similar to: TIOCSCTTY problem/fix

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=536 Summary: no access to tty on Linux 2.0 Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.6p1 Platform: ix86 OS/Version: Linux Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy: jfeise at

Hello, openssh-3.0.1p1 appears to transmit and parse tty modes correctly, but later in the code it uses vhangup() to close all tty references and reset the tty to default modes. I don't think that vhangup() should be needed on Unix98 ptys, possibly not even on BSD ptys, and I am probably wrong, so please tell me where. Of course vhangup() clears all tty modes, so you need to save them

Doing this breaks bash in virt-rescue with the error: bash: cannot set terminal process group (-1): Inappropriate ioctl for device bash: no job control in this shell Also ^C etc does not work. Removing this ioctl call fixes this. I noticed the problem because supermin's init compiled with dietlibc worked, since the dietlibc header files don't define TIOCSCTTY and hence the ioctl

Hi there I've just upgraded to openssh-3.2.2p1 from openssh-1.2.3 and am having some difficulties. On one of the platforms I'm using (linux kernel 2.2.19 with glibc 2.1.1) it works fine, but on another (linux kernel 2.2.20 with glibc 2.0.7) I get this in the syslog every time I log in: sshd[12277]: Accepted publickey for root from 212.38.67.158 port 2397 ssh2 PAM_pwdb[12277]: (sshd)

openssh-2.9.9p2 assumes that pid_t, uid_t, gid_t, and mode_t are no wider than int. GCC complains about this assumption on 32-bit Solaris 8 sparc, where these types are 'long', not 'int'. This isn't an actual problem at runtime on this host, as long and int are the same width, but it is a problem on other hosts where pid_t is wider than int. E.g., I've heard that 64-bit

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=536 stuge-openssh-unix-dev at cdy.org changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary|no access to tty on Linux |no access to tty on Linux |2.0 |2.0 and 2.4+libc5 ------- Additional Comments

Hi. Whenever I notice a typo someplace, I fix it in a local "typo tree". Attached is 2 patches from that tree, one against OpenBSD and the other against Portable. Is it worth fixing these? -Daz. -- Darren Tucker (dtucker at zip.com.au) GPG key 8FF4FA69 / D9A3 86E9 7EEE AF4B B2D4 37C9 C982 80C7 8FF4 FA69 Good judgement comes with experience. Unfortunately, the experience

Don't know why it works, but it works ... Rich.

Is anyone bothered by the compiler warnings that indicate that the format strings don't match the associated variables? I was, so I cast most of the objectionable args (pids, uids, gids) to "long", and added an "l" (el) to the format string. A single item was cast to an int. Here's the patch. If you haven't applied my UseLogin patch, the line numbers in

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=532 Summary: Conflicting basename and dirname on solaris Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.6p1 Platform: UltraSparc OS/Version: Solaris Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: Build system AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org

Hi All. Attached is a patch that implements password expiry with PAM and privsep. It works by passing a descriptor to the tty to the monitor, which sets up a child with that tty as stdin/stdout/stderr, then runs chauthtok(). No setuid helpers. I used some parts of Michael Steffens' patch (bugid #423) to make it work on HP-UX. It's still rough but it works. Tested on Solaris 8 and

Hello All. Attached is an update to my previous patch to make do_pam_chauthtok and privsep play nicely together. First, a question: does anybody care about these or the password expiration patches? Anyway, the "PRIVSEP(do_pam_hauthtok())" has been moved to just after the pty has been allocated but before it's made the controlling tty. This allows the child running chauthtok to

heres a fix for pam support im openssh, inline and attached.. openssh calls do_pam_session early, before a fork(). it does this on the proc still running as root, so it checks the users limits, against what root has running, and depending on limits can fail at the fork() (and almost always does). this patch moves it past the fork. ive been running it for a couple of weeks and everything seems

After upgrading to openssh-2.5.2p2, my users were unable to login using ssh Protocol 1. Entries like this were showing up in syslog: Apr 5 19:29:45 maple sshd[16726]: Accepted password for anthonyu from ::ffff:192.168.0.2 port 1019 Apr 5 19:29:45 maple sshd[16726]: fatal: stat(/dev/pts/1 19:29:45 sshd[16726]: Accepted password for anthonyu) failed: No such file or directory Apr 5 19:29:45

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=245 ------- Additional Comments From dtucker at zip.com.au 2002-12-14 00:36 ------- Did some digging on this. Carson seems to be correct in that the problem is due to missing controlling terminal. I uncommented the setsid() in sshd.c and added some debugging log() calls to sshd, which generated the following: sshd[21690]: main: before setsid

I've been giving SSH_ASKPASS a hard look, and it's not clear to me how it's supposed to work. The documentation (ssh.1) seems explicit enough: SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute

The primary purpose of the attached patches is for portable OpenSSH to support changing expired passwords as specified in shadow password files. To support that, I did a couple enhancements to the base OpenBSD OpenSSH code. They are: 1. Consolidated the handling of "forced_command" into a do_exec() function in session.c. These were being handled inconsistently and allocated

Can we do this? Or should we drop the whole char *tty; ? There will be no way of setting the TTY= correctly while using privsep (Mainly for multiple streams over single session). The only thing we really could do is do: In do_setusercontext() if (use_privsep) aix_usrinfo(pw, NULL); and back in the old spot put: if (!use_privsep) aix_usrinfo(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);

As posted, here is an updated patch which allows openssh to be built with non-selinux config. (Hi openssh guys, forwarding this to you incase you interested including it into the devel version of openssh. Please let us know if you have any suggestions or changes that need to be made) Regards Nigel Kukard On Thu, Sep 02, 2004 at 04:11:54PM -0400, Daniel J Walsh wrote: > New SSH patch. >

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=315 dirk.meyer at dinoex.sub.org changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Summary|add miissing includes and |add missing includes and |defines for FREEBSD |defines for FREEBSD ------- Additional Comments From