similar to: OpenSSH Certkey (PKI)

Here is a patch I just wrote and tested which may be of interest to those who wish to use KerberosGetAFSToken (currently requires Heimdal libkafs) in combination with GSSAPIDelegateCredentials. The patch is in the public domain and comes with no warranty whatsoever. Applies to pristine 3.8p1. Works for me on Solaris and Tru64. I'd probably have used Doug Engert's patch from 2004-01-30 if

Hi All. I'm looking for some help to merge an outstanding Kerberos credential cache change from OpenBSD into Portable. I don't know enough about Kerberos to figure out how that change should be applied for the non-Heimdal(?) code path. The outstanding diff is attached. Any volunteers? -- Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip.com.au) GPG key 8FF4FA69 / D9A3 86E9 7EEE AF4B B2D4

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Greetings, I am not sure if this is the correct place to ask these question, if I am at the wrong place please advise. I am currently working on some modifications to openssh which record the users rsa/dsa identity comment file to a log file when the user logs in (password authentication is disabled). The ssh1 portion of the modification works

Hello, in the BSD Authentication system the login script can request environment variables to be set/unset. The call to auth_close() in auth-passwd.c does change the current environment, but those changes are lost for the child environment. It would be really useful to add some kind of mechanism to get those changes into the child environment. I've added two possible solutions. Both

please test Olaf Kirch's patch. it looks fine to me, but i don't to K5. i'd like to see this in the next release. thx -m -------------- next part -------------- --- openssh-3.4p1/auth-krb5.c.krb Sun Jun 9 21:41:48 2002 +++ openssh-3.4p1/auth-krb5.c Tue Jul 23 15:15:43 2002 @@ -73,18 +73,17 @@ * from the ticket */ int -auth_krb5(Authctxt *authctxt, krb5_data *auth, char

Hi, the following patch removes some of the Cygwin specific code from OpenSSH. Since Cygwin is able to change the user context on NT/W2K even without a password since the new Cygwin version 1.3.2, there's no need anymore to allow changing the user context only if the sshd user is the same user as the one which logs in or when a password is given. For that reason the whole function

Hi, the following patch fixes a potential security hole in the Cygwin version of sshd. If you're logging in to a Cygwin sshd with version 2 protocol using an arbitrary user name which is not in /etc/passwd, the forked sshd which is handling this connection crashes with a segmentation violation. The client side encounters an immediate disconnect ("Connection reset by peer").

Can anyone validate this? I am attempting to run the puppet cert/ca standlone commands. I am running form an unchanged master branch and if I run (simplified for the example): puppet cert generate host the resulting ca_key.pem is not encrypted. If I run : puppet ca generate host the resulting ca_key.pem is encrypted. In both cases the ca.pass file is created but the code path through cert does

Hello! Please consider including the attached patch in the next release. It allows one to drop privilege separation code while building openssh by using '--disable-privsep' switch of configure script. If one doesn't use privilege separation at all, why don't simply allow him to drop privilege separation support completely? -- Sincerely Your, Dan. -------------- next part

On Fri, Feb 23, 2018 at 05:01:00PM +1100, Darren Tucker wrote: > You could try this patch which defers resetting the "tried" flag on the > pubkeys until the list of authentication methods changes. I don't have > a server with this behaviour so I'm not sure if it helps (and I'm not > sure it's the right thing to do anyway). I think this is a better way to

Hello! I recently discoverd a problem with ssh.com's ssh-agent2 and OpenSSH: If I have more than one key in my agent, then the agent tries to authenticicate me with every one of them at the OpenSSH server; but none of them is a valid key for that server. The Problem is that the Server increments the authctxt->attempt at every of that tries. So even if you want to login with a password at

Hi All. Attached is a patch against OpenBSD, based in part on the owl-always-auth patch. The idea is that the only way out of auth_passwd for the failure case is the "return 0" at the bottom. I don't know if this is a good way to do it or not, it's presented for discussion. Also, I don't think 3.6.1p2 is quite right WRT these timing issues (eg, you get a fast failure

I just cobbled up a little patch to add support for OPIE to OpenSSH. Currently untested, but feedback is welcome. Wichert. -- _________________________________________________________________ / Nothing is fool-proof to a sufficiently talented fool \ | wichert at cistron.nl http://www.liacs.nl/~wichert/ | | 1024D/2FA3BC2D 576E 100B 518D 2F16 36B0 2805 3CB8 9250

this is the proposed gssapi diff against OpenSSH-current (non-portable). note: if this goes in, the old krb5 auth (ssh.com compatible) will be removed. please comment. jakob Index: auth.h =================================================================== RCS file: /home/hack/jakob/mycvs/sshgss/auth.h,v retrieving revision 1.1.1.2 retrieving revision 1.3 diff -u -r1.1.1.2 -r1.3 --- auth.h

I need a way to make sshd require S/KEY authentication to succeed before allowing either password or public-key authentication. Currently, we can only have S/KEY+password, by using PAM for authentication, and configuring PAM accordingly. But PAM of course can't handle SSH public keys. I thought for a while that ideally we could actually use PAM to tell sshd what methods of authentication to

auth.c:auth_log contains the following code: authlog("%s %s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d%s", authmsg, method, authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ", ---> authctxt->valid && authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? "ROOT" : authctxt->user, get_remote_ipaddr(),

As posted, here is an updated patch which allows openssh to be built with non-selinux config. (Hi openssh guys, forwarding this to you incase you interested including it into the devel version of openssh. Please let us know if you have any suggestions or changes that need to be made) Regards Nigel Kukard On Thu, Sep 02, 2004 at 04:11:54PM -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > New SSH patch. >

I've implemented a patch to openssh which allows the PAM auth layer to detect if the PAM stack has changed the user name and then adjusts its internal data structures accordingly. (imagine a PAM stack that uses individual credentials to authenticate, but assigns the user to a role account). First, is the openssh community interested in this patch? Second, if there is interest in the patch,

Hi, This diff (for portable) makes the chrooted preauth privsep process log via the monitor using a shared socketpair. It removes the need for /dev/log inside /var/empty and makes mandatory sandboxing of the privsep child easier down the road (no more socket() syscall required). Please test. -d Index: log.c =================================================================== RCS file:

BSD/OS 4.2 comes with OpenSSH 2.1.1p4, patched to support BSDI's authentication library. However, BSDI's patches have several problems: 1. They don't run the approval phase, so they can allow users to login who aren't supposed to be able to. 2. They don't patch configure to automatically detect the BSDI auth system, so they're not ready to use in a general portable