similar to: remotely exploitable vulnerability in lukemftpd / tnftpd

Hi list, (Please Cc: me in your replies because I'm not subscribed to this list.) While trying to build lukemftpd staticaly on FreeBSD, I got a link-time error. Libssh.a indeed provides the "xmalloc" symbol (I suppose there are more). I wonder if this is whether intentional or not. It is a very common function name, and I think it would be worth renaming it to something like

Why wasn't there a FreeBSD security alert for Kerberos 5? Does FreeBSD use the MIT implementation? I got an email from CERT about this. See the attached message below. -- Daniel Rudy >From - Sat Sep 04 03:22:15 2004 X-UIDL: a8f31551eb03ca144862bddc8ccce266 X-Mozilla-Status: 0001 X-Mozilla-Status2: 00000000 X-Apparently-To: dcrudy@pacbell.net via 206.190.37.79; Fri, 03 Sep 2004

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:08.realpath Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Single byte buffer overflow in realpath(3) Category: core Module: libc Announced:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:08.realpath Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Single byte buffer overflow in realpath(3) Category: core Module: libc Announced:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:08.realpath Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Single byte buffer overflow in realpath(3) Category: core Module: libc Announced:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-03:08.realpath Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Single byte buffer overflow in realpath(3) Category: core Module: libc Announced:

Hello there. I tried make update using the following stable-supfile: *default base=/usr *default prefix=/usr *default release=cvs tag=RELENG_4 *default delete use-rel-suffix and my two nearest Russian CVS mirrors showed no changes in realpath. Heck, I downloaded the patch and said in /usr/src: # patch < realpath.patch so it was rejected. Then I looked into realpath.c's revision and

You've probably already seen the latest sendmail vulnerability. http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-September/010287.html I believe you can apply the following patch to any of the security branches: http://cvsweb.freebsd.org/src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.17&r2=1.1.1.18 Download the patch and: # cd /usr/src # patch -p1 < /path/to/patch #

You've probably already seen the latest sendmail vulnerability. http://lists.netsys.com/pipermail/full-disclosure/2003-September/010287.html I believe you can apply the following patch to any of the security branches: http://cvsweb.freebsd.org/src/contrib/sendmail/src/parseaddr.c.diff?r1=1.1.1.17&r2=1.1.1.18 Download the patch and: # cd /usr/src # patch -p1 < /path/to/patch #

Forwarded message: > From full-disclosure-admin@lists.netsys.com Wed Apr 21 11:49:12 2004 > To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com > From: Darren Bounds <dbounds@intrusense.com> > Subject: [Full-Disclosure] IETF Draft - Fix for TCP vulnerability > Date: Tue, 20 Apr 2004 18:19:58 -0400 > > -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- > Hash: SHA1 > >

Hi, i'm trying to boot an 135mb acronis iso image with syslinux but have no luck, client gets stuck[1] a few seconds after selecting the image - i used linux memdisk initrd acronis/acronis_home_2010_multi.iso append iso tftpd-log shows: Mar 25 14:45:15 smbsrv in.tftpd[18837]: RRQ from 192.168.0.102 filename pxelinux.cfg/default Mar 25 14:45:15 smbsrv in.tftpd[18838]: RRQ from 192.168.0.102

Hello Everyone, ISC has released new versions of BIND 8 which address a remotely exploitable denial-of-service vulnerability that may allow an attacker to perform `negative cache poisoning'--- convincing a name server that certain RRs do not exist (even though they may). I do not know of any workaround at this time. I have committed fixes to the RELENG_5_1 and RELENG_4_9 security branches.

Hello Everyone, The branches supported by the FreeBSD Security Officer have been updated to reflect recent releases and EoL (end-of-life) events. The new list is below (and should appear at <URL: http://www.freebsd.org/security/ > soon). In particular, FreeBSD 4.6 and FreeBSD 5.0 have `expired'. If you wish to be certain to get critical bug fixes, it is recommended that you upgrade

Hello Everyone, The branches supported by the FreeBSD Security Officer have been updated to reflect recent EoL (end-of-life) events. The new list is below (and should appear at <URL: http://www.freebsd.org/security/ > soon). FreeBSD 4.7 has `expired', but I have extended the EoL date for FreeBSD 5.1. If you are running FreeBSD 4.7 or older and you wish to be certain to get critical

Hi Folks, I have extended the lifetime of the RELENG_4_8 security branch, and of security branches in general: ----- Forwarded message from Jacques Vidrine <nectar@FreeBSD.org> ----- Date: Sat, 3 Apr 2004 07:23:54 -0800 (PST) From: Jacques Vidrine <nectar@FreeBSD.org> To: doc-committers@FreeBSD.org, cvs-doc@FreeBSD.org, cvs-all@FreeBSD.org Subject: cvs commit:

Hello, I have scheduled a birds-of-a-feather (BoF) meeting at BSDcon to discuss the FreeBSD Security Officer role. Details such as time, location, and topics are posted on the BSDcon unofficial Wiki <URL: http://bsdcon.kwiki.org/index.cgi?FreeBSDSecurityOfficerBoF >. Please attend if you are interested in what the SO team does currently and in participating in and improving its

Hello Everyone, You may have seen the recent announcement regarding new OpenSSL vulnerabilities. <URL: http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20030930.txt > Just thought I'd drop a line to head off the usual questions. :-) Don't panic. The vulnerability is denial-of-service. OpenSSL 0.9.7c will be imported into -CURRENT and -STABLE over the next couple of days, and included

You may or may not have already seen: <URL: http://www.sendmail.org/dnsmap1.html> I thought I'd drop an explanatory note here until I publish an advisory. This problem has been known for some time (it was first reported in FreeBSD PR#54367). The default configuration of sendmail is unaffected, and it is unknown whether the issue is truly exploitable by any means. Nonetheless, I

Hello, Expect to see commits to all branches today, and a FreeBSD advisory following sometime today or tomorrow. <URL: http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2003-12.html > <URL: http://www.sendmail.org/8.12.9.html > Cheers, -- Jacques A. Vidrine <nectar@celabo.org> http://www.celabo.org/ NTT/Verio SME . FreeBSD UNIX . Heimdal Kerberos

Hello Folks, Just a status on upcoming advisories. FreeBSD-SA-03:15.openssh This is in final review and should be released today. Fixes for this issue entered the tree on September 24. I apologize for the delay in getting this one out. FreeBSD-SA-03:16.filedesc A reference counting bug was discovered that could lead to kernel memory disclosure or a system panic.