similar to: rssh and scponly arbitrary command execution

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 [This came over BUGTRAQ this morning. Note the call for volunteers vis-a-vis rssh.] - ----- Forwarded message from Jason Wies <jason at xc.net> ----- List-Id: <bugtraq.list-id.securityfocus.com> List-Subscribe: <mailto:bugtraq-subscribe at securityfocus.com> To: bugtraq at securityfocus.com Cc: rssh-discuss at

rssh is a small shell whose purpose is to restrict users to using scp or sftp, and also provides the facilities to place users in a chroot jail. It can also be used to lock users out of a system completely. William F. McCaw identified a minor security flaw in rssh when used with chroot jails. There is a bug in rssh 2.0 - 2.1.x which allows a user to gather information outside of a chrooted jail

List, I am putting together a sftp server and would like to use a restrictive shell with a chroot jail. I was wondering what members of the list thought about rssh as opposed to scponly. Greg Ennis

PIZZACODE SECURITY ALERT program: rssh risk: low[*] problem: string format vulnerability in log.c details: rssh is a restricted shell for use with OpenSSH, allowing only scp and/or sftp. For example, if you have a server which you only want to allow users to copy files off of via scp, without providing shell access, you can use rssh to do that. Additioanlly, running rsync, rdist, and cvs are

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I'm pleased to announce that rssh now has per-user configurations! Today I released rssh v2.1.0 with that last peice of functionality to be added, bringing active development of rssh to a close. Additionally, I spent several hours testing and debugging this release as thoroughly as I could think to, and I'm pleased to report (tongue in cheek)

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I released rssh v2.0.4 today. It fixes bugs in the parser which affect quoted arguments in the config file, as well as the code which builds the vector for the arguments to the exec call. In the latter case, arguments which contain a space were treated as two sepearate args. The man page was also updated to include information about quoting values

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi folks, Today I released rssh 1.0.4. rssh is a small replacement shell that provides the ability for system administrators to give specific users access to a given system via scp or sftp only. For downloads or more information, visit the rssh homepage: http://www.pizzashack.org/rssh This release fixes a stupid bug caused by a failure to

Affected Software: rssh - all versions prior to 2.3.0 Vulnerability: local user privilege escalation Severity: *CRITICAL* Impact: local users can gain root access Solution: Please upgrade to v2.3.1 Summary ------- rssh is a restricted shell which allows a system administrator to limit users' access to a system via SSH to scp, sftp, rsync, rdist, and cvs. It also allows the system

Hi! I do not know if it's the ideal place, but I'm sending some suggestion. Always use openssh and its enormous features. - I needed to create an environment with only sftp access and thus used: - Match User suporte ForceCommand / usr / lib / openssh / sftp-server OK! It worked perfectly! But only sftp. - Create an environment with only blocking the ssh, but scp and

Package: logcheck-database Version: 1.3.13 Severity: wishlist Hi, scponly-full (using 4.8-4.1) in Debian is compiled with additional support for rsync, unison and SVN. However, the logcheck rule is based on the original version and doesn't include those commands in the regexp. Please add those three commands to the regexp. Best regards, Markus -- System Information: Debian Release:

> $ rsync -e 'ssh -v' lingnu.com: > OpenSSH_5.1p1 Debian-2, OpenSSL 0.9.8g 19 Oct 2007 > debug1: Reading configuration data /etc/ssh/ssh_config > debug1: Applying options for * > debug1: Connecting to lingnu.com [199.203.56.105] port 22. > debug1: Connection established. ... > debug1: Sending command: rsync --server --sender -de.L . As we can see, rsync runs ssh, and

Hello, This patch makes it possible to restrict sftp sessions to a certain subtree of the file system on a per-Unix account basis. It requires a program such as rssh or scponly to function. A patch for rssh is also attached to this email. The method employed uses realpath() and a string comparison to check that each file or directory access is allowed. With this patch, sftp-server takes a

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1755 Summary: Broken pipe with scponly with debuglevel Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.4p1 Platform: All OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sftp-server AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

Since rsync 3.0 i've detected a problem with rssh and -e option....rssh doesn't allow this option...but is essential to me (cyphered transmission with ssh). Surfing the net i've seen a guy that made a patch but I don't know how reliable is...and rssh former programer says he just left the project so it's no longer his problem. Is this stuff going to be updated in rsync or is

Good Morning All, Attached is a full patch [or so I hope] enabling chroot support for sshd. I know varied opinions about chroot exist among the masses; however, I continue to believe that until something far outside the scope of openssh tackles the sandbox issue, the role of enforcer will continue to be with the daemon. This patch is based on a previous work by John Furman as well as Eric

Hello, I know this chroot issue has been brought up many times before on this list. I saw that the contribibuted chroot-patch was removed from the contrib directory because it always was out of date. The main reason was of course was that sftp-server has to be run as root to be able to do the chroot() call? Most of you are against chroot (since it isnt in the src) but I believe a lot of users

On Fri, 8 Dec 2023 at 07:39, Philip Prindeville <philipp_subx at redfish-solutions.com> wrote: [...] > Problem is that if their default shell isn't sh, ash, dash, bash, zsh, etc. then things break. > Is there a workaround to allow scp/sftp to continue to work even for non-shell accounts? sftp should work regardless of the user's shell since it is invoked as a ssh subsystem

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Hello, I'm new to the list, but hopefully I've done enough digging around that I don't get yelled at too terribly ;) We're looking to implement a chrooted environment for allowing users to scp files from servers. That's basically the only functionality that we need in this case. We're looking to chroot the user and/or remove any chance that the account can login via

Hi, As per the subject line - if I look up setting up chroot jails for SFTP over SSH2 I'm led to various Web sites and patches and also to a CentOS wiki page dated 2005, but what's the 'best' or 'correct' way to set this up for Centos 4.5 and 5? Thanks