similar to: Indicating context when asking the ssh-agent to use a key

Processing commands for control at bugs.debian.org: > # changing bug submitter e-mail address from > # dkg-debian.org at fifthhorsemannet to > # dkg at fifthhorseman.net for consolidation > submitter 318123 ! Bug#318123: [CVE-2006-0061] xlockmore: xlock segfaults with libpam-opensc, returns to user session Changed Bug submitter from Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg-debian.org at

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1876 Summary: Requests to use keys held by the ssh-agent have no way of indicating their context Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.8p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: ssh-agent

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1506 Summary: rationalize agent behavior on smartcard removal/reattachment Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.1p1 Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: Smartcard AssignedTo:

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1545 Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CC| |dkg at fifthhorseman.net --- Comment #15 from Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> ---

Hello, On Sat, Dec 30, 2017 at 12:16 AM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net > wrote: > On Thu 2017-12-28 21:31:28 -0800, Dan Mahoney (Gushi) wrote: > > > > Perhaps if you're dead-set on this being so dangerous, > > It's not the developers who are dead-set on weak-keyed RSA being > insecure, it's the cryptanalysts who have shown that to be the

On Tue 2016-03-29 18:10:00 -0400, Damien Miller wrote: > On Tue, 29 Mar 2016, IMAP List Administration wrote: >> If you haven't already, an you please add the IP address to this message, and >> any similar messages? I'm using version 6.7p1. > > I actually added that recently. It will be in openssh-7.3, due in a > couple of months. Will it be configurable? There

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1777 Summary: KnownHostsCommand Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.5p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: ssh AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org ReportedBy: dkg at fifthhorseman.net A

hi folks: it looks like ssh-keygen -r can''t export SSHFP records for ECDSA keys: 0 dkg@pip:/tmp/cdtemp.oiRYAS$ ssh-keygen -f foobar -t ecdsa -q -P '''' 0 dkg@pip:/tmp/cdtemp.oiRYAS$ ssh-keygen -r foobar -f foobar.pub export_dns_rr: unsupported algorithm 0 dkg@pip:/tmp/cdtemp.oiRYAS$ the first number in my prompt is the return code of the last command; note that

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1498 Summary: OpenSC smartcard access should use raw public keys, not X.509 certificates Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.1p1 Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Keywords: patch Severity: normal

I guess I didn't want to litter the users table either - it just seems "wrong" to be actually adding things to the host when it is really so transient. It feels like it should be LDAP-ish. Just ask the server for the keys and do a one-off authentication. But I've seen even LDAP creates the user directories. I see that 2.6 kernels can have some 4B users, which should last me a

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1871 Summary: ssh-askpass should be able to distinguish between a prompt for confirmation and a prompt for an actual passphrase Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.8p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal

On 21 March 2014 10:56, Scott Duckworth <sduckwo at clemson.edu> wrote: > On Fri, Mar 21, 2014 at 12:15 PM, Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net> > wrote: >> those limits suggest that the size is 128kiB on anything resembling a >> modern Linux system. > > How about other platforms? Especially embedded systems which may have a lot less RAM? -- Eitan

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1612 Summary: ssh-add should not discard constraints if the agent fails to implement them Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.2p1 Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: ssh-add

Yes, I have tried that option with no difference in behavior. It seems it ignores that option when provided. Just for reference, I am building it on RedHat 5. I have never had this issue on any previous version of OpenSSH. I use the default configuration with only the changes specified in the RHEL 5 STIG applied. I appreciate the security advice. The root account was indicated simply as an

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2493 Bug ID: 2493 Summary: Accept host key fingerprint as the same as 'yes' Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.9p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: ssh Assignee:

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1869 Summary: ssh-add can no longer read from FIFOs as of 5.7p1 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.8p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: ssh-add AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

On Fri 2015-02-06 14:30:13 -0500, Cary FitzHugh wrote: > Hence - maybe a NSS User Database extension which looks for the > public keys from a webservice (and then maybe writes them to > /tmp/<username>. No, i'm suggesting that when you want to look up the user, use NSS to find the username and map it to a numeric user ID and the other information that is typically found in

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1663 Summary: Allow to use agent for distribution of public keys. Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.3p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

This got me thinking, shouldn't this go through PAM so that password strength restrictions can be set as well? Obviously most ssh keys are created locally. But, if this were implemented, I think most distros would adopt the same strength criteria on this as they do with passwd and the like. ---------- Forwarded message ---------- From: Daniel Kahn Gillmor <dkg at fifthhorseman.net>

Hi, I can disable agent-forwarding for any given key by prefixing it with "no-agent-forwarding", but it seems there's no global sshd_config setting for this (ie no "AgentForwarding [yes|no]"). Is this on purpose? If so, what's the rationale? -Jan -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: not available Type: