similar to: [Bug 238] sshd.pid file written AFTER key generation causes race condition

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=238 Summary: sshd.pid file written AFTER key generation causes race condition Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.1p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: enhancement Priority: P5 Component: sshd AssignedTo:

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=238 djm at mindrot.org changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Status|NEW |RESOLVED Resolution| |WONTFIX ------- Additional Comments From djm at mindrot.org 2003-05-17 09:44

Hello Samba people, I have been successfully using Samba for several years, across many minor versions of Samba across many minor versions of Linux kernel 2.4.x and 2.6.x, against a Windows 2000 and then in the past couple of years 2003 AD Domain. This morning, something broke... Setting the stage: RedHat Fedora based Linux box, FC8, updated over time using 'yum update'...,

I compiled OpenSSH 3.6.1p1 on NCR MP-RAS v4.3 (or at least "uname -a"'s output of 4.0.3.0 suggests v4.3, I'm not positive). I was able to compile zlib (1.1.4) and openssl (0.9.7a) with little trouble. OpenSSH took hand-hacking the includes.h file as follows: diff -cr openssh-3.6.1p1/includes.h openssh-3.6.1p1-customized/includes.h *** openssh-3.6.1p1/includes.h Sun Oct 20

Dear List... I have a similar question to the one that is copied below. I am trying to get instructions for configuring OpenSSH to use PKI based authentication. I understand that I can provide the server with the public keys of the client machines to get this working (one way) but the next step is where I would like to go... I want SSHD to authenticate my users based upon the "Root

Due to unpleasant (but arguably valid) policy changes at work, any SSH server within the work firewall must accept only PKI authentication. Unless we can convince the higher-ups otherwise, we will also have to use the commercial SSH server within the firewall. Of course, I should be able to use whatever client I like. Unfortunately, it is not clear that I can get OpenSSH to use PKI authentication.

I got a packet capture of one of the SSH2 sessions trying to log in as a couple of illegal usernames. The contents of one packet suggests an attempt to buffer overflow the SSH server; ethereal's SSH decoding says "overly large value". It didn't seem to work against my system (I see no strange processes running; all files changed in past ten days look normal). I am

Is it possible to access the described class in a shared behavior? I''m trying to do something like this: describe "Siberian feline", :shared => true do described_class_instance_as :feline, :name => "fluffy", :breed => "Siberian" # or maybe before(:all) do @feline = described_class.new(:name => "fluffy", :breed =>

Hello, This bug exists in 5.0p1. I apologize that I couldn't test against HEAD. I _believe_ I have found a race condition in sshd. In the v2 protocol, after a connection, the accepting process forks in privsep_preauth(). The parent executes monitor_child_preauth() to allow certain privsep requests necessary for authentication. The unprivileged child runs do_ssh2_kex() followed by

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1487 Summary: Race condition between monitor and unprivileged child in sshd Classification: Unclassified Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 5.0p1 Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd

I'm accustomed to systems where even the first failed login attempt incurs a 5 second delay. I don't think that's too harsh, but everyone has their own needs and considerations. This could be made configurable. -Jay -----Original Message----- From: Rick Jones [mailto:rick.jones2 at hp.com] Sent: Wednesday, December 15, 2004 8:09 PM To: Jay Libove Cc: openssh-unix-dev at

I have a situation where a number of potentially hostile clients ssh to a host I control, each ssh'ing in as the same user, and each forwarding a remote port back to them. So, the authorized_keys file looks like: no-agent-forwarding,command="/bin/true",no-pty,no-user-rc,no-X11-forwarding,permitopen="127.0.0.1:7" ssh-rsa AAAAB....vnRWxcgaK9xXoU= client1234 at example.com

why don't you do some profiling instead of posting so many lines of email?

https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=440 Darren Tucker <dtucker at zip.com.au> changed: What |Removed |Added ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Attachment #1429| |ok? Flag| | --- Comment #7 from Darren Tucker <dtucker at

[This is a copy of the contents of Debian bug report #147842.] Package: rsync Version: 2.5.5-0.2 Severity: normal Cause ----- - rsync forks a child which in turn forks a grandchild in main.c:do_recv(). - Diagnostics written by the grandchild need to be read by the child using read_error_fd() to be handled properly (with the end result being that they are seen by the user running rsync). -

Hello again, In discussing my proposed patches for supporting alignment assumptions (for supporting __builtin_assume_aligned; see http://lists.cs.uiuc.edu/pipermail/llvm-commits/Week-of-Mon-20121126/157659.html), Chandler and I have started discussing an infrastructure for declaring invariants in the IR for use by the optimizer. The basic idea is to introduce a new intrinsic: void

Wonder if you guys could help me out...have a security problem with sshd wich enables a user to do a password login tough the sshd_config states PasswordAuthentication no My config works fine in both gentoo and openbsd 3.3 but users are able to login with tunneled clear text passwords in both 4.9 and 5.1 Im lost.tried everything I can think of. Here is the config:

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=440 ------- Additional Comments From dtucker at zip.com.au 2004-02-10 18:07 ------- Took a quick look at this. I can confirm that when running in inetd ("-i -o Protocol=1,2") the SSHv1 ephemeral keys are still generated for v2 connects, and that with the patch it's not. The patch, however, seems to break SSHv1 connections in inetd

Hi, For each user connection when privilege separation is enabled, 3 processes are of interest for this topic. 1. sshd:[priv] - privileged user process. 2. sshd:user at pts/0 - user process. 3. shell - shell process. Openssh code writes the #2. sshd:user at pts/0 - user process to the utmp/wtmp file. Is this the correct behaviour.? Or should it write the #3. shell

I get error: %SSHD-3-ERROR: Could not load host key: /tmp/ssh_host_dsa_key: Bad file descriptor Jan 26 23:58:52: %SSHD-6-INFO: Disabling protocol version 2. Could not load host key Everything looks okay, the file exists, (it was generated using command: ssh-keygen -d -f ssh_host_dsa_key -N '') I also do 'ls' and find the file exists with permissions: -rw------- 1 root group