similar to: Sandboxing

Hello. Has anyone here ever successfully set up a jail for X apps, connecting to an external X server? I'm trying an experimental sandbox setup here. I have a jail running on an aliased IP on my local machine and X programs connect out of the jail to my local X server via an SSH tunneled TCP connection. All other packets to and from the jail are denied by the packet filter. The trouble I am

Hello, I'm absolutely 101% new to LLVM so please bare with me :). I'm trying to explore what LLVM can and cannot be used for. One thing I was wondering, whether it would be possible to execute an LLVM code in a completely sandboxed environment? By sandboxed I mean that the executed code should not have direct access to any system resources (i.e. hard drive, networking, devices), only

Hello, I have a setup similar to Rweb ( http://www.math.montana.edu/Rweb/ ): I get R scripts from users and need to execute them in in a safe manner (they are executed automatically, without human inspection). I would like to limit the user's script to reading from STDIN and writing to STDOUT/ERR. Specifically, preventing any kind of interaction with the underlying operating system (files,

Hi, The systrace and rlimit sandboxes have been committed and will be in snapshots dated 20110623 and later. This diff adds support for pre-auth privsep sandboxing using the OS X sandbox_init(3) service. It's a bit disappointing that the OS X developers chose such as namespace-polluting header and function names "sandbox.h", "sandbox_init()", etc. It already forced me to

Hello, I'm wondering about closing some information leaks in FreeBSD jails from the "outside world". Not that critical (depends on the application), but a simple user, with restricted devfs in the jail (devfsrules_jail for example from /etc/defaults/devfs.rules) can figure out the following: - network interfaces related data, via ifconfig, which contains everything, but the

Hi, OpenSSH 5.9 is almost ready for release, so we would appreciate testing on as many platforms and systems as possible. This release contains a couple of new features and changes and bug fixes. Testing of the new sandboxed privilege separation mode (see below) would be particularly appreciated. Snapshot releases for portable OpenSSH are available from http://www.mindrot.org/openssh_snap/ The

Recently I''ve found out some mentions to the "--sandbox" parameter to the "rails console" command. And I found the idea interesting, but since I''m using Sequel instead of ActiveRecord I guessed this wouldn''t work for me. But after talking about this subject in the Sequel mailing list, Jeremy Evans has brought to my attention that there are some

Hello again, (FYI, I took the liberty to change the topic since I started the former thread "How is Win/Dos syscalls implemented in Wine?" which I feel has gone a little bit off-topic) I had some more thoughts on the issue... I believe most wine users trust wine not to touch anything outside of its configured drive space. Malicious Linux/Unix syscalls could be embedded in windows

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2142 Bug ID: 2142 Summary: openssh sandboxing using libseccomp Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Hardware: All OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

Hi, Wine is a great tool, especially for newbies like me that switched from windows to linux. But there something, I really don't understand. When I configure Wine I can link pathes to "windows drives". I deleted "Z:", I deleted the links to desktop and so on. But every native windows application is able to see the hole linux path structure (which is naturally windows

I'm considering using virt-sandbox with lxc to sandbox and execute untrusted code like python scripts and compiled C code. Is it possible to limit CPU and Memory like is possible with lxc-execute and a config file? What are the defaults security settings? Is it completely isolated by default? What's the difference between lxc-execute and libvirt-sandbox? How can I use it in ubuntu?

Hi, i've set the outside ip for the jail..It works.. When i try to ssh to jail'ed system from the main system (in which is created jail) the connection is successful, but when i try to connect to jailed system from anywhere else i get this message: ssh: connect to host IP_NUMBER port 22: Operation timed out What can be wrong here? How to solve this problem?

Someone recently suggested building a system for automatically testing student's R programs. They would upload them to our Virtual Learning Environment, which would then run the code on some inputs and see if it got the right output. If it does, the student scores points for that course. My first thought was "you want to run unchecked, student-submitted code on a server that has access

I read this (http://www.petur.eu/blog/?p=459) blog post today. It's about that a remote user with root privilegs to a FreeBSD jail & user privileges to the jails host machine can obtain root privileges on the host machine. Can someone confirm if this bugg/exploit works?

Here''s the fix for Facebook apps that specify a controller in their callback URLs. First, set this variable in your environment scripts: ENV[''FACEBOOKER_CALLBACK_PATH''] = ''/controller'' # where controller is the name of your Facebook controller And then patch vendor/plugins/facebooker/lib/facebooker/rails/facebook_url_rewriting.rb as shown in the

Z-Man, DHH recently said: "And [_why''s] latest work on sandbox looks stellar. Making it drop-dead easy to run multiple Rails applications in the same Mongrel process without conflicts. Thumbs up to both him and Matz for getting Sandbox on track for inclusion with the next Ruby release." Does that mean what I think it means - that one or more Mongrel processes may one day be

This message was sent to bugtraq today: While playing around with FreeBSD 5.4 and jailing I discovered that it was possible to put an ethernet interface into promiscious mode from within the jailed environment, allowing a packetsniffer to gather data not meant for the jailed box. This also affects FreeBSD 5.3 (tested) but not FreeBSD 4.x This can be reproduced on boxes where BPF support is

I was wondering if the following attack would be feasible once I'm able to break into rlimit sandbox. Because sandboxed process that handles unauthenticated session is running as the 'sshd' user I was wondering if this could be used to jump between processes using ptrace(2). For example if I find a bug in the code executed before authentication I could use ptrace(2) to attach to

I'm setting up a server where I plan to use Jails to improve security I also have installed and am configuring ipfilter. Here are my questions: Because I'm using Jails, I will have to have multiple ip aliases on the network interface. I will use ipfilter to specify what can go to each of the addresses. (e.g., allow only incoming to port 80 on the jail running apache). Another

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2011 Bug #: 2011 Summary: sandbox selection needs some kind of fallback mechanism Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.0p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2