similar to: Empty password patch

Hello, appended is a patch that makes it possible to use PAM both for password authentication and TIS (i.e. s/key or opie or any other interactive challenge/response scheme). I have developed this starting from the patch at http://www.debian.org/Bugs/db/61/61906.html on Debian with openssh-2.1.1p4-3. After configuring ssh with --with-pam-tis, there are two PAM services, "sshd" and

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=118 Summary: Implement TIS (protocol 1) via PAM Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: All Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P3 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy: fcusack at

I am writing to report a bug in openssh-2.3.0p1, and to suggest a fix. I have OpenSSH installed on a Solaris 8 box. The output of uname -a is: > SunOS dipper.csi.cam.ac.uk 5.8 Generic_108528-06 sun4u sparc SUNW,Ultra-5_10 OpenSSH was configured with the following options: > ./configure --prefix=/jackdaw --with-default-path=/jackdaw/bin:/usr/bin On this OS, with this configuration, it

is this ok? symptom is: debug1: Starting up PAM with username "stevesk" debug1: Trying to reverse map address 127.0.0.1. debug1: PAM setting rhost to "localhost" debug1: Attempting authentication for stevesk. debug1: PAM Password authentication for "stevesk" failed[9]: Authentication failed Failed rsa for stevesk from 127.0.0.1 port 49568 Index: auth1.c

Hi, We've encountered a bug with OpenSSH 3.8.1p1 on Linux. With an account that has an empty password and with PAM and Privilege Separation turned on through the SSH1 protocol, the login fails with: fatal: mm_request_receive_expect: read: rtype 24 != type 46 I believe the problem is a missing do_pam_account() call. The patch below to auth1.c fixes the problem. If this is correct, can

Hi All. Attached is a patch against OpenBSD, based in part on the owl-always-auth patch. The idea is that the only way out of auth_passwd for the failure case is the "return 0" at the bottom. I don't know if this is a good way to do it or not, it's presented for discussion. Also, I don't think 3.6.1p2 is quite right WRT these timing issues (eg, you get a fast failure

For some reasons the afs tokenforwarding stuff has changed siginificantly from v 2.9p2 to 2.9.9p2. This makes it impossible to use public key authenticication in a standart AFS environment. I don't know the reasons for these changes. In any case attached is a patch which restores the old behaviour. Regards Serge -- Serge Droz Paul Scherrer Institut mailto:serge.droz at

Hi, We at BalaBit IT Security Ltd developed a patch against openssh 2.3.0p1 to support TIS authserv authentication. TIS authserv uses a simple protocol, and supports CryptoCard, SKey, password etc. authentication. The commercial versions of SSH support this protocol, OpenSSH implemented SKey on its own using the protocol primitives originally invented for TIS authentication. Our patch is an

Hello, I going to use ssh with Kerberos V5 support along with support for AFS. I don't want to use Kerberos V4 or AFS token passing. The only thing I need from AFS is creating an AFS token (using appropriate function from krb5 API) after user's authentication. It seems to me that such scenario is not much supported by the current code. Rather it is assumed only Kerberos 4 will be used

Hi, SSH brute force attacks seem to enjoy increasing popularity. Call me an optimist or a misrouted kind of contributer to the community, but on our company server I actually go through the logs and report extreme cases to the providers of the originating IP's. With the increasing number of these attacks, however, I have now decided that it's better to move the SSHd to a different

Precedence: bulk Hi folks, It seemed to me that it would be useful to be able to control access to my server with the /etc/ssh_known_hosts file, using RSA authentication of the remote host. But the protocol only allows RSA host authentication in conjunction with rhosts, while I prefer RSA user authentication. I've made a patch to the server which adds a new configuration option:

Hello, I came across an interoperability problem in OpenSSH 3.0p1 and 3.0.1p1 concerning the AFS token forwarding. That means that the new versions are not able to exchange AFS tokens (and Kerberos TGTs) with older OpenSSH releases (including 2.9p2) and with the old SSH 1.2.2x. In my opinion this problem already existed in Openssh 2.9.9p1, but I have never used this version (I only looked at the

Hello there! I have made a patch against OpenSSH 3.0.2p1 which allows the fingerprint of the accepted key to be printed in the log message. It works with SSH1-RSA and SSH2 pubkey (DSA+RSA) authentication. This feature is controllable by the LogKeyFingerprint config option (turned off by default). Michal Kara -------------- next part -------------- diff -u5

Could people please test -current? We will be making a release fairly soon. -d -- | By convention there is color, \\ Damien Miller <djm at mindrot.org> | By convention sweetness, By convention bitterness, \\ www.mindrot.org | But in reality there are atoms and space - Democritus (c. 400 BCE)

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=559 ------- Additional Comments From dtucker at zip.com.au 2004-07-01 13:40 ------- (From update of attachment 292) OK, except for the last bit, I think this is all done. >+#ifdef USE_PAM >+ options.permit_empty_passwd && >+#endif This is done in auth-passwd.c: if (*password == '\0' &&

this is the proposed gssapi diff against OpenSSH-current (non-portable). note: if this goes in, the old krb5 auth (ssh.com compatible) will be removed. please comment. jakob Index: auth.h =================================================================== RCS file: /home/hack/jakob/mycvs/sshgss/auth.h,v retrieving revision 1.1.1.2 retrieving revision 1.3 diff -u -r1.1.1.2 -r1.3 --- auth.h

Dear list, since the order of authentication and AFS token/KRB TGT forwarding changed (around 3.0), we have had problems with users accidentally overwriting their credentials from a "password" login with forwarded credentials. E.g. user A logs in as user B, but stays with the AFS permissions of user A. A workaround is to use "-k" on these sessions, but "it worked without

I need a way to make sshd require S/KEY authentication to succeed before allowing either password or public-key authentication. Currently, we can only have S/KEY+password, by using PAM for authentication, and configuring PAM accordingly. But PAM of course can't handle SSH public keys. I thought for a while that ideally we could actually use PAM to tell sshd what methods of authentication to

----- Forwarded message from Andrea Barisani <lcars at infis.univ.trieste.it> ----- Date: Fri, 2 May 2003 14:01:33 +0200 From: Andrea Barisani <lcars at infis.univ.trieste.it> To: openssh at openssh.com Subject: openssh 3.6.1_p2 problem with pam Hi, I've just updated to openssh 3.6.1_p2 and I notice this behaviour: # ssh -l lcars mybox [2 seconds delay] lcars at mybox's

There is one spot where the password_authentication option was ignored, patch follows. Wichert. diff -wur org/openssh-2.5.2p2/auth2.c openssh-2.5.2p2/auth2.c --- org/openssh-2.5.2p2/auth2.c Sun Mar 11 21:01:56 2001 +++ openssh-2.5.2p2/auth2.c Mon Jun 4 23:31:54 2001 @@ -397,7 +397,7 @@ authenticated = auth2_challenge(authctxt, devs); #ifdef USE_PAM - if