similar to: Security of OpenSSL ECDSA signatures

Here's a recently-published paper that describes a flush & reload attack on OpenSSL's ECDSA implementation: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140.pdf According to the authors, snooping a single signing round is sufficient to recover the secret key. --mancha

Hello a newbie here. The situation is that: 2 machine one master one client Puppet 0.24.5 This my configuration: Client: /etc/puppet/puppetd.conf [puppetd] server = Asus-Vista-Box logdir = /var/log/puppet vardir = /var/lib/puppet rundir = /var/run master /etc/puppet/manifests/classes/sudo.pp class sudo { file { "/etc/sudoers": owner => "root",

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3748 Bug ID: 3748 Summary: "webauthn-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 at openssh.com" signature type not supported from ssh agent Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.7p1 Hardware: 68k OS: Mac OS X Status: NEW Severity: enhancement

After browsing "Remote timing attacks are practical" (Boneh & Brumley, <http://crypto.stanford.edu/~dabo/abstracts/ssl-timing.html>), I wonder if it might be a good idea to add calls to RSA_blinding_on() before the OpenSSL RSA decryption routines are invoked. The issue is not a LAN-only issue, BTW. Packet delay variation is usually higher in LANs than in WANs. -- Florian

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1971 Bug #: 1971 Summary: ssh-keyscan should default to ecdsa or ecdsa,rsa Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.9p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: ssh-keyscan

2 more roadblocks for Visual Studio users are the inability to compile gcc and the inability to compile and run the test suite. I would not want to submit a change unless I could still compile/run gcc and pass the test suite. (Testing before submission is the way we do it where I come from - I am assuming it's the same here). On a related note, has anyone gotten the LLVM test suite working

On 15.06.2015 21:31, Christian Weisgerber wrote: > On 2015-06-15, Gerhard Wiesinger <lists at wiesinger.com> wrote: > >> I saw that OpenSSH release 6.7 removed all CBC ciphers by default. Is >> CBC therefore considered as broken and unsecure (in general or SSH >> implementation)? > CBC modes in SSH use the last encrypted block of the previous packet > as the IV

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1971 Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Status|RESOLVED |CLOSED --- Comment #2 from Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> --- Set all RESOLVED bugs to CLOSED with release

Does the version of OpenSSL on Centos 6.5 support ECDSA keypairs? How do I test if this works? (though I should probably ask this on the OpenSSL list) The reason I suspect a problem is that HIPL for Centos (http://infrahip.hiit.fi/) is not creating the ECDSA Host Identity, whereas my Fedora installation IS creating the ECDSA HI.

Hi, for those who have adopted ECDSA, Are there still any commonly used IMAPS/POP3S clients that still can not handle ECDSA certificates? I know you can set up Dovecot dor dual cert, I am just trying to determine if there still is a real world need to.

On 12/16/18 7:52 AM, Tributh via dovecot wrote: > > > Am 16.12.18 um 12:13 schrieb Michael A. Peters: >> Hi, for those who have adopted ECDSA, >> >> Are there still any commonly used IMAPS/POP3S clients that still can not >> handle ECDSA certificates? >> >> I know you can set up Dovecot dor dual cert, I am just trying to >> determine if there

Folks, I read the 5.7 release announcement and updated, to try out ECDSA. Most parts worked very smoothly. The inability to create SSHFP records is understandable, since IANA haven't allocated a code yet. One apparent bug: I think StrictHostKeyChecking=ask is broken for ECDSA. % ssh -o HostKeyAlgorithms=ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 localhost

Hi, I was sure I sent this to openssh at openssh.com, but cannot find that email now in my Sent mailbox, so I am sending it to the developers list. I took a liberty and wrote an I-D with accompanying patch (with contributions from Ondrej Caletka) to support ECDSA in the SSHFP DNS resource record. The I-D is here: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-os-ietf-sshfp-ecdsa-sha2 (and the source XML

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1961 Bug #: 1961 Summary: ECDSA memory leak Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: ssh AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at

Hello, While running 'cvs up' against the CVS repository for the portable branch of OpenSSH, I received the following warning: % cvs up @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ @ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @ @@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY! Someone could be

Hi, I'm interested in extending OpenSSH's PKCS#11 code to support ECDSA keys, but have so far been unable to find anyone who can sell me a smartcard that supports it. They certainly exist - AFAIK it's required by the US PIV standard, but obtaining cards that support it in single digit quantities seems all but impossible. Can anybody on this list help? I'd want 2-6 cards/tokens

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1862 Summary: document ECDSA within the "-b" option of the ssh-keygen manpage Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.8p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P2 Component: Documentation

When connecting to a host that provides an ECDSA host key and the client has "VerifyHostKeyDNS" set to 'yes' or 'ask' SSH outputs a mysterious and undocumented message "Error calculating host key fingerprint." This error actually seems to be generated by verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname, struct sockaddr *address, Key *hostkey, int *flags) in dns.c, but

Hi there, As I'm sure you are aware, there are suspicions (as usual) against the NSA potentially weakening crypto around the globe. This time it is about a cipher that is/will be used in the new tinc protocol: ECDSA According to https://github.com/gsliepen/tinc/blob/1.1/src/openssl/ecdsagen.c you use the secp521r1 curve, which is derived (according to

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2157 Bug ID: 2157 Summary: [man] ssh-keygen page says ECDSA keys can be 521 bits Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.2p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: minor Priority: P5 Component: Documentation Assignee: