similar to: How to tell if I've been hacked?

Hi all, I need to install an anti-rootkid in a lot of servers. I know that there're several options: tripwire, aide, chkrootkit... ?What do you prefer? Obviously, I have to define my needs: - easy setup and configuration - actively developed -- Thanks, Jordi Espasa Clofent

Hi, I have a 4.9-STABLE FreeBSD box apparently hacked! Yesterday I ran chkrootkit-0.41 and I don't like some of the outputs. Those are: chfn ... INFECTED chsh ... INFECTED date ... INFECTED ls ... INFECTED ps ... INFECTED But all the rest is NOT PROMISC, NOT INFECTED, NOTHING FOUND, NOTHING DELETED, or NOTHING DETECTED. I know by the FreeBSD-Security archives that

My home system has been hacked. It's running CentOS 4.4, and I recently added an account to play around with Samba shares to back up PCs here at home. I had set a weak password for that account and forgot to disable it after my testing. I could hear the disk being accessed constantly, so I knew something was up. I disabled the port forwarding to my CentOS box on my Linksys router

Hello all: I have a couple CentOS 4 servers (all up-to-date) that are having strange command failures. I first noticed this with a perl script that uses lots of system calls. Basically, sometimes a command just won't run: thoth(52) /tmp> ls thoth(53) /tmp> ls thoth(54) /tmp> ls thoth(55) /tmp> ls learner lost+found/ thoth(56) /tmp> ls learner lost+found/ thoth(57)

George Brown sent this to my private Email address instead of to the list. Because I forwarded it, my addres is in the header. Roger. ----- Forwarded message from root ----- >From root@bull.bullnet.co.uk Mon Aug 24 16:20:29 1998 Received: from dutepp0.et.tudelft.nl by rosie.BitWizard.nl (fetchmail-4.2.9 POP3 run by wolff) for <wolff@localhost> (single-drop); Mon Aug 24

I''d like to hear some suggestions about securely administering a system remotely. Here''s the application: a project is going to scatter some server machines around the US. The server machines will be running Linux, with the only network servers being a custom application. Ignoring the separate question of physical security, how can I remotely check the system''s

WE have a centos 5.3 install, and our server is keep getting hacked. We see load averages of 500+ and see people from all over the world logging into our server (used last). Is there a good place to start to avoid these kinds of things? For example, here is what I already did. Open up sshd port only setup iptables to only accept port 80 and 22 No FTP No other ports are allowed according to IP

Woops... this didn't show up here but it did on BugTraq. Questions answered! -- Chuck Mead, CTO, MoonGroup Consulting, Inc. <http://moongroup.com> Mail problems? Send "s-u-b-s-c-r-i-b-e mailhelp" (no quotes and no hyphens) in the body of a message to mailhelp-request@moongroup.com. Public key available at: wwwkeys.us.pgp.net ----------

Question, there are the teardrop, ping of death, DoS and a host of other forms of attacks. While all of the research that I have been doing concerning another form of an attack.... I became sorta stumped on an idea... is there anywhere.... a description on what to expect or what happenes during any one of these or other attacks listed somewhere? If so, could someone please direct me in that

We just had a security application vendor come in. We asked about Linux support and he said that putting a security application on top of an insecure OS was useless. When I asked what he meant by insecure he replied that Linux does not have a true Auditing capability - as opposed to HP-UX & Solaris which they do support. Can anyone explain to me what he was talking about? Thanks, Marty

Hello, when one has physical access to a computer, he can run something like tripwire, with keys and checksum on a separate, write-only media, to verify the integrity of the system. What if the system is a remote one (in my case Centos 4.3 on a User Mode Linux VPS some hundred of KMs from here)? Does it still make sense to run tripwire remotely? If yes, how, since you cannot plug a floppy or

> > systems which no longer seem to have this. This file contained an archive of > > the trojan''s that were inserted into the compromised system - does anybody know > > what is in these trojans? > > Check the Linux RootKit ... (LRK).. > > Typically LRK to use config-files.. (and typically LRK-users to place > files in /dev.. find /dev -type f | grep -v

As halflife demonstrated in Phrack 50 with his linspy project, it is trivial to patch any system call under Linux from within a module. This means that once your system has been compromised at the root level, it is possible for an intruder to hide completely _without_ modifying any binaries or leaving any visible backdoors behind. Because such tools are likely to be in use within the hacker

Someone I was speaking with this evening claimed they have installed the latest named rpms yet they are still getting exploited daily and being hacked. Do the latest rpm''s for the named 4.9.x stuff fix all the root exploits or is this person just an idiot who probably has holes elsewhere in the system?

This morning, I noticed in my security email, that my entire /usr/bin directory had setuid diff's set on them. I think I've been hacked. So I installed chkrootkit from ports and ran it. It showed not infected for everything, except NETSTAT. NETSTAT showed infected... I ran chkrootkit for another machine (at my office), and it showed not infected for everything. Both machines are

[mod: Just to show you that people DO get bitten after a bugwarning has gone out on linux-security..... -- REW] -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Has anyone been hit with the Bind Inverse Query Buffer Overrun on their Linux servers? We have had 3 servers attacked using this expoit and all of the machines had several binaries replaced with trojan

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Hello. My server was hacked. The CPU has been loaded on 99 % by "sh -i" process. I found out that someone has started phpshell through a hole in one of phpbb forums. Also has filled in scripts for flud and spam and "vadim script" in "/tmp". I has made it noexec. Recently has found out the same process. May be i have left again /tmp opened, or other hole may

I've been noticing yum updates on several servers I manage over the last few weeks, which I know I didn't perform and could not explain until this morning. At first I suspect a break-in, but found no other evidence or reason an intruder would run the yum updates I was viewing. Yum updates are logged in /var/log/yum.log, which is what Logwatch scans. Seems that the format of the log

hello, i have a FreeBSD 4.8-PRERELEASE #0 that i use as a gateway / nat box for my home. It also acts as a dns / mail server to the outside world. I'm using ipf and basically filter for bogus networks on the way in and out. I allow everything out keeping state, and allow this in: pass in proto icmp from any to any icmp-type squench group 200 pass in proto icmp from any to any icmp-type timex