similar to: How can I detect WINE from my program

Hello, I frequently run untrusted programs through wine and wonder, how much of underlying linux system do I expose to those programs. I believe, that wine is quite free of bugs, but I am not an expert of Windows API and the level wine implements them. I am particularly interested in these issues: * If I do not connect my filesystem to wine in any way (through winecfg), is there a possibility

Hello! I want to have firewall/monitor in wine. Configuring Linux firewall is an external solution that affects all programs etc. The idea is to create configuration file for black- and/or while- list that would be analysed by wine during connections requests. The brute way is to modify ws2_32 dll source directly, but maybe there is more accurate way. Could you suggest where to start digging?

./wine /root/.wine/drive_c/Program\ Files/Firaxis\ Games/Civilization\ III\ Complete/Civilization3.exe wine: Unhandled page fault on read access to 0x0000000c at address 0x571589 (thread 0009), starting debugger... Unhandled exception: page fault on read access to 0x0000000c in 32-bit code (0x00571589). Register dump: CS:0073 SS:007b DS:007b ES:007b FS:0033 GS:003b EIP:00571589 ESP:0033fbc8

> De : Dan Kegel <dank at kegel.com> > ? : Randall Hopper <viznut at charter.net> > Cc : wine-users at winehq.org > Envoy? le : Jeudi, 17 Avril 2008, 0h14mn 03s > Objet : Re: [Wine] How to remove read access to / and my $HOME > > On Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 3:00 PM, Randall Hopper wrote: > > |Sort of. By deleting the ~/.wine/dosdrives/z: symlink, you'll

Hello again, (FYI, I took the liberty to change the topic since I started the former thread "How is Win/Dos syscalls implemented in Wine?" which I feel has gone a little bit off-topic) I had some more thoughts on the issue... I believe most wine users trust wine not to touch anything outside of its configured drive space. Malicious Linux/Unix syscalls could be embedded in windows

Currently wine is able to run the windows program JoytoKey decently. One of the most important features of JoytoKey (emualtion of the mouse using a joystick), works within the Linux desktop, but not inside applications which take control of the mouse (mainly games). I was wondering if it would be possible for Wine to allow JoyToKey to control such applications using Joytokey's mouse emulation.

http://blog.mellenthin.de/archives/2008/12/30/25c3-hangover/ says, in a writeup about the recent CCC meeting, "Sehr interessant war Squeezing Attack Traces und Stormfucker: Owning the Storm Botnet. Zuerst wurden konkrete Techniken gezeigt, wie man Malware analysieren kann. Die Zentrale Idee ist hier, statt eine Sandbox (Windows in einer VM) zu verwenden, die Requests unter Linux an Wine

This patchset allow syscalls (flock, ipc, getuid, geteuid and ioctl), so openssl engines, e.g. OpenSSL-ibmca and OpenSSL-ibmpkcs11, can work and communicate with the crypto cards during ssh login. 1. The flock and ipc are allowed only for s390 architecture. They are needed for openCryptoki project (PKCS#11 implementation), as the ibmpkcs11 engine makes use of openCryptoki. For more information,

On Tue, 28 Feb 2017, Eduardo Barretto wrote: > On 13-02-2017 13:23, Eduardo Barretto wrote: > > This patch enables specific ioctl calls for ICA crypto card on s390 > > platform. Without this patch, users using the IBMCA engine are not able > > to perform ssh login as the filter blocks the communication with the > > crypto card. > > > > Signed-off-by: Harald

> From the provided documentation I understood that in memory data > structures of a PNaCl program are incompatible to the host program because > ABIs are different (e.g. PNaCl pointers are always 32-bit even when running > on x86_64 platform). > So PNaCl program can't access any data structures of the host program > directly. The only communication way is by using syscalls,

On 18 June 2013 15:27, Dmitri Rubinstein <dmitri.rubinstein at googlemail.com>wrote: > Is it possible to use PNaCl infrastructure (i.e. translation and execution > in a sandbox) without a Chrome ? > > I mean a something like a standalone VM like Java or Mono/C#. > Yes. The NaCl tool 'sel_ldr' will run a program inside a sandbox outside of the web browser. We do a

This patch enables specific ioctl calls for ICA crypto card on s390 platform. Without this patch, users using the IBMCA engine are not able to perform ssh login as the filter blocks the communication with the crypto card. Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude at linux.vnet.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto at linux.vnet.ibm.com> --- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c |

Am 19.06.2013 18:01, schrieb JF Bastien: > > From the provided documentation I understood that in memory data > structures of a PNaCl program are incompatible to the host program > because ABIs are different (e.g. PNaCl pointers are always 32-bit > even when running on x86_64 platform). > So PNaCl program can't access any data structures of the host >

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3702 Bug ID: 3702 Summary: sshd fork crashed when compiled with seccomp Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.7p1 Hardware: ARM64 OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: minor Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3085 Bug ID: 3085 Summary: seccomp issue after upgrading openssl Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 8.1p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: critical Priority: P5 Component: sshd Assignee: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

Hello, I recently posted my experimental thoughts in the playonlinux forums, but I really want to open all possible channels to get feedback for the idea to deliver a complete (for the certain windows-app optimized) wine-structure, windows app and all nessassary wrapper scripts for processing the app in a deb. This would mean that every single application(-group) brings its own fitting

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OpenSSH 5.9 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol version 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches,

OpenSSH 5.9 has just been released. It will be available from the mirrors listed at http://www.openssh.com/ shortly. OpenSSH is a 100% complete SSH protocol version 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0 implementation and includes sftp client and server support. Once again, we would like to thank the OpenSSH community for their continued support of the project, especially those who contributed code or patches,

Hi, I was trying to determine how Wine captures syscalls, and I found this thread: http://www.winehq.org/pipermail/wine-users/2002-October/009077.html The answer was that Wine *doesn't* deal with syscalls, and relies on the application never directly making a syscall, but instead calling into the standard system libraries (Win32). Is this still true today? I'm surprised that Wine can