similar to: restricted scp and/or sftp

Hi, As per the subject line - if I look up setting up chroot jails for SFTP over SSH2 I'm led to various Web sites and patches and also to a CentOS wiki page dated 2005, but what's the 'best' or 'correct' way to set this up for Centos 4.5 and 5? Thanks

Hi, my goal: sftp/scp only access, without the need for linux users. I want to provide 10 sftp/scp directories to 10 people. Let's call this "virtual account" I don't want to create linux users for each of them. I would like to create one linux user (backup_user). In his home-directory will be 10 directories. For each "virtual account" one directory. Every

I worked on a proposal like this a few years back (including proof of concept code).? I taught sftp to have an scp personality (closer to scp2 than scp), and it was rejected by the higher ups.? It may have been the dual-personality issue, but I know the scp2 concept was also rejected at the time as it was stated there should be one transfer tool. But the only way to drag scp into this century

I am supporting a site that allows members to upload release files. I have inherited this site which was previously existing. The goal is to allow members to file transfer to and from their project area for release distribution but not to allow general shell access and not to allow access to other parts of the system. Currently rsync and old scp has been restricted using a restricted shell

Hi, On CentOS 7 I?m trying to set up a chrooted SFTP server on which specific users can only read and write on specific folder. And I?d like to disable some commands, so the users can only do ?cd?, ?ls?, ?get? and ?put? (and disabling ?chgrp?, ?chmod?, ?chown?, ?df? etc ?). Is there a way to achieve it, natively or with using a third-party software ? Alexandre MALDEME Analyste d'exploitation

PIZZACODE SECURITY ALERT program: rssh risk: low[*] problem: string format vulnerability in log.c details: rssh is a restricted shell for use with OpenSSH, allowing only scp and/or sftp. For example, if you have a server which you only want to allow users to copy files off of via scp, without providing shell access, you can use rssh to do that. Additioanlly, running rsync, rdist, and cvs are

Hi, We have a CLI that certain users get dropped into when they log in. One of the things they can go is generate certificates (actually .p12 key/certificate bundles) that they will then scp out of the box from another host. Problem is that if their default shell isn't sh, ash, dash, bash, zsh, etc. then things break. Is there a workaround to allow scp/sftp to continue to work even for

Affected Software: rssh - all versions prior to 2.3.0 Vulnerability: local user privilege escalation Severity: *CRITICAL* Impact: local users can gain root access Solution: Please upgrade to v2.3.1 Summary ------- rssh is a restricted shell which allows a system administrator to limit users' access to a system via SSH to scp, sftp, rsync, rdist, and cvs. It also allows the system

Hello List, Do I get it right that I *MUST* chroot a user first and make /bin/rssh his shell in the /etc/passwd to effectively restrict him? There should be no /bin/ksh (or bash) in his jail? If I do not jail him - no matter what is his passwd shell - he will be able to issue "ssh user at server /bin/sh" still, right? -- Best regards, Anthony mailto:rz1a at

> $ rsync -e 'ssh -v' lingnu.com: > OpenSSH_5.1p1 Debian-2, OpenSSL 0.9.8g 19 Oct 2007 > debug1: Reading configuration data /etc/ssh/ssh_config > debug1: Applying options for * > debug1: Connecting to lingnu.com [199.203.56.105] port 22. > debug1: Connection established. ... > debug1: Sending command: rsync --server --sender -de.L . As we can see, rsync runs ssh, and

On 05.07.23 18:01, MCMANUS, MICHAEL P wrote: > It appears the forced command either does not run or runs to completion > and exits immediately, as there is no process named "receive.ksh" in > the process tree. FWIW, two cents of mine: -- The script *exiting* should *not* prompt sshd to execute the requested subsystem "as a second thought", or else it'd happen

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Hello, This patch makes it possible to restrict sftp sessions to a certain subtree of the file system on a per-Unix account basis. It requires a program such as rssh or scponly to function. A patch for rssh is also attached to this email. The method employed uses realpath() and a string comparison to check that each file or directory access is allowed. With this patch, sftp-server takes a

I upgraded a compiled version of ssh-1.2.27 to a swinstalled depot of OpenSSH_2.5.1p1 on HPUX-11.00. I created links in /usr/local/bin/<ssh program> pointing to /opt/openssh2/bin/<ssh program>. Ssh works. Scp does not. HP support does not support ssh. Below the line you will find the output of a verbose scp command from the server to it self.

Hi Damien, Thank you. I read the rationale. Just to summarize, a user writeable chroot target is considered dangerous if: 1) the user has another way of gaining non-chrooted access to the system 2) is able to create hardlinks to setuid-binaries outside of the chroot tree 3) there are bugs somewhere that allow privilige escalation or remote execution of other programs While all these

On Mon, 3 Jul 2023, Jochen Bern wrote: > On 30.06.23 17:56, MCMANUS, MICHAEL P wrote: > > The actual command is similar to the following (parameters inserted to > > protect the source): > > (print ${FQDN} ; print ${Environment} ; cat ${OutFileXML}) | \ > > ssh -Ti ${EmbeddedPrivateKey} \ > > -o HostKeyAlias="${Alias}" \

On 30.06.23 17:56, MCMANUS, MICHAEL P wrote: > The actual command is similar to the following (parameters inserted to protect the source): > (print ${FQDN} ; print ${Environment} ; cat ${OutFileXML}) | \ > ssh -Ti ${EmbeddedPrivateKey} \ > -o HostKeyAlias="${Alias}" \ > -o

Good Morning All, Attached is a full patch [or so I hope] enabling chroot support for sshd. I know varied opinions about chroot exist among the masses; however, I continue to believe that until something far outside the scope of openssh tackles the sandbox issue, the role of enforcer will continue to be with the daemon. This patch is based on a previous work by John Furman as well as Eric

I am using sftp-server chroot patch: http://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev&m=116043792120525&w=2 Works fine, except user is able to ssh in box. I could change users shell to /usr/libexec/sftp-server, but then chrooting wouldn't work. What is secure way to accomplish this, so that I could give friend ssh access, so that he could upload/download stuff, but not compromise my system or

On 05.07.23 02:50, Damien Miller wrote: > Some possibilities: > 1. the receive.ksh script is faulty in some way that causes it to invoke > sftp-server How would the script even *know* that the client requested the SFTP subsystem? Is a subsystem's executable/path, supposedly internally overwritten with the forced command at that point, exposed through $SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND ?