similar to: [Bug 2044] New: error message is printed for SSHv1 when ssh is forced to allocate a pseudo-tty even when it does not have a one

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1835 Summary: sftp should fallback to sshv1 if server doesn't support sshv2 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.6p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sftp AssignedTo:

Hi all! I was scanning my servers with nmap, ( i have installed ssh), and the result gave me this: 22/tcp open ssh sshv1: Server Supports SSHv1 ssh-keyhost: 1024 ea:7e:77:b7:a1:78:18:70:6c:46:ee:a0:dd:08:0e:74 (RSA1) 1024 ba:d0:8a:44:16:fc:7c:7a:38:24:2e:72:06:fe:99:56 (DSA) 1024 ff:43:15:78:98:3c:75:f9:12:36:58:92:46:6c:1c:99 (RSA) could this be a threat for intruders? i know that sshv1

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2519 Bug ID: 2519 Summary: Obsolete SSHv1 config options Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 7.1p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: ssh Assignee: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

Hi, On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 02:36:50PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote: > > Same thing with needing sshv1 to access old network gear where even sshv1 > > was an achievement. "Throw away gear that does its job perfectly well, > > but has no sshv2 for *management*" or "keep around an ssh v1 capable > > client"? > > If you depend on hardware like this,

Hi, On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 12:53:05PM +0100, Hubert Kario wrote: > On Thursday 26 March 2015 11:19:28 Michael Felt wrote: > > Experience: I have some hardware, on an internal network - that only > > supports 40-bit ssl. I am forced to continue to use FF v17 because that was > > the last browser to provide SSL40-bit support. My security is weakened > > because I cannot

ssh-add on OpenBSD current (with malloc -S enabled) crashes ("chunk is already free") when loading my password-protected SSHv1 key (used only for testing). "ssh-add ~/.ssh/identity" also fails to format the prompt properly ("Enter passphrase for :"). The issue is as follows: Starting at ssh-add.c:158 in add_file(ac, filename = "~/.ssh/identity"), we call

Anyone ever come across a linux server host key changing with out a reboot, sshd restart, change in negotiating (SSHv1, SSHv2), and different DNS name or IP address? I have a server on RHEL4.4 that changed its host key. Red Hat Enterprise Linux ES release 4 (Nahant Update 4) openssh-server-3.9p1-8.RHEL4.15 2.6.9-42.ELsmp uptime 944 days Started getting the eavesdropping message from a login

Hi, At this stage, we're most of the way towards fully deprecating SSH protocol 1 - this outlines our plans to complete this task. We've had this old protocol in various stages of deprecation for almost 10 years and it has been compile-time disabled for about a year. Downstream vendors, to their credit, have included this change in recent OS releases by shipping OpenSSH packages that

On Tue, 3 May 2016, Colin Watson wrote: > Debian takes the latter approach. Specifically, we have an > "openssh-client-ssh1" binary package that includes only scp1, ssh1, and > ssh-keygen1 binaries; we do not ship any server-side SSHv1 support. I > modelled this on Fedora's approach, which is basically the same aside > from a slightly different package name. >

Hi, OpenSSH plans to remove support for DSA keys in the near future. This message describes our rationale, process and proposed timeline. Rationale --------- DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is <=80 bits symmetric equivalent[1][2]. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by

Hi, OpenSSH plans to remove support for DSA keys in the near future. This message describes our rationale, process and proposed timeline. Rationale --------- DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is <=80 bits symmetric equivalent[1][2]. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=440 ------- Additional Comments From dtucker at zip.com.au 2004-02-10 18:07 ------- Took a quick look at this. I can confirm that when running in inetd ("-i -o Protocol=1,2") the SSHv1 ephemeral keys are still generated for v2 connects, and that with the patch it's not. The patch, however, seems to break SSHv1 connections in inetd

Hi, I just deleted SSHv1 support in OpenBSD and portable OpenSSH. There's probably a little dead code still to be expunged, but all user-visible functionality and the bulk of the supporting infrastructure is gone. Sic transit gloria mundi. -d

Hi Guys I need to implement ssh server daemon on OLD installations of real time OS, which uses flash memory and every program gets loaded in flash mem, once the device is booted. I have very limited space in flash memory of this device. SO what we are trying to do is reducing the size of sshd by taking out least common used things. Can someone give me input what features, version and crypto

Alright, so I pulled the data from scans.io, There's actually 82,650 devices on the open Internet claiming support for <=SSH-1.5, generally routers. Top 20 on that is: $ head -n 20 ssh1_versions.txt 39148 SSH-1.5-Cisco-1.25 14477 SSH-1.5-HUAWEI-VRP3.1 10571 SSH-1.5-1.0.0 4634 SSH-1.5-HUAWEI-VRP-3.10 3284 SSH-1.5-1.2.33 2965 SSH-1.5-VRP-3.3 1836 SSH-1.5-VRP-3.4 1125

Protocols and ciphers are sunsetted all the time, this is a regular thing, but there are announcements before breaking changes are inserted. You assume people are slow to update anyway; some are, some aren't, what you're doing is wildly rewarding the slow updaters and punishing the fast ones. That has negative effects elsewhere. What would it hurt to announce the release in 3-6 months

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=667 dtucker at zip.com.au changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Status|NEW |RESOLVED Resolution| |INVALID ------- Additional Comments From dtucker at zip.com.au 2003-12-22

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 11:55:18 -0700, Dan Kaminsky wrote: > You're right. My argument the is the next build of OpenSSH should be > OpenSSH 7, and the one after that 8, then 9, then 10. No minor releases? > Sure, go ahead. Deprecate the point, > > Do you manage any machines running SSHv1? > If by "running" you mean accepting SSH1, of course not. From a

There's a world of difference between changing defaults and killing functionality. SSH in general and OpenSSH in particular is part of what we'll eventually get around to identifying as (I know everyone hates this word) critical infrastructure. That means it doesn't break, particularly not intentionally, and even more particularly not without time, warning, and probably public input.

mdb-bsd is a FreeBSD 4.2-STABLE box morpheus is a Red Hat Linux 6.2 box with openssl 0.9.6 on it. Attempts to use SSHv2 fail. Using SSHv1 succeeds. sshd from OpenSSH2.5.1p1 is getting a fatal: xfree: NULL pointer given as argument Full client and server interaction given below. -- Mark Script started on Mon Feb 19 10:47:01 2001 1:mdb at mdb-bsd$ ssh -v -v -v -2 -x morpheus date SSH Version