similar to: [PATCH] Add config option disabling drop_connection() behavior

Hi, I am not sure to report this as a bug. so mailing to the list. I have sshd(openssh3.5p1) server running on my router and when i run tcpjunk to that port, sshd gets killed after some time 192.168.71.1 is my sshd server and 192.168.71.4 is my client from where i send my dos attack This is the tcpjunk command i gave to the ssh server #tcpjunk -s 192.168.71.1 -p 22 -c req -i 100 req session

Could people please test -current? We will be making a release fairly soon. -d -- | By convention there is color, \\ Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> | By convention sweetness, By convention bitterness, \\ www.mindrot.org | But in reality there are atoms and space - Democritus (c. 400 BCE)

Hello, I came across an interoperability problem in OpenSSH 3.0p1 and 3.0.1p1 concerning the AFS token forwarding. That means that the new versions are not able to exchange AFS tokens (and Kerberos TGTs) with older OpenSSH releases (including 2.9p2) and with the old SSH 1.2.2x. In my opinion this problem already existed in Openssh 2.9.9p1, but I have never used this version (I only looked at the

Here's another patch for people providing ssh access to restricted environments. We allow our users to use port forwarding when logging into our mail servers so that they can use it to fetch mail over an encrypted channel using clients that don't support TLS, for example fetchmail. (In fact, fetchmail has built-in ssh support.) However we don't want them connecting to other places

On 21/01/20 8:44 pm, Damien Miller wrote: > On Tue, 21 Jan 2020, Philipp Marek wrote: > >>> This makes me think that the syslog approach is probably the way to go >> >> Yeah, right. >> Another idea is to mirror the current preauth load via setproctitle()... >> That makes that data accessible even without a syscall (at least the >> writing of the

Heya, I'm trying to convince my company to use OpenSSH instead of the commercial SSH version. I need a little help: 1. What features does OpenSSH offer over commercial SSH (besides being free and open source of course)? 2. Our lawyers want details on the licensing / patents stuff. I have the high level details from the OpenSSH page. I need the nitty gritty like RSA patent# and

The following patch against openssh-SNAP-20000823 allows to override the compile-time "ssh_prng_cmds" file at run time by adding new options to the server and client configurations. (We move binaries around a bit, and this was the only absolute path that couldn't be fixed at run-time). Regards Jan diff -ur openssh-SNAP-20000823.orig/entropy.c openssh-SNAP-20000823.new/entropy.c

> This makes me think that the syslog approach is probably the way to go Yeah, right. Another idea is to mirror the current preauth load via setproctitle()... That makes that data accessible even without a syscall (at least the writing of the data - quering needs syscalls, right), so that can be kept up-to-date and allows a high monitoring frequency as well. Multiple instances of SSHd (on

The following is a patch I've been working on to support a "ChrootUser" option in the sshd_config file. I was looking for a way to offer sftp access and at the same time restict interactive shell access. This patch is a necessary first step (IMO). It applies clean with 'patch -l'. Also attached is a shell script that helps to build a chrooted home dir on a RedHat 7.2

Hi, sorry if it is the wrong approuch to suggest improvments to OpenSSH, but here comes my suggestion: I recently stumbled upon the scponly shell which in it's chroot:ed form is an ideal solution when you want to share some files with people you trust more or less. The problem is, if you use the scponlyc as shell, port forwarding is still allowed. This can of course be dissallowed in

We recently switched to OpenSSH from ssh 1.2.x and I quickly noticed that /etc/environment processing has gone AWOL. This patch adds a new sshd_config variable: SysEnvFile Specifies a file containing the system-wide default environment in ``VARNAME=value'' format (default is none.) The contents of a user's $HOME/.ssh/environment file, if

Would anybody happen to have or know of a patch to make /etc/default/login PATH and SUPATH the default openssh path? We have customized paths for each school of engineering (each have their own customized site bin). This is easily controled with /etc/default/login. The --with-default-path option is too rigid. This is Solaris I am talking about. --mike

The patch below implements a couple of features which are useful in an environment where users do not have a regular shell login. It allows you to selectively disable certain features on a system-wide level for users with a certain shell; it also allows you to control and audit TCP forwarding in more detail. Our system is an email server with a menu for the login shell; we selectively allow port

We have a system on which users are given a very restricted environment (their shell is a menu) where they should not be able to run arbitrary commands. However, because their shell is not statically linked, ld.so provides a nice clutch of holes for them to exploit. The patch below adds a new configuration option to sshd which quashes their attempts to set LD_PRELOAD etc. using ~/.ssh/environment

Hi, We serve a fairly substantial number[1] of ssh connections across our fleet.? We have hit MaxStartups limits in the past and bumped it up a few times (currently at 300), but we have no warning before the limit is reached and connections start being dropped.? What I would love is some sort of instrumentation that could let us see the highest number of concurrent pre-auth connections the

This issue has been discussed here and elsewhere a fair bit in the past year or so, but to re-address the issue... As of OpenSSH 2.9.something the ability to have an Xauthority located in /tmp was removed, with the following description in the ChangeLog : - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 21:21:29 [session.c] remove xauth-cookie-in-tmp handling. use default $XAUTHORITY, since

Hi. >From my understanding the MaxStartups option can be set to limit the number of concurrent sessions the OpenSSH server opens. My concern is how OpenSSH handles the case where this number is reached. >From the code it looks like it simply closes the socket: sshd.c:1440 if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) { debug("drop connection #%d", startups); close(newsock);

Hi, We'd like to run sshd with a configuration morally equivilent to: # stuff ... AuthorizedKeysFile /var/db/keys-distributed-by-security-team/%u AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys # be backwards compatable for a bit longer yet AuthorizedKeysFile %h/.ssh/authorized_keys2 # more stuff ... The following patch (against the cvs source) turns the authorizedkeysfile statement in sshd.conf

Here is my third attempt at the idletimeout patch. I tried to address the points which Marcus Friedl brought up. It is actually bigger than the previous patches, but not as intrusive. It is big because it moves some stuff from serverloop.c to packet.c. - I moved all the logic to packet.c. This means that I also had to move the actual select() call, which used to be in serverloop.c to packet.c.

Hi ! I hacked together a couple of patches for Openssh 2.1.1p4 port forwarding. It is a one patch file that does the following two things: First: If the server is configured not to allow port forwardings it sends SSH_SMSG_FAILURE (protocol 1) while openssh client expects SSH_SMSG_SUCCESS. When the client gets the failure it exists with protocol error message. This patch will accept both failure