similar to: Max Packet Size in sshd server and negotiation with client

The full SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA packet looks like this: uint32 packet length byte SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA uint32 recipient channel uint32 nr data bytes byte[] data OpenSSH_6.1p1 considers that the 'maximum packet size' from SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN or SSH_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION impacts only the 'byte[] data' field and not the entire message (headers included).

Howdy- TL;DR An SSH daemon for a memory-constrained embedded platform didn't work with a recent OpenSSH client because it couldn't handle the payload size during key exchange. In general, what should SSH implementors in such limited environments do to ensure forwards compatibility with future OpenSSH releases? I am unable to SSH to any of my HP servers' iLO2 interfaces using

Hi, I discovered when using my fuse fs for connecting to a remote host using sftp that the new server version 7.4 sends a greeter which is not according the format desribed in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4253#section-4 There is written that the greeter "MUST be terminated by a single Carriage Return (CR) and a single Line Feed (LF) character (ASCII 13 and 10, respectively)." Now

Hi, I've a problem configuring my Asterisk. What I try to reach is to interconnect a Tandberg Visioconference (SIP) world with my Asterisk (SIP) with 1 constraint I can't change : "every RTP flow needs to pass THROUGH Asterisk, and are NOT nated" What I observe : - a call made from a SIP Phone registred in Asterisk to Tandberg works (voice and video bidirectionnal) - a call

Hi, according to RFC 4253 https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4253#section-7.1 for the selection of algorithms (ciphers, KEX, MAC etc.), the leftmost matching client algorithm is picked. While this is fine in most cases, there are cases where it is not desirable, for example: 1) for compatibility with a single old client you enable an old cipher, say aes128-cbc, server side. A modern client

Hi, OpenSSH plans to remove support for DSA keys in the near future. This message describes our rationale, process and proposed timeline. Rationale --------- DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is <=80 bits symmetric equivalent[1][2]. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by

Hi, OpenSSH plans to remove support for DSA keys in the near future. This message describes our rationale, process and proposed timeline. Rationale --------- DSA, as specified in the SSHv2 protocol, is inherently weak - being limited to a 160 bit private key and use of the SHA1 digest. Its estimated security level is <=80 bits symmetric equivalent[1][2]. OpenSSH has disabled DSA keys by

hi OpenSSH folks-- I have several OpenSSH sshd servers that i've maintained for a long time. Some of them have keys that are considered short by today's standards (e.g. 1024-bit RSA keys). On these servers, I would like to be able to do a key rotation such that multiple keys are valid during a time window so that users can learn the new key before i remove the old one. I don't

Hi, This is just a quick note to state that the recently reported SSL/TLS MITM attack[1] *does not* affect SSH. Like SSL/TLS, SSH supports key and parameter renegotiation, but it is not vulnerable because a session identifier is carried over from the first key exchange into all subsequent key exchanges. Technical details: In SSL, key exchanges and subsequent renegotiations are completely

This message is a few years old so I cannot reply to the original, but it is still of current research interest. > So one of my coworkers is doing a little research on SSH usage in the > wild using netflow data. One of the things he's trying to do is > determine a way to differentiate between data transfers and interactive > sessions. We thought of a couple of ways but we wanted

When connecting to a host for which there's no known hostkey, check if the relevant key has been accepted for other hostnames. This is useful when connecting to a host with a dymamic IP address or multiple names. --- auth.c | 4 ++-- hostfile.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- hostfile.h | 8 ++++++-- sshconnect.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------

Am I correct in assuming that the user and host public/private keys used in openSSH are only used for authentication (is the remote server known to be X, is this Harry trying to login), and have no role in the encryption? I was under the assumption that each connection used a newly generated key (using DH for key exchange) so each session was unique. (I believe this because the transport layer

Hi all, I have recently only discovered that openssh prints lines to stderr separated by CLRF pairs, and am trying to understand where this behavior comes from. This behavior can be seen here: --snip-- $ ssh u at u 2>&1 | sed -n l ssh: Could not resolve hostname u: Name or service not known\r$ --snip-- I have seen section 11.3 from rfc4253, but am unsure whether that is the origin of

[I do think this discussion belongs to R-devel rather than anywhere else .. MM] >>>>> "Kurt" == Kurt Hornik <Kurt.Hornik@ci.tuwien.ac.at> writes: >>>>> Peter Dalgaard BSA writes: >> Kurt Hornik <Kurt.Hornik@ci.tuwien.ac.at> writes: KH>>> While trying to write documentation for data.class(), I came

>>>>> "Kurt" == Kurt Hornik <Kurt.Hornik@ci.tuwien.ac.at> writes: >>>>> Paul Gilbert writes: >> Friedrich >> Regarding the location of data for libraries it might be easier if >> everything for one library is included in one subdirectory. At least >> it would certainly be easier to clean-up, which I like to do

Hi Oka, It worked! All works fine in the tcsh. Thanks! Kurt ----- Original Message ----- From: Stam, Kurt To: 'kurt@oneheartbreak.com' Sent: Friday, August 25, 2000 4:33 PM Subject: FW: smbsh - Samba 2.0.7 - Solaris 2.6 -----Original Message----- From: Oka Setiawan [mailto:oka@indigopool.com] Sent: Friday, August 25, 2000 4:37 PM To: Stam Kurt Subject: RE: smbsh - Samba 2.0.7 -

Ok Kurt, thank you !! El mar, 06-11-2012 a las 10:38 -0700, Kurt escribi?: > Sorry for the slow response. Today, I am swamped, hope to be able > to help you tomorrow > > Kurt > LSDcode.com > 801.599.1227 > > > On 11/5/2012 8:45 PM, Jos? Luis Artuch wrote: > > > > > Kurt, I have retested the Icecast server on port 8000 and it works > >

--Hipsgkxbeg Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Description: message body text Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit This one was sent privately to me. --Hipsgkxbeg Content-Type: message/rfc822 Content-Description: forwarded message Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Received: from tuvok.kom.tuwien.ac.at (tuvok.kom.tuwien.ac.at [192.35.241.66]) by fangorn.ci.tuwien.ac.at (8.9.3/8.8.5)

I am using the 0.50 alpha version of R packaged (in 3 parts) by Kurt for Debian Linux. Package: r-base Status: install ok installed Priority: optional Section: local Maintainer: Kurt Hornik <Kurt.Hornik at ci.tuwien.ac.at> Version: 0.50b7-1 Depends: libc5, xlib6, libreadline2 Description: R, a language not entirely unlike the language S. Package: r-contrib Status: install ok

On Ubuntu 12.04 / OpenSSH_5.9p1 Debian-5ubuntu1 trying to initiate a connection with hmac-sha2-512 and diffie-hellman-group1-sha1 results in OpenSSH killing the connection after the SSH_MSG_KEXINIT packet is sent. The OpenSSH error logs state the following: debug2: mac_setup: found hmac-sha2-512 [preauth] debug1: kex: server->client arcfour256 hmac-sha2-512 none [preauth] dh_gen_key: group too