similar to: Requirement for sshd account since 4.4p1

this is at the bottom of auth.c. What is it? struct passwd * fakepw(void) { static struct passwd fake; memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake)); fake.pw_name = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_passwd = "$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK"; fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER"; fake.pw_uid = -1; fake.pw_gid = -1; fake.pw_class =

Hello Porters, I've finally (thanks to Wendy Palm of Cray) ported OpenSSH to Dynix v4.4.4. I had to make sure that "UseLogin" was set to "no" in the sshd_config file. Also, here are the old-style contextual diffs (obtained with 'diff -c' on the Dynix box) of the two files I had to change: *** configure Sat Jun 16 17:09:50 2001 --- configure.new Mon Oct 8

Hi, the below patch solves the same problem for gids as has already been solved for uids. Windows has no concept of permanently changing the identity. It's always possible to revert to the original identity. Thanks, Corinna Index: uidswap.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/openssh_cvs/uidswap.c,v retrieving revision 1.44 diff -p -u -r1.44

Hi, I'm terribly sorry that I missed this before 3.7p1 was out. The permanently_set_uid() function fails on Cygwin since the test to revert to the saved uid unfortunately works on Cygwin though it shouldn't. The reason is that a Windows NT process always can revert to its previous privileges. There's no such concept of giving up rights in a process permanently. This is only

Ok, for those running NeXT and other platforms with broken/missing _POSIX_SAVED_ID please try this patch, and anyone that has spent any amount of time dealing with this problem. I believe it's right. BTW, this patch is no where near as big as it looks. The patch was done against an earily version of the tree which had an issue with white space. - Ben --- ../openssh/uidswap.c Sun Apr 22

I need this for BSD/OS 4.2 + privsep perhaps we should not call do_setusercontext() after chroot(). --- sshd.c.orig Fri Jun 21 03:09:47 2002 +++ sshd.c Tue Jun 25 13:11:03 2002 @@ -548,21 +548,35 @@ /* Change our root directory*/ if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1) fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, strerror(errno)); if

Hello Porters, I am attempting to compile OpenSSH 2.9.9p2 on a Dynix V4.4.4 host. I have set USE_PIPES and BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS (the latter because there are no functions for set{eu,eg}id() that I can find). I configured with "./configure '--with-libs=-lnsl -lsec'". Each time I attempt to login, I get this error: No utmp entry. You must exec "login" from

I'm trying to understand the code around PAM support in auth2.c and auth2-chall.c. I'm working with the OpenSSH 3.7.1p2 sources on FreeBSD 4.x. The scenario I'm trying to make work is SSH login to a captive accout for users in a RADIUS database but whose login does not appear in /etc/passwd or getpwnam(). I understand that if the username is not found in getpwnam(), then the

The following are patches against openssh 2.1.1p4 to add support for the BSD_AUTH authentication mechanisms. It allows the use of non-challenge/response style mechanisms (which styles are allowed my be limited by appropriate auth-ssh entries in login.conf). The patches also add support for calling setusercontext for the appropriate class when called with a command (so that the PATH, limits,

Accidently removed XXX comment. New patch below. Regards Magnus --- openssh-3.6.1p2/sftp-server.c.org 2003-08-11 22:07:47.098650000 +0200 +++ openssh-3.6.1p2/sftp-server.c 2003-08-16 19:07:14.273582000 +0200 @@ -24,15 +24,24 @@ #include "includes.h" RCSID("$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.41 2003/03/26 04:02:51 deraadt Exp $"); +#define CHROOT #include "buffer.h"

Hello all, Here is an updated patch. I published the original patch published on august 16. --- openssh-3.7.1p2/sftp-server.c.org 2003-08-22 01:34:41.000000000 +0200 +++ openssh-3.7.1p2/sftp-server.c 2003-09-30 17:22:43.730402000 +0200 @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include \"includes.h\" RCSID(\"$OpenBSD: sftp-server.c,v 1.43 2003/06/25 22:39:36 miod Exp $\"); +#define CHROOT

A change was recently introduced into uidswap.c to cover the case where the user is root. The change is "&& pw->pw_uid != 0 &&". /* Try restoration of GID if changed (test clearing of saved gid) */ if (old_gid != pw->pw_gid && pw->pw_uid != 0 && (setgid(old_gid) != -1 || setegid(old_gid) != -1))

Hello, I know this chroot issue has been brought up many times before on this list. I saw that the contribibuted chroot-patch was removed from the contrib directory because it always was out of date. The main reason was of course was that sftp-server has to be run as root to be able to do the chroot() call? Most of you are against chroot (since it isnt in the src) but I believe a lot of users

Hi, the below patch drops another test for uid 0 on Cygwin. It's embarassing that I never found it. Actually temporarily_use_uid never worked on Cygwin due to that. So far that had no influence, but now that we have activated another feature which makes Cygwin more POSIX-like, somebody on the Cygwin list found that agent forwarding didn't work anymore. The reason is that due to the

The references to pw_expire and pw_change in pwcopy() in misc.c cause compilation errors at least on solaris. How about doing a memcpy of the whole structure and only explicitly setting those that need xstrdup? That would work on openbsd and everywhere else. - Dave Dykstra --- misc.c.O Thu Jun 21 11:35:28 2001 +++ misc.c Thu Jun 21 11:36:09 2001 @@ -125,14 +125,10 @@ { struct passwd *copy =

Quoting Rick Romero <rick at havokmon.com>: > Quoting Eric Broch <ebroch at whitehorsetc.com>: > >> On 10/4/2018 7:27 AM, Rick Romero wrote: >>> Quoting Eric Broch <ebroch at whitehorsetc.com >>> <mailto:ebroch at whitehorsetc.com>>: >>> >>>> On 10/4/2018 6:34 AM, Rick Romero wrote: >>>>> ? >>>

On 10/4/2018 7:27 AM, Rick Romero wrote: > > Quoting Eric Broch <ebroch at whitehorsetc.com > <mailto:ebroch at whitehorsetc.com>>: > >> >> On 10/4/2018 6:34 AM, Rick Romero wrote: >>> > Quoting Aki Tuomi <aki.tuomi at open-xchange.com > <mailto:aki.tuomi at open-xchange.com>>: > >> On 03.10.2018 23:30, Eric Broch wrote:

openssh-2.9.9p2 assumes that pid_t, uid_t, gid_t, and mode_t are no wider than int. GCC complains about this assumption on 32-bit Solaris 8 sparc, where these types are 'long', not 'int'. This isn't an actual problem at runtime on this host, as long and int are the same width, but it is a problem on other hosts where pid_t is wider than int. E.g., I've heard that 64-bit

On 12/27/2016 08:20 PM, John Fawcett wrote: > On 12/28/2016 01:43 AM, John Fawcett wrote: >> On 12/28/2016 01:12 AM, Robert Moskowitz wrote: >>> On 12/27/2016 07:06 PM, John Fawcett wrote: >>>> On 12/28/2016 12:34 AM, Robert Moskowitz wrote: >>>>> On 12/27/2016 05:44 PM, John Fawcett wrote: >>>>>> That error should be caused by having

Hello, I was trying to build a chrooted sftp account when I faced a problem. The chroot is done with the patch present in the contrib subdirectory in the portable version (I'm under linux slackware current). My problem is that verifying access rights on directories and files are too tight and then I couldn't have the following things : The user sftp, with primary group sftp, is chrooted