similar to: [patch] Incorrect umask in FreeBSD

I need this for BSD/OS 4.2 + privsep perhaps we should not call do_setusercontext() after chroot(). --- sshd.c.orig Fri Jun 21 03:09:47 2002 +++ sshd.c Tue Jun 25 13:11:03 2002 @@ -548,21 +548,35 @@ /* Change our root directory*/ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, strerror(errno)); if

For root sessions pam_open_session is called, but not pam_close_session. sshd behavior is broken for root logins because if pam session is run from the child, close is never called due to exec: on open since use_privsep is not set, parent calls do_exec_pty(), which does not open session. then, it skips calling do_setusercontext(), so it does not open session. child calls

This patch revive almost all login.conf and password/account expiration features, makes OpenSSH more FreeBSD login compatible and fix non-critical memory leak. Please review and commit. --- sshd.c.old Fri Feb 25 08:23:45 2000 +++ sshd.c Sun Feb 27 02:53:33 2000 @@ -37,9 +37,8 @@ #endif /* LIBWRAP */ #ifdef __FreeBSD__ -#include <libutil.h> -#include <syslog.h> #define LOGIN_CAP

Hi, I am running FreeBSD 4.7 and openssh 3.7.1p1. I have enabled PAM usage and indeed, I can use PAM for authentication purposes. Since configure does login_cap.h, the preprocessor is side stepping do_pam_session() altogether in session.c:do_setusercontext(). Here is my patch for session.c. My understanding about portability issues is rather limited. I would very much appreciate if you

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=298 Summary: sshd fails to set user context, preventing all logins, also setgroups is failing Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: ix86 OS/Version: BSDI Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P2 Component: sshd

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3715 Bug ID: 3715 Summary: safely_chroot is a little too restrictive: noexec or nosuid should be enough Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.8p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5

The following are patches against openssh 2.1.1p4 to add support for the BSD_AUTH authentication mechanisms. It allows the use of non-challenge/response style mechanisms (which styles are allowed my be limited by appropriate auth-ssh entries in login.conf). The patches also add support for calling setusercontext for the appropriate class when called with a command (so that the PATH, limits,

BSD/OS 4.2 comes with OpenSSH 2.1.1p4, patched to support BSDI's authentication library. However, BSDI's patches have several problems: 1. They don't run the approval phase, so they can allow users to login who aren't supposed to be able to. 2. They don't patch configure to automatically detect the BSDI auth system, so they're not ready to use in a general portable

On 2025-04-16 14:22 +02, Jannik Peters via nsd-users <nsd-users at lists.nlnetlabs.nl> wrote: > Dear all, > > NSD 4.12.0rc1 pre-release is available: > https://nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/nsd/nsd-4.12.0rc1.tar.gz > sha256 b9085a3fd08b8318ac30715faf1c7698099781eb3520253774a46f74386342e9 > pgp https://nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/nsd/nsd-4.12.0rc1.tar.gz.asc > > > This release

This is the patch part of contrib/chroot.diff updated to be appliable against openssh-2.9p2. Tested on FreeBSD (various 3.x and 4.x) without PAM or UseLogin. Also, as part of deployment (replacing emergency-withdrawal of Telnet access) I've chosen to get sftp on the relevant boxes. The deployment had a scriptlet doing the config/make/etc and after the "make install" would change

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=298 ------- Additional Comments From sshbugs at wayne47.com 2002-06-26 11:05 ------- Problem appears to be that setusercontext is being called after a chroot. ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are the assignee for the bug, or are watching the assignee.

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=446 Summary: $LOGIN not set by openssh under AIX Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy: mii at

The following is a patch I've been working on to support a "ChrootUser" option in the sshd_config file. I was looking for a way to offer sftp access and at the same time restict interactive shell access. This patch is a necessary first step (IMO). It applies clean with 'patch -l'. Also attached is a shell script that helps to build a chrooted home dir on a RedHat 7.2

Hi openssh developers, I'm trying to port openssh to Interix. See [1] for more on this. For Interix sshd needs to be patched to not use setuid()/setgid(), but an Interix specific function setuser(). See [2] why it is needed. Unfortunately, setuser() needs the clear-text password of the user to be fully functional (If you use password-less setuser(), then the user doesn't have network

I have just tarred up a snapshot and uploaded it to: http://www.mindrot.org/misc/openssh/openssh-SNAP-20000823.tar.gz The snapshot incorporates the last month's fixes and enhancements from the openssh-unix-dev mailing list and from the OpenBSD developers. In particular: - ssh-agent and ssh-add now handle DSA keys. NB. this does not interop with ssh.com's ssh-agent. (Markus Friedl)

Hi- Under privsep, I experimented with moving the session_setup_sia() out of do_child() and into do_setusercontext(), which is where the uids/gids are set to the final execution user. The call is made with a NULL tty, and this is functional provided that any later pty allocation uses grantpty() to set the device permissions. Logging in with this method shows that a utmp entry does get made for

Hello, I'm trying to implement setting of user limits (ulimit) in sshd. I'm not using PAM so I need it in the sshd itself. The task is very simple - just to put one line calling setup_limits(pw); and link with -lshadow. But the problem is, where to put this line. I did it in session.c, in do_child(), like this: #ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL

On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 12:12:21PM +0300, Roman Kagan wrote: > On Sat, May 21, 2016 at 01:14:40PM +0100, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: > > + path = safe_asprintf (g, "/proc/%d/status", getpid ()); > > Why not "/proc/self/status"? Hmm indeed why not :-( I will fix it ... Rich. -- Richard Jones, Virtualization Group, Red Hat http://people.redhat.com/~rjones Read

Since Linux 4.7, the process umask is available in /proc/<pid>/status. See: https://github.com/torvalds/linux/commit/3e42979e65dace1f9268dd5440e5ab096b8dee59 Use this value if available, else fall back to the existing codepath for Linux <= 4.6 and other Unix. --- src/umask.c | 86 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 78 insertions(+), 8

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=918 Summary: ssh_gssapi_storecreds called to late to be usable by PAM in sesion.c Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: PAM support AssignedTo: