similar to: security issues of aio

Hi everyone, every comment about this: http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/16264 Didn't find any hint or patch on http://www.xfree86.org/security/. Best regards Konrad Heuer (kheuer2@gwdg.de) ____ ___ _______ GWDG / __/______ ___ / _ )/ __/ _ \ Am Fassberg / _// __/ -_) -_) _ |\ \/ // / 37077 Goettingen /_/ /_/

Well i haven't seen anyone talk about this, so i was just wondering if FreeBSD is affected by this. http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/6508

We're being bitten an Outlook bug [1,2] that is triggered by a NUL character in a message being sent through POP3. I see that dovecot's imap implementation converts 0x00 to 0x80, but this conversion is not done for POP3. Would it be possible to add an option to do this mapping for POP3 as well? Matt [1] http://xforce.iss.net/xforce/xfdb/15859 [2]

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-05:05.cvs Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in CVS Category: contrib Module: cvs Announced:

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SA-05:05.cvs Security Advisory The FreeBSD Project Topic: Multiple vulnerabilities in CVS Category: contrib Module: cvs Announced:

FYI, for those who may not have heard about this one. I got this from another mailing list as is evident by the headers. >Delivered-To: alert-out-link@iss.net >Delivered-To: alert-out@iss.net >Date: Wed, 9 Jun 1999 16:16:41 -0400 (EDT) >From: X-Force <xforce@iss.net> >To: alert@iss.net >cc: X-Force <xforce@iss.net> >Subject: ISSalert: ISS Security Advisory: KDE

Hi, I am performing a two-way ANOVA (2 factors with 4 and 5 levels, respectively). If I'm interpreting the output of summary correctly, then the interaction between both factors is significant: ,---- | ## Two-way ANOVA with possible interaction: | > model1 <- aov(log(y) ~ xForce*xVel, data=mydataset) | | > summary(model1) | Df Sum Sq Mean Sq F value Pr(>F) |

NT uses proprietary encryption mechanisms to protect passwords and to authenticate users. There is no one source of information on these schemes outside of Microsoft. If anyone has any information on any of the following or any other topics that they would like to see published as a White Paper, please contact lkcl@iss.net. The paper will include as comprehensive a list of these mechanisms as

occasionally i feel like i and other people would like to know how samba is being used. if you feel so inclined, could people kindly let us know some of the things below (pick one or more or all), such as: - a brief description of your organisation. - what you use samba for (e.g as file servers; login servers; backup purposes or remote admin with smbclient or rpcclient). - what version(s) of

Hello, As part of the Rust bindings for Libnbd, I try to integrate the asynchronous (aio_*) functions with Tokio <https://docs.rs/tokio/latest/tokio/>, the most used asynchronous runtime in Rust. However, in its eventloop, Tokio uses epoll(7) instead of poll(2) (which is used internally in Libnbd). The difference is that poll(2) uses level-triggered notifications as aposed to epoll(7)

When structured replies are negotiated, the server may advertise support for the DF flag (the server promises to return at most one data/hole chunk, or to fail with NBD_EOVERFLOW if the chunk would be too large). As both nbdkit and qemu-nbd support this flag (the former only trivially, but the latter by not compressing holes over the wire), it is worth exposing to clients, if only for testing

On Wed, Jul 5, 2023 at 3:38?PM Tage Johansson <tage.j.lists at posteo.net> wrote: > As part of the Rust bindings for Libnbd, I try to integrate the > asynchronous (aio_*) functions with Tokio > <https://docs.rs/tokio/latest/tokio/>, the most used asynchronous runtime > in Rust. However, in its eventloop, Tokio uses epoll(7) instead of poll(2) > (which is used internally

On Thu, Jul 11, 2019 at 09:35:02AM -0500, Eric Blake wrote: >On 7/11/19 9:23 AM, Martin Kletzander wrote: >> The callback (e.g. for `nbd_block_status`) now has a support for returning >> errors thanks to the last parameter (`int *error`), so it was switched to >> returning void. > >No, the callback still returns int. Where are you seeing it return >void, because

On 5/28/19 4:26 AM, Richard W.M. Jones wrote: > On Mon, May 27, 2019 at 09:01:01PM -0500, Eric Blake wrote: >> diff --git a/lib/rw.c b/lib/rw.c >> index feaf468..343c340 100644 >> --- a/lib/rw.c >> +++ b/lib/rw.c >> @@ -234,11 +234,17 @@ int64_t >> nbd_unlocked_aio_pread (struct nbd_handle *h, void *buf, >> size_t count,

I figured that someone reading this list might want to take a look at the proceeding, considering that the version of Snort in FreeBSD ports -is- affected. -----Forwarded Message----- > From: CERT Advisory <cert-advisory@cert.org> > To: cert-advisory@cert.org > Subject: CERT Advisory CA-2003-13 Multiple Vulnerabilities in Snort Preprocessors > Date: 17 Apr 2003 11:30:47 -0400

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- ============================================================================= FreeBSD-SN-02:05 Security Notice The FreeBSD Project Topic: security issues in ports Announced: 2002-08-28 I. Introduction Several ports in the FreeBSD Ports

v1 was here: https://www.redhat.com/archives/libguestfs/2019-August/msg00168.html I pushed uncontroversial patches 1-4 v2: - The implementation of OClosure (new patch 1) in Python is fixed. - Patch 2 (old patch 5) is unchanged. - I added a new API for removing debug callbacks. I think this approach has some advantages over using OClosure. - I didn't yet do any work on changing the

Recent proftpd security vulnerability release FYI. Ports has latest patched proftpd distribution. -- Jez http://www.munk.nu/ -------------- next part -------------- An embedded message was scrubbed... From: Dave Ahmad <da@securityfocus.com> Subject: ISS Security Brief: ProFTPD ASCII File Remote Compromise Vulnerability (fwd) Date: Tue, 23 Sep 2003 10:25:54 -0600 (MDT) Size: 4588 Url:

Hi, I spotted today following line at my FreeBSD 4.6.2-RELEASE IPFIREWALL log: Jul 1 13:34:35 fbsd /kernel: ipfw: 1400 Accept TCP xxxxxx:22 yyyyy:22 in via ed1 where xxxxxx is the attacker's IP and yyyyy is my box. But in sshd log, there are no traces left behind by this connection. Normally, there is "Did not receive identification string from xxx" etc, when somebody tries to

I'm looking into trying out AIO on one of our file servers in the office but I can't find any info on what the values for "aio read size" and "aio write size" correspond to. Is it a buffer size of some sort or a tuning type parameter were it allows the socket to read/write x blocks? Thanks, David Miller