similar to: PATCH: Fix memory leak in sshd

Hi, This diff (for portable) makes the chrooted preauth privsep process log via the monitor using a shared socketpair. It removes the need for /dev/log inside /var/empty and makes mandatory sandboxing of the privsep child easier down the road (no more socket() syscall required). Please test. -d Index: log.c =================================================================== RCS file:

There are a couple of niggles with the sandboxing of the unprivileged child in the privsep code: the empty directory causes namespace pollution, and it requires care to ensure that it is set up properly and remains set up properly. The patch below (against the portable OpenSSH, although the patch against the OpenBSD version is very similar) replaces the fixed empty directory with one that is

Hello, we've run a coverity scan on the openssh sources and it found several issues. Although the scan was run on patched rhel sources, some results are applicable to vanilla sources too. * servconf.c:1458:dead_error_line ? Execution cannot reach this statement "*intptr = *intptr + 1;" --- a/servconf.c +++ b/servconf.c @@ -1451,12 +1451,8 @@

I have renamed all of the patch files to .txt, which should be acceptable for the mailer daemon at mindrot, per Angel's suggestion. I am attaching the patch files to the email, with the extra space removed and a minor correction made. Bill Parker (wp02855 at gmail dot com) -------------- next part -------------- --- port-linux.c.orig 2012-12-19 17:40:53.231529475 -0800 +++ port-linux.c

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2140 Bug ID: 2140 Summary: Capsicum support for FreeBSD 10 (-current) Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Hardware: All OS: FreeBSD Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2167 Bug ID: 2167 Summary: Connection remains when fork() fails. Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.3p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

Hello All. Attached is an update to my previous patch to make do_pam_chauthtok and privsep play nicely together. First, a question: does anybody care about these or the password expiration patches? Anyway, the "PRIVSEP(do_pam_hauthtok())" has been moved to just after the pty has been allocated but before it's made the controlling tty. This allows the child running chauthtok to

Hi, About a year and a half ago I brought up the topic of encrypted hostkeys and posted a patch (http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=132774431906364&w=2), and while the general reaction seemed receptive to the idea, a few problems were pointed out with the implementation (UI issues, ssh-keysign breakage). I've finally had some spare time in which to get back to this, and I've

Hello All, In reviewing source code for OpenSSH-6.1p1, I found instances of deprecated library calls still within various source code files. Examples of deprecated calls are: bzero() (replaced with memset() which is ANSI compliant), index() (replaced with strchr() which is also ANSI compliant). In file 'auth2-jpake.c', I've replaced all the bzero() calls with the equivalent

Hi! I sent a mail a while ago wondering if it was possible to change the loglevel for the "User child is on pid"-message from debug2 to verbose. It would make it easier to trace a connection in the logs when privilege separation is used and sshd uses the user child pid to report that the connection is closing . Is it possible to change this or would it violate the privacy of the users?

Hi! It would be easier to trace a connection in the logs if sshd reported the change of pid with LogLevel set to verbose instead of debug2. Is it possible to have it changed? Regards Claes Leufv?n Here is a patch for it: --- sshd.c_orig 2005-11-21 10:51:08.000000000 +0100 +++ sshd.c 2005-11-21 10:51:11.000000000 +0100 @@ -652,7 +652,7 @@ if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1) fatal("fork of

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2225 Bug ID: 2225 Summary: sshd core dumps when used in high scaled environments. Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.2p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

I've been trying to cut down the size of openssh so I can run it on my Nokia 770. One thing which helps a fair amount (and will help even more when I get '-ffunction-sections -fdata-sections --gc-sections' working) is to have the option of compiling out privilege separation... Is it worth me tidying this up and trying to make it apply properly to the OpenBSD version? Does the openbsd

Hi, I am happy to (re)send a set of patches for compiling OpenSSH 4.7p1 with FIPS 140-2 OpenSSL. These are based on previously reported patches by Steve Marquess <marquess at ieee.org> and Ben Laurie <ben at algroup.co.uk>, for ver. OpenSSH 3.8. Note that these patches are NOT OFFICIAL, and MAY be used freely by anyone. Issues [partially] handled: SSL FIPS Self test. RC4,

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=585 ------- Additional Comments From dtucker at zip.com.au 2003-07-07 00:32 ------- dmalloc (http://dmalloc.com/) claims to work on IRIX. It's likely to increase the CPU and memory load, though. I've built with dmalloc on Linux thusly: LDFLAGS=-ldmalloc ./configure && make eval `dmalloc -l /path/to/log high` ./sshd [options]

Hello Steve, Hello OpenSSH-portable developers, I am building OpenSSH for our (EBCDIC-based) BS2000 mainframe operating system, and I noticed you do the same for OS/390. Because my initial ssh port was based on IBM's OSS port (ssh-1.2.2 or some such), I thought it was fair enough to help with a little co-operation; we might come up with a unified EBCDIC patch which could be contributed to

Hi, sifting through my system's logs, I noticed many break-in attempts by rogue ssh clients trying long lists of common passwords. For some time now I pondered different approaches to counter these, but could not come up with a solution that really satisfied me. I finally reached the conclusion that any countermeasures required support in sshd itself, and created the attached patch. If

Due to difficulties in getting PAM (with krb5) password expiry working consistently on multiple platforms, I'd like to see if I could hack something into auth-krb5.c to do so. Here's a backtrace when stopped in auth_krb5_password: #0 auth_krb5_password (authctxt=0x8e148, password=0x90250 "XXXXXXXX") at auth-krb5.c:270 #1 0x274d8 in auth_password (authctxt=0x8e148,

Hi, This patch (relative to -HEAD) defines an API to allow sandboxing of the pre-auth privsep child and a couple of sandbox implementations. The idea here is to heavily restrict what the network-face pre-auth process can do. This was the original intent behind dropping to a dedicated uid and chrooting to an empty directory, but even this still allows a compromised slave process to make new

Occasionally, we're noticing that sshd is core dumping on our IRIX 6.5.18f machine. The only time we've really noticed it is when users are logging in with putty from offsite (although I'm not really sure it's a client issue). The user manages to log in, sshd apparently core dumps, but the user is not logged out, the privilege separated user is still running their own