similar to: a story of compromise and an idea

Hey all, Let's make an assumption: 1) I am a root user on a system. 2) I don't want said system being used as a jumping-off point if either a user account or the root account is compromised. Given an unencrypted private key, plus a known_hosts file, plus bash_history, it's a pretty easy avenue of attack once you're in the front door. And it's happened before*. Thus,

Hi guys, I'm working on a project which concern SSH and there is something i don't understand about server authentication. So I explain my problem: - When you authorize only RSA keys in the sshd_config on the server, you need to have the RSA public key of this server in the known_hosts file of the client. This is absolutely normal. - When you authorize only DSA keys in the sshd_config

There's currently no way to express trust for an SSH certificate CA other than by manually adding it to known_hosts. This patch modifies the automatic key write-out behaviour on user verification to associate the hostname with the CA rather than the host key, allowing environments making use of certificates to update (potentially compromised) host keys without needing to modify client

I like to retain some semblance of optimism for humanity, and so I'm just going to hope that this assertion is false. I have to hope that there is at least a large minority of people who correctly use ssh-agent for the suppression of password prompting, and protect their private keys with passwords.? -------- Original message -------- From: Dan Kaminsky <dan at doxpara.com> Date:

Hey all, I came across a security news article, referenced by http://www.linux.org/news, at http://www.techworld.com/security/news/index.cfm?NewsID=3668 talking about an SSH weakness involving the known_hosts file. I apologize if this issue has already been addressed, but the mailing list archives didn't turn up anything when i tried searching for something relevant. So; not to knee-jerk or

Hi list, I do not known, if this is really an issue but i noticed that when connecting to a remote ssh host with the standard linux openssh client using a private key, that there is no line of text indicating when the local key-passwd process was completed and the connection session was established. On a compromised host, the login shell could write the line 'Enter passphrase for key

Yeah but if you are uncertain about your own box my VERY STRONG advise is that you reinstall. IF your host is indeed owned, then you are a lot further away then just reinstalling, god knows what issues can arrise when a cracker exploits the system to do bogus tasks.. Then i say: Too bad for your time, sorry but it's like that -- Kind regards, Remko Lodder Elvandar.org/DSINet.org

I've got a problem that I'm hoping the list can help with, otherwise ... Heres the problem, I've got OpenSSH 1.2.2p1 running on my Intel Linux box as the secure server. I can connect from another Intel Linux box using scp and it all seems to work fine. Another box tries to connect and it gets a warning about the host keysize not matching. I'm thinking this could be some byte

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3627 Bug ID: 3627 Summary: openssh 9.4p1 does not see RSA keys in know_hosts file. Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 9.4p1 Hardware: SPARC OS: Solaris Status: NEW Severity: major Priority: P5 Component: ssh

that only works when you are presuming that the host was not hacked already because i would clear those logs when i hacked a system :) but indeed it's a try, If you remain unsure, it is best to reinstall the system to be sure that a fresh and newly updated (yeah update it when installed :)) system is not compromised at that time.. loads of work, but it gives you some relief to know that

Hello & thanks for reading. I'm having a problem configuring known_hosts from scripts so an accept key yes/no prompt doesn't appear. I'm using this command to detect if the server is known and add it to known_hosts: if ! ssh-keygen -F ${IP_ADDR} -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts > /dev/null 2>&1; t hen ssh-keyscan -p ${PORT} ${IP_ADDR} >> ~/.ssh/known_hosts; fi This works

On Wed, May 17, 2017 at 2:46 AM, Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> wrote: > On Mon, 15 May 2017, Adam Eijdenberg wrote: >> https://github.com/golang/go/issues/20273 >> >> By default they are looking for a principal named "host:port" inside >> of the certificate presented by the server, instead of just looking >> for the host as I believe OpenSSH

1] not using secure http for log-ins seems a bit 20th century. 2] to join this mailing list, I needed to send my new credentials over unsecured http - see 1] above. 3] to change password from the compromised reset password, I need to use unsecured http - see 1] above. My point here is that if you are saddened, upset or concerned about the compromise, might the 3 above points also be on the list

Valeri Galtsev wrote: > > On Thu, April 28, 2016 8:56 am, mdubendris at gmail.com wrote: >> The problem is not with your installation of CentOS, it is with the >> computer you are connecting from. Read the error log you pasted earlier, >> it tells you exactly what the problem is and how to remedy it: >>> >>> Add correct host key in

Hi SSH-devs, This may be a bit off topic for this list, but.... Would it be ok to share a private key in an installer script so long as the corresponding public key is setup like this... command="cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub" ssh-rsa AAAA... I'm looking for a secure way to get a user to share their public key through SSH which can be invoked from an installer on another host...for

Hi, I try to get OpenSSH working on Compaq's Tru64 Unix (alias Digital Unix) Version 5.1. It compiles smootly with OpenSSL-0.9.6, but I observer some odd things. (A) AS SERVER The authenification via .ssh/known_host doesn't work. I have the same sshd_config as on FreeBSD (OpenSSH 2.2.0), where it works. sshd -d -d: ----------- debug1: sshd version OpenSSH_2.3.0p1 ... RSA key generation

Hello! I'd just like to run this by some people who are more familiar with the RSA and DSA algorithms and their use within (Open)SSH. I've been using OpenSSH happily with the assumption that using key-based authentication (RSA or DSA public keys pushed to .ssh/authorized_keys on remote hosts) provides a number of benefits, including an important security-related one -- Logging in to a

I have a centos box that will need to ssh into 2 other centos boxes (with keys). Now one of these boxes is a firewall, and another is a system behind the firewall. I have rules in my firewall to punch into the system behind the FW. Now if i connect to the IP (sine the public one is shared), anytime i connect to the other system, I get the host verification failed error and have to

Hi, I just fixed a couple of corner-cases relating to UpdateHostkeys in git HEAD and have enabled the option by default. IMO this protocol extension is important because it allows ssh clients to automatically migrate to the best available signature algorithms available on the server and supports our goal of deprecating RSA/SHA1 in the future. We would really appreciate your feedback on this

Hi All As many may have noticed the GNU Project's FTP server had been compromised as outlined in this CERT advisory[1]. I felt the urge to quickly hack together a small perl script to check my distfiles against the published md5 sums from FSF. Using this file as reference: ftp://ftp.gnu.org/before-2003-08-01.md5sums.asc (Check and Verify the PGP signature ![1]) [1] Full CERT advisory :