similar to: sshd runs with -R flag?

Hello all, I recently found myself wanting to run sshd with passphrase-protected host keys rather than the usual unencrypted format, and was somewhat surprised to discover that sshd did not support this. I'm not sure if there's any particular reason for that, but I've developed the below patch (relative to current CVS at time of writing) that implements this. It prompts for the

Hi All. While wandering in auth-pam.c I noticed that there's a few Portable-specific escapees from the xmalloc(foo * bar) cleanup. There's also a "probably can't happen" integer overflow in ssh-rand-helper.c with the memset: num_cmds = 64; - entcmd = xmalloc(num_cmds * sizeof(entropy_cmd_t)); + entcmd = xcalloc(num_cmds, sizeof(entropy_cmd_t));

Hi, first sorry for cross-posting but I thought this patch might interest -CURRENT users as well as people concerned by security. I wrote a patch that integrates ProPolice/SSP into FreeBSD, one step further than it has been realized so far. It is available here : http://tataz.chchile.org/~tataz/FreeBSD/SSP/ Everything is explained on the web page, but I will repeat some informations here.

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=529 Summary: sshd doesn't work correctly after SIGHUP Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.6p1 Platform: All OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy:

Hi all Does FreeBSD support a non-executable stack on any of the tier 1 and 2 platforms that has this feature? If not, are there any plans of implementing this and is there a patch I can use for 6.0 (when it is released)? Best regards db

Hi! This is the third and last patch. This patch makes the xen kernel buildable on OpenBSD by adding support for ProPolice. ProPolice has been added to standard GCC in version 4.1.x under the name Stack Smashing Protection (SSP). Cheers Christoph _______________________________________________ Xen-devel mailing list Xen-devel@lists.xensource.com http://lists.xensource.com/xen-devel

Preserving the command line from the invoking ssh command doesn't make much sense, so use setproctitle() to hide the arguments. --- ssh.c | 20 +++++++++++++++++--- 1 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c index d32ef78..8ebcc88 100644 --- a/ssh.c +++ b/ssh.c @@ -230,12 +230,25 @@ main(int ac, char **av) struct servent *sp; Forward fwd; - /* Ensure

If all ListenAddress lines in the sshd_config file specify a port, then the -p option to sshd is silently ignored: # cat test_sshd_config2 ListenAddress 0.0.0.0:22 ListenAddress 0.0.0.0:2222 # `pwd`/sshd -D -d -p 4411 -f test_sshd_config2 debug1: sshd version OpenSSH_4.2p1 debug1: private host key: #0 type 0 RSA1 debug1: read PEM private key done: type RSA debug1: private host key: #1 type 1

A while back, I sent in a patch that added Digital Unix SIA authentication to OpenSSH. Well, I just figured out that it didn't handle everything correctly (locked accounts could still log in). I thought I had checked that, but I guess I missed it. Anyway, here is a patch against OpenSSH 2.2.0p1 that fixes this. -- Chris Adams <cmadams at hiwaay.net> Systems and Network Administrator

On 08/03/16 03:19, Darren Tucker wrote: > > Yes. Debugging something on a system you can't interact with is hard > enough without having information withheld. > I'll run again and add the relevant unedited texts as attachments. There is nothing in /var/log/secure. Also a diff between the config.h 's without and with --with-ssh1 is attached. I have a centos-6.7 under

Hi, If sshd is started with 'sshd', restarting with kill -HUP will fail. I've included the most obvious patch, but making sure that the full pathname is in saved_argv[0] just might be more secure. Cheers, Han Holl --- sshd.c.orig Mon Feb 19 10:55:54 2001 +++ sshd.c Mon Feb 19 10:56:15 2001 @@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ { log("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");

Hi there, I'm still running 6.2 on various servers without any tweaks (GENERIC kernel, binary updates via freebsd-update etc.) but lots of ports (apache, postgresql, diablo-jdk etc.) and would like to use stack smashing protection in order to harden my boxes and avoid many potential exploits. I've known about ProPolice/SSP for a while now (from the Gentoo world) and am aware that

The following are patches against openssh 2.1.1p4 to add support for the BSD_AUTH authentication mechanisms. It allows the use of non-challenge/response style mechanisms (which styles are allowed my be limited by appropriate auth-ssh entries in login.conf). The patches also add support for calling setusercontext for the appropriate class when called with a command (so that the PATH, limits,

Hello. The following is a patch against OpenSSH 3.0.2p1 to fix OpenSSH's handling of Tru64 SIA authentication. The main changes are to make the SIAENTITY a global variable (so that it remains persistent across function calls), initialization only happens once, the session is only released once. This makes SIA modules that require authentication in order to perform certain actions during the

Here is a long-overdue (sorry about that) patch for Tru64. It is pretty minor mostly (minor formatting and removal of a couple of unneeded calls), and it disables post-auth privsep (so that OpenSSH will work "out of the box" on Tru64, avoiding the many questions). I'm also looking at getting setproctitle working. For Tru64 4.x, it isn't a big deal (normal PS_USE_CLOBBER_ARGV

I am porting over the portable version of openssh to our uCLinux implementation. Everything has worked with minimal effort and I appreciate all the work. But, I am having a problem whereby the sshd executable is crashing and I really could use some help on where to look at this in more details. Here is how I start up the sshd for testing. /usr/sbin/sshd -D -ddd -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config -p 65

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1197 kpimm at yahoo.com changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- CC| |kpimm at yahoo.com --- Comment #7 from kpimm at yahoo.com --- I'm having likely the same problem as halsteaw. Can someone please

Hi, I have a very strange ssh issue, and I do not know how to solve it. I have a centos VM (managed by libvirt) running the latest centos 7 and latest openssh server package (debug1: sshd version OpenSSH_7.4, OpenSSL 1.0.2k-fips 26 Jan 2017). When I ssh remotely to this centos VM (using latest putty 0.70 and other ssh clients as well), I do not get a login prompt whatsoever. I used

sshd will die from an unhandled SIGALRM if you allow SSH1 connections, ssh in, HUP sshd, and don't ssh in again for KeyRegenerationInterval. The HUP handler calls exec which resets signal handlers but persists alarm timers. Chapter and verse: http://www.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/000095399/functions/alarm.html -- Andrew Gaul http://gaul.org/ -------------- next part -------------- Index:

sshd will die from an unhandled SIGALRM if you allow SSH1 connections, ssh in, HUP sshd, and don't ssh in again for KeyRegenerationInterval. The HUP handler calls exec which resets signal handlers but persists alarm timers. Chapter and verse: