similar to: [PATCH] prevent users from changing their environment

Hi, sorry if it is the wrong approuch to suggest improvments to OpenSSH, but here comes my suggestion: I recently stumbled upon the scponly shell which in it's chroot:ed form is an ideal solution when you want to share some files with people you trust more or less. The problem is, if you use the scponlyc as shell, port forwarding is still allowed. This can of course be dissallowed in

The patch below implements a couple of features which are useful in an environment where users do not have a regular shell login. It allows you to selectively disable certain features on a system-wide level for users with a certain shell; it also allows you to control and audit TCP forwarding in more detail. Our system is an email server with a menu for the login shell; we selectively allow port

A short while ago, I looked at using the AllowUsers configuration option in openssh (v3.8p1 , but I believe this to be unchanged in 3.9p1) to restrict access such that only specific remote machines could access specific local accounts. I swiftly discovered that a) specifying wildcarded IP numbers to try to allow a useful IP range was pointless: if I specified AllowUsers joe at

Would anybody happen to have or know of a patch to make /etc/default/login PATH and SUPATH the default openssh path? We have customized paths for each school of engineering (each have their own customized site bin). This is easily controled with /etc/default/login. The --with-default-path option is too rigid. This is Solaris I am talking about. --mike

I looked around for a while, but couldn't find any code for requiring multiple authentication mechanisms in openssh. So I wrote an implemention. I thought at first I should change the PasswordAuthentication, PubkeyAuthentication, etc. keywords to allow no/yes/required. But there's some funky stuff in auth2.c with respect to keyboard interactive auth that would make this kind of

Here's another patch for people providing ssh access to restricted environments. We allow our users to use port forwarding when logging into our mail servers so that they can use it to fetch mail over an encrypted channel using clients that don't support TLS, for example fetchmail. (In fact, fetchmail has built-in ssh support.) However we don't want them connecting to other places

We recently switched to OpenSSH from ssh 1.2.x and I quickly noticed that /etc/environment processing has gone AWOL. This patch adds a new sshd_config variable: SysEnvFile Specifies a file containing the system-wide default environment in ``VARNAME=value'' format (default is none.) The contents of a user's $HOME/.ssh/environment file, if

I need a way to make sshd require S/KEY authentication to succeed before allowing either password or public-key authentication. Currently, we can only have S/KEY+password, by using PAM for authentication, and configuring PAM accordingly. But PAM of course can't handle SSH public keys. I thought for a while that ideally we could actually use PAM to tell sshd what methods of authentication to

Hey everyone, I wanted to add support for denying PTY allocation through OpenSSH. I'm not certain if this is quite thorough enough for all cases, but for me it might work for the moment. I know that you can currently do this through authorized_keys, but as far as I know that only works for an actual key. In my use case, I wanted a user with no password which is forced to run a specific

Could people please test -current? We will be making a release fairly soon. -d -- | By convention there is color, \\ Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> | By convention sweetness, By convention bitterness, \\ www.mindrot.org | But in reality there are atoms and space - Democritus (c. 400 BCE)

Hello, whereas most people take passwd/shadow/ldap/<whatever> as the place where decision on a chrooted environment / sandbox for certain users is met (just set the given usershell appropriateley), I needed a somewhat different approach. Below is a tiny patch to 2.2.0p1 which enhances the sshd-config by two options and, when set, places all users / users of a certain group immediately in

Hello, I came across an interoperability problem in OpenSSH 3.0p1 and 3.0.1p1 concerning the AFS token forwarding. That means that the new versions are not able to exchange AFS tokens (and Kerberos TGTs) with older OpenSSH releases (including 2.9p2) and with the old SSH 1.2.2x. In my opinion this problem already existed in Openssh 2.9.9p1, but I have never used this version (I only looked at the

Here is a patch that does TIS auth via PAM. It's controlled by a switch in the sshd_config. You'd use it by having a PAM module that sets PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON. eg, you could use it with pam_skey or pam_smxs. The patch is against the 2.9.9p2 distribution. I'm not on the list, a reply if this patch is accepted would be great. (But not required, I know some folks have a distaste for

The following is a patch I've been working on to support a "ChrootUser" option in the sshd_config file. I was looking for a way to offer sftp access and at the same time restict interactive shell access. This patch is a necessary first step (IMO). It applies clean with 'patch -l'. Also attached is a shell script that helps to build a chrooted home dir on a RedHat 7.2

Specifying a RemoteForward of 0:example.com:1234 dynamically allocates the listen port on the server, and then reports it to ... the client! Where it is practically useless. Was this someone's idea of a joke? Presumably not--there are some technical obstacles to reporting it to the remote process. I'd like to help solve that problem. The natural way to me would be to extend the syntax

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=118 Summary: Implement TIS (protocol 1) via PAM Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P3 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy: fcusack at

Hello, appended is a patch that makes it possible to use PAM both for password authentication and TIS (i.e. s/key or opie or any other interactive challenge/response scheme). I have developed this starting from the patch at http://www.debian.org/Bugs/db/61/61906.html on Debian with openssh-2.1.1p4-3. After configuring ssh with --with-pam-tis, there are two PAM services, "sshd" and

Heya, I'm trying to convince my company to use OpenSSH instead of the commercial SSH version. I need a little help: 1. What features does OpenSSH offer over commercial SSH (besides being free and open source of course)? 2. Our lawyers want details on the licensing / patents stuff. I have the high level details from the OpenSSH page. I need the nitty gritty like RSA patent# and

Hi ! I hacked together a couple of patches for Openssh 2.1.1p4 port forwarding. It is a one patch file that does the following two things: First: If the server is configured not to allow port forwardings it sends SSH_SMSG_FAILURE (protocol 1) while openssh client expects SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS. When the client gets the failure it exists with protocol error message. This patch will accept both failure

The auth-pam.c of sshd server contains a small flaw that allows empty password logins even if "PermitEmptyPasswords" option in the sshd config file is set to "no". The scenario is as follows: Using ssh the user tries to logon to the machine using an account that has empty password. If the user presses enter on the password prompt (NULL password) access is