similar to: Corrupted check bytes on input with SSH1 - OpenSSH-4.3 and OpenSSL-0.9.6b

I see that commercial SSH version it is possible to run sshd in SSH1 using DES (i.e, accepting SSH-DES clients). I understand from Damien Miller that Cisco routers also run in only SSH1 DES mode. Is it possible in openSSH to configure sshd (compile-time/runtime) to run sshd in SSH1 or SSH2 mode and accept SSH1 or SSH2 DES clients ? [I would like to be able to run sshd in SSH1/DES mode ] Is

Hello, I was searching for this information virtually everywhere, but as I couldn't find it - I'm asking here. I was wondering, why setting the Compression Level was removed in SSH2, and if on, is always set to 6. In SSH1 it was possible to set the Compression Level from 1 to 9. I have made some tests with Compression Levels using scp: SSH1, compression 9 (highest available for

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1712 Summary: partial server keep-alive implementation for SSH1 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.3p1 Platform: Other OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P2 Component: ssh AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

Hello, I get this error when trying to connect to an ancient server from the 3.2.3p1 client on Linux 2.2 (OpenSSL 0.9.5): [root at XXX openssh-3.2.3p1]# /usr/local/bin/ssh -vv LOGIN_STRIPPED at decef.elf.stuba.sk OpenSSH_3.2.3p1, SSH protocols 1.5/2.0, OpenSSL 0x0090581f debug1: Reading configuration data /etc/ssh/ssh_config debug1: Applying options for * debug1: Rhosts Authentication disabled,

Hi, the OpenSSH installation script for Cygwin still creates a SSH1 host key by default. My question is, wouldn't it make more sense to drop all auto-generation of SSH1 keys from the default installation procedure? I mean, nobody should use SSH1 anymore, right? Or should the script stick to it for some reason? Corinna -- Corinna Vinschen Cygwin Project Co-Leader Red Hat

No, I just think 15 years or so is more than enough time to have addressed the issue. On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 14:05:08 -0700, Dan Kaminsky wrote: > So, this isn't your problem and you don't respect the people's whose > problem it is. > > On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 12:43 PM, Iain Morgan <imorgan at nas.nasa.gov> wrote: > > > On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 11:55:18

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=138 patl at cag.lcs.mit.edu changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Status|RESOLVED |REOPENED Resolution|FIXED | ------- Additional Comments From patl at cag.lcs.mit.edu 2002-05-13 00:55

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 11:55:18 -0700, Dan Kaminsky wrote: > You're right. My argument the is the next build of OpenSSH should be > OpenSSH 7, and the one after that 8, then 9, then 10. No minor releases? > Sure, go ahead. Deprecate the point, > > Do you manage any machines running SSHv1? > If by "running" you mean accepting SSH1, of course not. From a

CORE SDI http://www.core-sdi.com SSH1 CRC-32 compensation attack detector vulnerability Date Published: 2001-02-08 Advisory ID: CORE-20010207 Bugtraq ID: 2347 CVE CAN: CAN-2001-0144 Title: SSH1 CRC-32 compensation attack detector vulnerability Class: Boundary Error Condition Remotely Exploitable: Yes Locally Exploitable: Yes Release Mode:

This is small patch for scp. It allows to force SSH1 or SSH2. P.S.: give me Cc: - I'm not subscribed... -- --------------------------------- pozdr. Pawe? Go?aszewski --------------------------------- R.I.P. - rest in pieces ... -------------- next part -------------- --- ./scp.c.org Sat Sep 8 23:37:22 2001 +++ ./scp.c Sun Sep 9 00:07:36 2001 @@ -244,9 +244,11 @@

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2369 Bug ID: 2369 Summary: `ssh-keygen -A` errors on RSA1 when building with SSH1 disabled Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.9p1 Hardware: All OS: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P5 Component: ssh-keygen

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2343 Bug ID: 2343 Summary: test_fuzz.c won't compile if ssh1 support is disabled Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 6.7p1 Hardware: Other OS: Linux Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: Build system Assignee:

Hi, I am trying to decide if it is worth the time to test the Kerberos support in a port I am working on of Openssh 3.5p1. Does using Kerb5 with SSH1 solve the security problems inherent in protocol 1 and bring it up to par with the security level of SSH2 or are there other issues that Kerb5 authentication won't help for SSH1? Thanks, Greg Lambert --------------------------------- Do

I think I've found a bug with sshd handling audit events for commands (like scp) over ssh1 connections. Specifically, after updating to a recent FreeBSD 6.x with audit support, I'm getting log messages like these when using scp over ssh1: Sep 12 14:13:16 <auth.info> bm55 sshd[12335]: Accepted rsa for xxx from A.B.C.D port 2981 Sep 12 14:13:16 <auth.crit> bm55 sshd[12335]:

On Solaris 8, I have ssh 3.1.0 and on other box Sol 7 I have 1.2.26 (min version for comtable with ssh 3), I checked also /etc/ssh2/sshd2_config file ## SSH1 compatibility # Ssh1Compatibility <set by configure by default> # Sshd1Path <set by configure by default 2) generate key for ssh3 # ssh-keygen2 -P /etc/ssh2/hostkey

On 08/03/16 03:19, Darren Tucker wrote: > > Yes. Debugging something on a system you can't interact with is hard > enough without having information withheld. > I'll run again and add the relevant unedited texts as attachments. There is nothing in /var/log/secure. Also a diff between the config.h 's without and with --with-ssh1 is attached. I have a centos-6.7 under

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=138 ------- Additional Comments From rob at adso.com.pl 2002-06-29 07:46 ------- Created an attachment (id=121) Patch for openssh 3.4p1, which corrects problems with blowfish + ssh1 + OpenSSL 0.9.5a ------- You are receiving this mail because: ------- You are the assignee for the bug, or are watching the assignee.

If an ssh1 client initiates challenge-response authentication but does not submit a response to the challenge, and instead switches to some other authentication method, verify_response() will never run, and the kbdint device context will never be freed. In some cases (such as when the FreeBSD PAM authentication code is being used) this may cause a resource leak leading to a denial of service.

OK, with this additional information I can now reproduce it. Based on some quick experiments it seems to be triggered when sshd is built --with-ssh1 and the config does not *load* a Protocol 1 host key. Works: Protocol=1,2 + Hostkey not specified Protocol=1,2 + Hostkeys for both protocols specified. Doesn't work: Protocol=2 + Hostkey not specified. Protocol=1,2 + Hostkeys specified only for

On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 10:19:05 -0700, Dan Kaminsky wrote: > Communication is a two way street. If OpenSSH wants to go down the route > of single releases, like the browsers did, it can remove its minor numbers, > like the browsers did. > There's no question of "going down the route." This has been the practice with OpenSSH for many years -- if not from the beginning.