similar to: Fwd: [Full-Disclosure] Sendmail 8.12.9 prescan bug (a new one) [CAN-2003-0694]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:13.sendmail Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: a third sendmail header parsing buffer overflow Category: contrib Module:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:13.sendmail Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: a third sendmail header parsing buffer overflow Category: contrib Module:

Has anyone around here heard of this ? ---Mike >Subject: Re: [Full-Disclosure] new ssh exploit? >From: christopher neitzert <chris@neitzert.com> >Reply-To: chris@neitzert.com >To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com >X-Mailer: Ximian Evolution 1.4.3.99 >Sender: full-disclosure-admin@lists.netsys.com >X-BeenThere: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com

You've probably already seen the latest sendmail vulnerability. http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-September/010287.html I believe you can apply the following patch to any of the security branches: http://cvsweb.freebsd.org/src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.17&r2=1.1.1.18 Download the patch and: # cd /usr/src # patch -p1 < /path/to/patch #

You've probably already seen the latest sendmail vulnerability. http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-September/010287.html I believe you can apply the following patch to any of the security branches: http://cvsweb.freebsd.org/src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.17&r2=1.1.1.18 Download the patch and: # cd /usr/src # patch -p1 < /path/to/patch #

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:07.sendmail Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: a second sendmail header parsing buffer overflow Category: contrib Module:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:07.sendmail Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: a second sendmail header parsing buffer overflow Category: contrib Module:

From bugtraq :-( >-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > >Sendmail, Inc., and the Sendmail Consortium announce the availability >of sendmail 8.12.9. It contains a fix for a critical security >problem discovered by Michal Zalewski whom we thank for bringing >this problem to our attention. Sendmail urges all users to either >upgrade to sendmail 8.12.9 or apply a patch for

In nouveau_dmem_init(), a number of struct nouveau_dmem_chunk are allocated and put on the dmem->chunk_empty list. Then in nouveau_dmem_pages_alloc(), a nouveau_dmem_chunk is removed from the list and GPU memory is allocated. However, the nouveau_dmem_chunk is never removed from the chunk_empty list nor placed on the chunk_free or chunk_full lists. This results in only one chunk ever being

Full_Name: Roger Bivand Version: 1.3.0 OS: GNU/Linux RH6.2, 7.0, Debian 2.2 Submission from: (NULL) (158.37.100.64) I'm working on interfacing ANN: A Library for Approximate Nearest Neighbor Searching (http://www.cs.umd.edu/~mount/ANN/) to R, following up a prototype package I tried in May 2000. ANN is written in C++; my C++ is very weak. Last year I didn't experience any problems with

Sorry for the cross post, but this is an important one potentially affecting all recipients. This just crossed the Full Disclosure mailman moderated mailing list. It bears a careful read, and thought about whether a response is needed. The implication is that if there is any use of a mailman password in common with a password you 'care' about, you need to take appropriate action at

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-06:13.sendmail Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Race condition in sendmail Category: contrib Module: contrib_sendmail Announced:

On Thu, Mar 21, 2019 at 04:59:14PM +0100, Tobias Klausmann wrote: > Hi, > > just for your information and maybe for some help: with 5.1rc1 and SVM > enabled i see the following backtrace [1] when the nouveau card (reverse > prime) goes to sleep, for now i have papered over with [2] which leaves me > with userspace hangs. Any pointers where to look for the actual culprit? >

It looks as though the problem isn't in R - I provoked a SIGSEGV under R 1.1.1 on RH62: > for (i in 1:100) an1 <- ann(cbind(runif(1000), runif(1000)), k = 4) > for (i in 1:100) an1 <- ann(cbind(runif(1001), runif(1001)), k = 4) Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault. 0x40111109 in chunk_free (ar_ptr=0x401a5d40, p=0x8849a30) at malloc.c:3111 3111 malloc.c: No such

Hello -- Some wav files have been crashing the stuff I checked out from cvs last night. Is this happening to anyone else? Red Hat Linux release 7.3 (Valhalla) Kernel 2.4.18-5 on an i686 gcc-2.96-110 glibc-2.2.5-36 Encoding "04_imiuta.wav" to "04_imiuta.ogg" at quality 1.00 [100.0%] [ 0m00s remaining] \Segmentation fault Program received signal

I received a segmentation violation whilst using openssh-2.2.9p2 today: Kernel 2.2.19-6.2.7 (Redhat 6.2) Gcc version egcs-2.91.66 glibc-2.1.3-22 Hardware is 333MHz K6-3Dnow with 64MB RAM if that matters Here is what happened along with a stack dump... # ssh -L 80:someplace.net:80 -l charlie someplace.net Password: (works for a while, then seems to freeze) ^C Segmentation violation (core

Hello, trying to start tinc I get the following at the client: Apr 17 16:34:50 otto tincd[10238]: tincd 0.3.3 starting, debug level 1. Apr 17 16:34:50 otto tincd[10238]: Generating 128 bits keys. Apr 17 16:34:50 otto tincd[10238]: Ready: listening on port 655. Apr 17 16:34:50 otto tincd[10238]: Connected to xxx Apr 17 16:34:50 otto tincd[10238]: Memory exhausted; exiting. - on a machine with 80

Forwarded message: > From full-disclosure-admin@lists.netsys.com Wed Apr 21 11:49:12 2004 > To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com > From: Darren Bounds <dbounds@intrusense.com> > Subject: [Full-Disclosure] IETF Draft - Fix for TCP vulnerability > Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 18:19:58 -0400 > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > >

----- Forwarded message from Telford Tendys <telford@triode.net.au> ----- Delivery-Date: Thu Jan 25 22:22:57 2001 Date: Fri, 26 Jan 2001 16:26:27 +1100 From: Telford Tendys <telford@triode.net.au> To: feedback@vorbis.com Subject: Comments on your code User-Agent: Mutt/1.2.5i Dear Vorbis, I didn't even know about ogg or vorbis until I was at a conference and someone said, ``if

On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 04:11:07PM -0700, Ralph Campbell wrote: > In nouveau_dmem_init(), a number of struct nouveau_dmem_chunk are allocated > and put on the dmem->chunk_empty list. Then in nouveau_dmem_pages_alloc(), > a nouveau_dmem_chunk is removed from the list and GPU memory is allocated. > However, the nouveau_dmem_chunk is never removed from the chunk_empty > list nor