similar to: Fwd: Re: [Full-Disclosure] new ssh exploit?

More patch-o-rama :-( ---Mike >From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf@dione.ids.pl> >To: bugtraq@securityfocus.com, <vulnwatch@securityfocus.com>, > <full-disclosure@netsys.com> >X-Nmymbofr: Nir Orb Buk >Subject: [Full-Disclosure] Sendmail 8.12.9 prescan bug (a new one) >[CAN-2003-0694] >Sender: full-disclosure-admin@lists.netsys.com >X-BeenThere:

I haven't seen anything about this here and thought I should pass it along. christopher neitzert <chris at neitzert.com> made two postings to the full-disclosure list earlier today. They stated, in part: ***** Does anyone know of or have source related to a new, and unpublished ssh exploit? An ISP I work with has filtered all SSH connections due to several root level incidents

This is the 1st revision of the Advisory. This document can be found at: http://www.openssh.com/txt/buffer.adv 1. Versions affected: All versions of OpenSSH's sshd prior to 3.7 contain a buffer management error. It is uncertain whether this error is potentially exploitable, however, we prefer to see bugs fixed proactively. 2. Solution: Upgrade to OpenSSH

This is the 1st revision of the Advisory. This document can be found at: http://www.openssh.com/txt/buffer.adv 1. Versions affected: All versions of OpenSSH's sshd prior to 3.7 contain a buffer management error. It is uncertain whether this error is potentially exploitable, however, we prefer to see bugs fixed proactively. 2. Solution: Upgrade to OpenSSH

The box has a fairly heavy UDP load. Its RELENG_7 as of today and took 3hrs for it to dump core. Fatal trap 12: page fault while in kernel mode cpuid = 1; apic id = 01 fault virtual address = 0x68 fault code = supervisor read, page not present instruction pointer = 0x20:0xc0637146 stack pointer = 0x28:0xe766eaac frame pointer = 0x28:0xe766eb54 code segment

Sorry for the cross post, but this is an important one potentially affecting all recipients. This just crossed the Full Disclosure mailman moderated mailing list. It bears a careful read, and thought about whether a response is needed. The implication is that if there is any use of a mailman password in common with a password you 'care' about, you need to take appropriate action at

This patch series allows user-specified mount commands to be sent in via kernel command line ("kinit_mount=...") or via an embedded /etc/fstab file. The first patch is a cleanup of a patch sent last November by San Mehat (http://web.archiveorange.com/archive/v/EazJNBMORV2U7E0coh5h); the next two are small improvements or bug fixes.

Forwarded message: > From full-disclosure-admin@lists.netsys.com Wed Apr 21 11:49:12 2004 > To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com > From: Darren Bounds <dbounds@intrusense.com> > Subject: [Full-Disclosure] IETF Draft - Fix for TCP vulnerability > Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 18:19:58 -0400 > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > >

You've probably already seen the latest sendmail vulnerability. http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-September/010287.html I believe you can apply the following patch to any of the security branches: http://cvsweb.freebsd.org/src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.17&r2=1.1.1.18 Download the patch and: # cd /usr/src # patch -p1 < /path/to/patch #

You've probably already seen the latest sendmail vulnerability. http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-September/010287.html I believe you can apply the following patch to any of the security branches: http://cvsweb.freebsd.org/src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.17&r2=1.1.1.18 Download the patch and: # cd /usr/src # patch -p1 < /path/to/patch #

OK, an official OpenSSH advisory was released, see here: <URL: http://www.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-announce/2003-September/000063.html > The fix is currently in FreeBSD -CURRENT and -STABLE. It will be applied to the security branches as well today. Attached are patches: buffer46.patch -- For FreeBSD 4.6-RELEASE and later buffer45.patch -- For FreeBSD 4.5-RELEASE and

I got a packet capture of one of the SSH2 sessions trying to log in as a couple of illegal usernames. The contents of one packet suggests an attempt to buffer overflow the SSH server; ethereal's SSH decoding says "overly large value". It didn't seem to work against my system (I see no strange processes running; all files changed in past ten days look normal). I am

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=617 Summary: /etc/services disregarded Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.6.1p2 Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-bugs at mindrot.org ReportedBy: tiaan at netsys.co.za

Hi all, I'm having a small problem with browsing. I've got a network full of Windows (2000 and XP) machines and I've installed a Samba server in it. The server is configured to be Domain Master Browser (DMB), Local Master Browser (LMB) and WINS server for a workgroup. The Win machines are configured to use the WINS server. Name resolution works perfectly, but browsing

Inspired by libvirt's virCommand* internal mini-library, this adds some internal APIs for running commands. The first patch contains the new APIs. The subsequent patches change various parts of the library over to use it. Rich.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:13.sendmail Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: a third sendmail header parsing buffer overflow Category: contrib Module:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:13.sendmail Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: a third sendmail header parsing buffer overflow Category: contrib Module:

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1637 Summary: Change the context when starting internal-sftp Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.2p1 Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sftp-server AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

Commit-ID: cf9ea962f1fb310a92efd184f14df2c04b30f75a Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/?p=libs/klibc/klibc.git;a=commit;h=cf9ea962f1fb310a92efd184f14df2c04b30f75a Author: Jim Meyering <meyering at redhat.com> AuthorDate: Fri, 8 Jul 2011 16:12:20 +0800 Committer: maximilian attems <max at stro.at> CommitDate: Mon, 2 Jul 2012 10:44:23 +0200 [klibc] [MEMALLOC] Avoid gcc warning:

Commit-ID: 21ceb151c758eb2384962b9ee8abc33b5bd674e9 Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/?p=libs/klibc/klibc.git;a=commit;h=21ceb151c758eb2384962b9ee8abc33b5bd674e9 Author: Herbert Xu <herbert at gondor.apana.org.au> AuthorDate: Thu, 31 May 2018 01:51:48 +0800 Committer: Ben Hutchings <ben at decadent.org.uk> CommitDate: Sat, 28 Mar 2020 21:42:55 +0000 [klibc] dash: memalloc: Avoid