd like to commit it now, so I can experiment easier with my ZFS improvements. -- Pawel Jakub Dawidek http://www.wheel.pl pjd@FreeBSD.org

Hi. When we don't have too many IP addresses available and we want to run for example www server inside a jail, but use the same IP address as the main system, we need to actually use an internal IP address and forward http port with firewall from external IP to jail's IP. In that way we know that if somebody breaks into out jail, he cannot run sshd server (we have keys, I know) or any

I'm going to apply the ssh patch. Applying it to the "real" server seems straightforward enough, but I'm wondering what the right procedure is to apply this patch to my jailed servers.

> I recently did something like this. I have a webserver in a jail that > needs to talk to a database, and the webserver is the only thing that > should talk to the databse. > My solution was to use 2 jails: one for the webserver, and another for the > database. > Jail 1: > * runs webserver > * binds to real interface with real, routable IP > Jail 2: > *

I suspect this has been asked before but I'll ask anyway. Q1: Is it possible for a non-root process to perform a chroot? My interest is this: I have a typical ISP hosting account (verio; on a FreeBSD 4.4 server.) I'd like to install and run various CGI packages, yet protect myself (and my email, and my .ssh keys) from bugs being exploited in those CGI packages. Chroot at the start

HI everyone, I have resently installed a jail environment on my freebsd box, and had some problems getting postgresql running under it. After looking a bit on various mailinglists i figured out that I needed to set jail.sysvipc_allowed to be 1 using sysctl in order to make postgresql run. However man jail gives me: jail.sysvipc_allowed This MIB entry determines whether or not

-----Original Message----- From: CentOS [mailto:centos-bounces at centos.org] On Behalf Of Rainer Duffner Sent: Samstag, 21. Oktober 2017 00:41 To: CentOS mailing list Subject: Re: [CentOS] scp setup jailed chroot on Centos7 > Am 20.10.2017 um 15:58 schrieb Adrian Jenzer <a.jenzer at herzogdemeuron.com>: > > Dear all > > I'm looking for instructions on how to setup a

On 2/17/19 8:18 PM, Rowland Penny via samba wrote: > Possible things to check: > Is the ip for vlan1 10.1.2.34 ? Sure. It's the only IP vlan1 has inside the jail; it's shown as an alias on the base host. > Try just setting 'vlan1' You mean change "interfaces=vlan1 10.1.2.34/24" to just "interfaces=vlan1"? It doesn't change anything (still

Hi, i've set the outside ip for the jail..It works.. When i try to ssh to jail'ed system from the main system (in which is created jail) the connection is successful, but when i try to connect to jailed system from anywhere else i get this message: ssh: connect to host IP_NUMBER port 22: Operation timed out What can be wrong here? How to solve this problem?

Hello list. I would like to get your opinion on what is a safe multi-user environment. The scenario: We would like to offer to some customers of ours some sort of network backup/archive. They would put daily or weekly backups from their local machine on our server using rsync and SSH. Therefore, they all have a user account on our server. However, we must ensure that they would absolutely not be

Howdy! I'm not sure if this is actually an issue, feature or a bug, but I have found that inside a jail, the jailed root user is able to sniff traffic (and enable promiscuous mode) on at least the interface of the IP address the jail is attached to. I have not found any documentation explaining if this should occur or not, but I feel it is something that should at least be known to those