similar to: recent breakins

Crap. I hit send too fast. Last sentence in first paragraph should have read "no completely secure way" for authentication to be passed-- because the agent-based forwarding program could have been compromised as well--except for the cases already mentioned such as SRP and RSAAuth where the auth. information is better protected. Even if the SF server had been capable of forwarding the

All-- But it's not as simple as forwarding the password-based authentication. Regardless of what method was used to SSH from system one (user's) to system two (SF), the user then started up *a second* SSH session to go from two (SF) to three (Apache). There is no effective way for any authentication information from the first session to be passed to the second, in my mind. Remember

The trojaned ssh client is nothing new to the hacker community, and the statement in the previous thread claiming "This type of man-in-the-middle attack (trojaned ssh) is not theoretical anymore, and password authentication is broken." is an example of how many poeple still think "hacking" is something very difficult and nothing short of a genius is required to make the

This is to announce the availability of SRP (Secure Remote Password) support for OpenSSH. A tarball is available on Tripod: http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/ http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/openssh-2.5.2p2-srp5.tar.gz (Note: Tripod requires you to LEFT click on links to download files.) To install, unpack, configure --with-srp, and make install, then create an

On Sun, 29 Apr 2001, RJ Atkinson wrote: > At 06:26 27/04/01, Tom Wu wrote: > >For those of you who were following the discussion about the new draft > >and implementation of SRP-based password authentication in OpenSSH, I > >promised to have Stanford issue the IETF an official, explicit, > >statement reiterating the unencumbered royalty-free licensing terms. > >The

I noticed that (perhaps because ':' is invalid in a username) you can say ssh -l user:style host, where the "user:style" is sent by the client, and the server strips the ":style" part off and makes it available as part of the authentication context. It's currently unused. What are the plans for this, if any? I was experimenting with the idea of using it with SRP

This is the 2nd beta release of SRP for OpenSSH. The patch attached to this message is relative to the current (20010411) CVS sources of OpenSSH-portable (2.5.4p1). A tarball is also available: http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/ http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/openssh-2.5.4p1-srp6.tar.gz (Note: Tripod requires you to LEFT click on links to download files, and

In message <Pine.LNX.4.30.0104031615270.8678-100000 at holly.crl.go.jp>, Tom Holro yd writes: >SRP has different requirements from Diffie-Hellman. In particular, >for SRP the generator must be primitive. It turns out that the "primes" >file contains only safe primes with primitive generators, and is thus >ideal for SRP, but so far in OpenSSH it has only been used for

The latest snapshot (20020324) fails to compile here. Linux 2.4.18-rc1 Alpha The first messages are: monitor_wrap.c: In function `mm_request_receive': monitor_wrap.c:91: warning: int format, different type arg (arg 3) monitor_wrap.c:100: warning: int format, different type arg (arg 3) which have to do with fatal() calls and int not being the same as ssize_t... But the next one is the

Hai Mark, I see the bugreport for this is still untouched. https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11998 Is vfs_full_audit not an option? with %I you can log the IP address of the client machine. But i dont know if that wil work of if vfs_full_audit hase that option. With something like this. full_audit:prefix = %u|%I|%m|%S full_audit:failure = connect full_audit:success = connect

I'm running Linux 2.1.130 on an AXP, with Samba 2.0 beta 2. I have smbfs enabled in the kernel with Win 95 bug fixes enabled but I'm not running smbd. The server containing the share is an HP running Samba 1.9.16p11. I mount the share with smbmount //hpname/share -c 'mount /home/me/mydir' All is well for a while (~1 hour), but then I get kernel: smb_get_length: recv error = 5

How is -n supposed to work? When you say ssh -n, it sets stdin_null_flag but not batch mode. When the client is choosing authmethods, there is a batch_flag that is tested to see (presumably) if we are in batch mode or perhaps if -n has been given. But nothing sets it. It looks like it's supposed to point to options.batch_mode, but it's never even initialized! Even if it did point to

Are there any plans to include support for SRP or a similar zero-knowledge password protocol into OpenSSH? -- Jeremy

This may have been asked before, but I can't find it. I am getting repeated external attempted to log into our AD/DC (running Samba 4.4.14). In /var/log/samba/log.samba I get entried like: 2017/09/19 05:02:25.562957, 2] ../source4/auth/ntlm/auth.c:430(auth_check_password_recv) auth_check_password_recv: sam_ignoredomain authentication for user [HPRS\333] FAILED with error

On Tue, 2017-09-19 at 17:02 +0200, L.P.H. van Belle via samba wrote: > Hai Mark, > > I see the bugreport for this is still untouched. > https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=11998 I've closed that bug now. Extensive work has been done to add this feature to Samba 4.7, due out this week: https://wiki.samba.org/index.php/Setting_up_Audit_Logging Two new debug classes,

I have uploaded a new release of the OpenSSH (portable) SRP patch. This version is vs. the 20010625 openssh_cvs; there are no other changes. You can find it here: http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/ http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/OpenSSH-srp9.tar.bz2 http://members.tripod.com/professor_tom/archives/OpenSSH-srp9.patch.bz2 The tarball is the whole thing with the

Hi, I'm playing around using Opus in a 'chunked' streaming context, where chunks of media are served in separate HTTP responses. I am trying to hunt down the source of some clicks-and-pops during playback, and while it is very likely that these glitches are due to the low quality of my code, I wanted to ask if the admonition in the API docs[1] that "encoder state *must*

The way things are now, input_userauth_request() calls the authmethod, and then does a bunch of checks, like the special case for root. If an authmethod requires a challenge-response conversation, these checks are skipped, unless they are duplicated by the authmethod. For example, in auth2-chall.c, some of the code is duplicated (logging, sending the reply), but the root special case is skipped.

Does anybody use openbsd-compat/vis.c? Not at the moment I think: % find . -name '*.[ch]' -exec grep -l "vis *(" {} \; ./openbsd-compat/vis.c ./openbsd-compat/vis.h % find . -name '*.[ch]' -exec grep -l VIS_ {} \; ./includes.h ./openbsd-compat/vis.c ./openbsd-compat/vis.h The reason I ask is, AT&T's graphviz package includes a vis.h, and when I try to compile

I was having a discussion with a MS person about the performance of NT. I got this reply: ---------- Forwarded message ---------- By the way, I looked into that claim that Linux could outperform NT server, and my source claimed that the test was done on different hardware (i.e. it was rigged) and that Linux still loses to NT on equivalent HW, although "it has gotten closer." Do you