similar to: cvs commit: ports/multimedia/xine Makefile

Hello, The current png-1.2.5_4 port has no more vulnerability. It has been corrected by ache@FreeBSD.org yesterday. But when i try to install the updated port to remplace the vulnerable one this is what i am told : # make install ===> png-1.2.5_4 has known vulnerabilities: >> libpng denial-of-service. Reference:

Attached is a security alert from Gentoo pertaining to clam antivirus. It seems that as of this morning, FreeBSD's ports still contain the affected version. Thank in advance, Tom Veldhouse -------------- next part -------------- An embedded message was scrubbed... From: Tim Yamin <plasmaroo@gentoo.org> Subject: [gentoo-announce] [ GLSA 200402-07 ] Clamav 0.65 DoS vulnerability Date:

Any reason why portaudit and its associated infrastructure was not announced to this list or security-notifications? I recently discovered it, and discovered the feature was added to bsd.port.mk in the beginning of feburary. Seeing as the security officer apparently (without announcement) no longer issues security notices (SNs) for ports, I am assuming that portaudit has replaced SNs entirely,

Greetings, I'm a little curious about the way FORBIDDEN knob is used in ports system. Traditionally, we use it to mark a port which have known security issue, with the new vuxml mechanism, are we still doing the same thing when necessary? Or, only the "critical" ones, for example, remote exploitable buffer overruns, etc? If the second assumption (only critical ones are marked

Hello Everyone! It has been my pleasure and privilege to serve as the FreeBSD Security Officer for the past 3+ years. With the crucial support of the FreeBSD Security Team members, a lot has been accomplished: hundreds of security issues have been researched and tracked, with some resulting in security advisories and patches; software in the Ports Collection are updated more quickly

Hi Everyone, http://vuxml.freebsd.org/c4b025bb-f05d-11d8-9837-000c41e2cdad.html A critical vulnerability was found in lukemftpd, which shipped with some FreeBSD versions (4.7 and later). However, with the exception of FreeBSD 4.7, lukemftpd was not built and installed by default. So, unless you are running FreeBSD 4.7-RELEASE or specified WANT_LUKEMFTP when building FreeBSD from source, you

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Has anyone see this alert? http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/353352 It seems to work on Linux, but when I tried the proof of concept on 4.3.0,1 running 5.2 RELEASE, I couldn't get the X server to core dump or segmentation fault. So, it seems likely to me that FreeBSD is not vulnerable to this. Any other thoughts on this matter? John

This affects only 3.7p1 and 3.7.1p1. The advice to leave PAM disabled is far from heartening, nor is the semi-lame blaming the PAM spec for implementation bugs. I happen to like OPIE for remote access. Subject: Portable OpenSSH Security Advisory: sshpam.adv This document can be found at: http://www.openssh.com/txt/sshpam.adv 1. Versions affected: Portable OpenSSH versions 3.7p1

OK, an official OpenSSH advisory was released, see here: <URL: http://www.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-announce/2003-September/000063.html > The fix is currently in FreeBSD -CURRENT and -STABLE. It will be applied to the security branches as well today. Attached are patches: buffer46.patch -- For FreeBSD 4.6-RELEASE and later buffer45.patch -- For FreeBSD 4.5-RELEASE and

What does mean this bizarre msgid? maillog: Mar 31 19:31:15 cu sm-mta[5352]: h2VFVEGS005352: from=<nb@sindbad.ru>, size=1737, class=0, nrcpts=1, msgid=<!~!UENERkVCMDkAAQACAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABgAAAAAAAAAfp4Fa2ShPE2u4pP/QpPDIMKAAAAQAAAAj+zb4Isbuk+tYEPVF9Vf, proto=ESMTP, daemon=MTA, relay=wg.pu.ru [193.124.85.219] -- Nikolaj I. Potanin, SA http://www.drweb.ru ID

In http://docs.freebsd.org/cgi/mid.cgi?200402260743.IAA18903 it seems RELENG_4 is vulnerable. Is there any work around to a system that has to have ports open ? Version: 1 2/18/2004@03:47:29 GMT >Initial report > <<https://ialert.idefense.com/KODetails.jhtml?irId=207650>https://ialert.idefense.com/KODetails.jhtml?irId=207650; >ID#207650: >FreeBSD Memory Buffer

Hello Folks, The official email address for this list is `freebsd-security@freebsd.org'. Due to convention, there is an email alias for this list: security@freebsd.org, just as there is for hackers@ & freebsd-hackers@, arch@ & freebsd-arch@, and so on. The security@freebsd.org alias has been the source of occassional problems. Several times in the past, postings have been made to

Hello Everyone, You may have seen the recent announcement regarding new OpenSSL vulnerabilities. <URL: http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030930.txt > Just thought I'd drop a line to head off the usual questions. :-) Don't panic. The vulnerability is denial-of-service. OpenSSL 0.9.7c will be imported into -CURRENT and -STABLE over the next couple of days, and included

Is it true that (dynamic) binaries are vulnerable if and only if they are linked with libssl.so.3, not with libcrypt or libcrypto? Thanks for your help. Andrew.

You've probably already seen the latest sendmail vulnerability. http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-September/010287.html I believe you can apply the following patch to any of the security branches: http://cvsweb.freebsd.org/src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.17&r2=1.1.1.18 Download the patch and: # cd /usr/src # patch -p1 < /path/to/patch #

You've probably already seen the latest sendmail vulnerability. http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-September/010287.html I believe you can apply the following patch to any of the security branches: http://cvsweb.freebsd.org/src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.17&r2=1.1.1.18 Download the patch and: # cd /usr/src # patch -p1 < /path/to/patch #

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:08.realpath Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Single byte buffer overflow in realpath(3) Category: core Module: libc Announced:

In FreeBSD 5.x only telnet/telnetd works 'out of box' with kerberos. Why ftp/ftpd, ssh/sshd and cvs do not support kerberos ? Thanks!

In regards to FreeBSD-SA-03:05.xdr, does anyone know which static binaries or tools under /bin or /sbin actually use that problem code? The recent XDR fixes the xdrmem_getlong_aligned(), xdrmem_putlong_aligned(), xdrmem_getlong_unaligned(), xdrmem_putlong_unaligned(), xdrmem_getbytes(), and/or xdrmem_putbytes() functions, but it is difficult to know what uses these (going backwards manually).

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:18.openssl Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: OpenSSL vulnerabilities in ASN.1 parsing Category: crypto Module: openssl Announced: