similar to: [PATCH] global port forwarding restriction

The patch below implements a couple of features which are useful in an environment where users do not have a regular shell login. It allows you to selectively disable certain features on a system-wide level for users with a certain shell; it also allows you to control and audit TCP forwarding in more detail. Our system is an email server with a menu for the login shell; we selectively allow port

Hi, sorry if it is the wrong approuch to suggest improvments to OpenSSH, but here comes my suggestion: I recently stumbled upon the scponly shell which in it's chroot:ed form is an ideal solution when you want to share some files with people you trust more or less. The problem is, if you use the scponlyc as shell, port forwarding is still allowed. This can of course be dissallowed in

We have a system on which users are given a very restricted environment (their shell is a menu) where they should not be able to run arbitrary commands. However, because their shell is not statically linked, ld.so provides a nice clutch of holes for them to exploit. The patch below adds a new configuration option to sshd which quashes their attempts to set LD_PRELOAD etc. using ~/.ssh/environment

We recently switched to OpenSSH from ssh 1.2.x and I quickly noticed that /etc/environment processing has gone AWOL. This patch adds a new sshd_config variable: SysEnvFile Specifies a file containing the system-wide default environment in ``VARNAME=value'' format (default is none.) The contents of a user's $HOME/.ssh/environment file, if

Hi ! I hacked together a couple of patches for Openssh 2.1.1p4 port forwarding. It is a one patch file that does the following two things: First: If the server is configured not to allow port forwardings it sends SSH_SMSG_FAILURE (protocol 1) while openssh client expects SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS. When the client gets the failure it exists with protocol error message. This patch will accept both failure

A short while ago, I looked at using the AllowUsers configuration option in openssh (v3.8p1 , but I believe this to be unchanged in 3.9p1) to restrict access such that only specific remote machines could access specific local accounts. I swiftly discovered that a) specifying wildcarded IP numbers to try to allow a useful IP range was pointless: if I specified AllowUsers joe at

Patch is below : diff -nru openssh-3.8.1p1/auth-options.c openssh-3.8.1p1-devs//auth-options.c --- openssh-3.8.1p1/auth-options.c Tue Jun 3 02:25:48 2003 +++ openssh-3.8.1p1-devs//auth-options.c Mon Feb 21 16:56:49 2005 @@ -265,6 +265,81 @@ xfree(patterns); goto next_option; } + +/* e.g: permitopenned="158.156.0.0/255.255.255.0:25[-1024]" + * note that part between [] is

The following is a patch I've been working on to support a "ChrootUser" option in the sshd_config file. I was looking for a way to offer sftp access and at the same time restict interactive shell access. This patch is a necessary first step (IMO). It applies clean with 'patch -l'. Also attached is a shell script that helps to build a chrooted home dir on a RedHat 7.2

The patch below (against openssh 3.2.3p1) adds a CheckMaxStartups option, defaulting to yes, to determine whether sshd calls drop_connection(). The motivation behind this is twofold. In our environment, our timesharing machines get enough incoming connections that will trigger spuriously with the default value (10 forked unauthenticated connections) as well as some significantly higher values,

I'm curious as to whether or not there is a way to restrict forwarded ports server side. For instance, I'm running an IRC server and am allowing users to connect via ssh forwarding (so I can take advantange of using openssh's public key method for authentication). Each client I tell to setup their ~/.ssh/config in a certain way, but the relevant line is: LocalForward 6667

Hi ! Here's a patch to add remote port forwarding support (protocol 2) for openssh. I have tried to test that it works like it should but a more thorough testing is needed. This patch adds both client/server support. The patch should be applied to openssh-2.1.1p4 source tree. Also included is a PortForwarding sshd_config option, new ./configure option --disable-forwarding that should make it

Hey everyone, I wanted to add support for denying PTY allocation through OpenSSH. I'm not certain if this is quite thorough enough for all cases, but for me it might work for the moment. I know that you can currently do this through authorized_keys, but as far as I know that only works for an actual key. In my use case, I wanted a user with no password which is forced to run a specific

Hi all, I'm very new in this list, as looking for codes to plug up the lack of functionality of "Protocol 2 Remote Forwardig". Fortunately, I could find it in MARC's archive. Mr. Jarno Huuskonen posted the codes in Sept, last year, and I tried applying it to my FreeBSD box environment. I couldn't apply an original patch, of course, for incompatibility of virsion. The

It appears that openssh has inherited the dos attack that ssh is susceptible to. This has been discussed on Bugtraq (see http://securityportal.com/list-archive/bugtraq/1999/Sep/0124.html for the thread). There does not appear to be an official for ssh. Attached below is a simple, proof of concept, patch that adds a MaxConnections to sshd_config that sets the maximum number of simultaneous

Hi ! Here's an experimental patch for openssh-2.1.1p4 to add support (to openssh client) for -R (protocol 2). So if you have access to a commercial ssh2 server (that allows port forwardings) could you test this patch. (Note the openssh server doesn't have support for -R with protocol 2 so testing with openssh server won't do much good). To test remember to use -o "Protocol

The following patch against openssh-SNAP-20000823 allows to override the compile-time "ssh_prng_cmds" file at run time by adding new options to the server and client configurations. (We move binaries around a bit, and this was the only absolute path that couldn't be fixed at run-time). Regards Jan diff -ur openssh-SNAP-20000823.orig/entropy.c openssh-SNAP-20000823.new/entropy.c

From: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap at oracle.com> scripts/headers_install.pl prevents "__user" from being exported to userspace headers, so just use compiler.h to make sure that __user is defined and avoid the error. unifdef: linux-next-20101112/xx64/usr/include/xen/privcmd.h.tmp: 79: Premature EOF (#if line 33 depth 1) Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap at

From: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap at oracle.com> scripts/headers_install.pl prevents "__user" from being exported to userspace headers, so just use compiler.h to make sure that __user is defined and avoid the error. unifdef: linux-next-20101112/xx64/usr/include/xen/privcmd.h.tmp: 79: Premature EOF (#if line 33 depth 1) Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap at

From: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap at oracle.com> scripts/headers_install.pl prevents "__user" from being exported to userspace headers, so just use compiler.h to make sure that __user is defined and avoid the error. unifdef: linux-next-20101112/xx64/usr/include/xen/privcmd.h.tmp: 79: Premature EOF (#if line 33 depth 1) Signed-off-by: Randy Dunlap <randy.dunlap at

There are a couple of niggles with the sandboxing of the unprivileged child in the privsep code: the empty directory causes namespace pollution, and it requires care to ensure that it is set up properly and remains set up properly. The patch below (against the portable OpenSSH, although the patch against the OpenBSD version is very similar) replaces the fixed empty directory with one that is