similar to: [BUGTRAQ] rssh and scponly arbitrary command execution

I just released rssh version 2.2.3 to fix the problem detailed below. I haven't had time to update my website yet, and my Internet acess is quite limited these days (hence the terse announcement), so I probably won't get to that for a while. However, rssh 2.2.3 is available from the sourceforge.net site: http://sourceforge.net/projects/rssh All users of rssh should update to the

List, I am putting together a sftp server and would like to use a restrictive shell with a chroot jail. I was wondering what members of the list thought about rssh as opposed to scponly. Greg Ennis

Hi! I do not know if it's the ideal place, but I'm sending some suggestion. Always use openssh and its enormous features. - I needed to create an environment with only sftp access and thus used: - Match User suporte ForceCommand / usr / lib / openssh / sftp-server OK! It worked perfectly! But only sftp. - Create an environment with only blocking the ssh, but scp and

Hello, This patch makes it possible to restrict sftp sessions to a certain subtree of the file system on a per-Unix account basis. It requires a program such as rssh or scponly to function. A patch for rssh is also attached to this email. The method employed uses realpath() and a string comparison to check that each file or directory access is allowed. With this patch, sftp-server takes a

rssh is a small shell whose purpose is to restrict users to using scp or sftp, and also provides the facilities to place users in a chroot jail. It can also be used to lock users out of a system completely. William F. McCaw identified a minor security flaw in rssh when used with chroot jails. There is a bug in rssh 2.0 - 2.1.x which allows a user to gather information outside of a chrooted jail

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1755 Summary: Broken pipe with scponly with debuglevel Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.4p1 Platform: All OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sftp-server AssignedTo: unassigned-bugs at mindrot.org

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I'm pleased to announce that rssh now has per-user configurations! Today I released rssh v2.1.0 with that last peice of functionality to be added, bringing active development of rssh to a close. Additionally, I spent several hours testing and debugging this release as thoroughly as I could think to, and I'm pleased to report (tongue in cheek)

PIZZACODE SECURITY ALERT program: rssh risk: low[*] problem: string format vulnerability in log.c details: rssh is a restricted shell for use with OpenSSH, allowing only scp and/or sftp. For example, if you have a server which you only want to allow users to copy files off of via scp, without providing shell access, you can use rssh to do that. Additioanlly, running rsync, rdist, and cvs are

Since rsync 3.0 i've detected a problem with rssh and -e option....rssh doesn't allow this option...but is essential to me (cyphered transmission with ssh). Surfing the net i've seen a guy that made a patch but I don't know how reliable is...and rssh former programer says he just left the project so it's no longer his problem. Is this stuff going to be updated in rsync or is

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 I released rssh v2.0.4 today. It fixes bugs in the parser which affect quoted arguments in the config file, as well as the code which builds the vector for the arguments to the exec call. In the latter case, arguments which contain a space were treated as two sepearate args. The man page was also updated to include information about quoting values

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 Hi folks, Today I released rssh 1.0.4. rssh is a small replacement shell that provides the ability for system administrators to give specific users access to a given system via scp or sftp only. For downloads or more information, visit the rssh homepage: http://www.pizzashack.org/rssh This release fixes a stupid bug caused by a failure to

Hello, I know this chroot issue has been brought up many times before on this list. I saw that the contribibuted chroot-patch was removed from the contrib directory because it always was out of date. The main reason was of course was that sftp-server has to be run as root to be able to do the chroot() call? Most of you are against chroot (since it isnt in the src) but I believe a lot of users

On Fri, 8 Dec 2023 at 07:39, Philip Prindeville <philipp_subx at redfish-solutions.com> wrote: [...] > Problem is that if their default shell isn't sh, ash, dash, bash, zsh, etc. then things break. > Is there a workaround to allow scp/sftp to continue to work even for non-shell accounts? sftp should work regardless of the user's shell since it is invoked as a ssh subsystem

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Package: logcheck-database Version: 1.3.13 Severity: wishlist Hi, scponly-full (using 4.8-4.1) in Debian is compiled with additional support for rsync, unison and SVN. However, the logcheck rule is based on the original version and doesn't include those commands in the regexp. Please add those three commands to the regexp. Best regards, Markus -- System Information: Debian Release:

Affected Software: rssh - all versions prior to 2.3.0 Vulnerability: local user privilege escalation Severity: *CRITICAL* Impact: local users can gain root access Solution: Please upgrade to v2.3.1 Summary ------- rssh is a restricted shell which allows a system administrator to limit users' access to a system via SSH to scp, sftp, rsync, rdist, and cvs. It also allows the system

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1998 Bug #: 1998 Summary: Arbitrary command execution using SCP Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.8p1 Platform: All OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: security Priority: P2 Component: scp AssignedTo:

X-PMC-CI-e-mail-id: 13726 Hi, I have been a successful user of Openssh for some time. I am attaching two articles from BugTraq. Hopefully, they show exactly the security problems reported in the BugTraq mailing list. [Pity that no one seemed to have bothered to contact the mailing list(s) for openssh development.] I am not sure what the right fixes would be. But at least, people need to be

does anyone have a comment to make about this? (cert picked it up and we're being asked for a vendor response) http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/324016/2003-06-03/2003-06-09/0 do we have an "official" response yet? thanks, wendy -- wendy palm Cray Open Software Development, Cray Inc. wendyp at cray.com, 651-605-9154

Hello, I don't know if this is of anybody's interest here, but I have written a patch to selectively override a user's shell dependent of the username. The reason behind this is, that at the high performance cluster I work at, we would like that normal users are only permitted to use scp and sftp (and thus a shell like rssh) on our master nodes, but should retain their