similar to: Patches for OpenSSH 2.5.2p2: evaluate /etc/default/login, makefiles manpages

This patch revive almost all login.conf and password/account expiration features, makes OpenSSH more FreeBSD login compatible and fix non-critical memory leak. Please review and commit. --- sshd.c.old Fri Feb 25 08:23:45 2000 +++ sshd.c Sun Feb 27 02:53:33 2000 @@ -37,9 +37,8 @@ #endif /* LIBWRAP */ #ifdef __FreeBSD__ -#include <libutil.h> -#include <syslog.h> #define LOGIN_CAP

Hi! Here is a patch against openssh-2.9.p2 that adds support for Maildir style mailboxes, the way which qmail prefers to store mails in. The changes/additions are the following: 1) $MAIL env. variable is set to $HOME/Maildir if it exists, or else to _PATH_MAIL/$USER. 2) Mail checking (the main purpose of this patch) is done by first checking whether $MAIL is a regular file or directory. If

This bug may be specific to the portability releases of OpenSSH. It's minor, but trivially corrected. I'm observing it under: * openssh-2.3.0p1 (openssl-0.9.6) * compiled under Solaris 2.5.1 * running under Solaris 2.5.1 and Solaris 8 The relevant source code does not appear to have changed up to and including openssh-2.9p2. The bug is that the $MAIL environment variable

The following are patches against openssh 2.1.1p4 to add support for the BSD_AUTH authentication mechanisms. It allows the use of non-challenge/response style mechanisms (which styles are allowed my be limited by appropriate auth-ssh entries in login.conf). The patches also add support for calling setusercontext for the appropriate class when called with a command (so that the PATH, limits,

Hi, I'm not subscribed, so keep me in cc. And thanks for having mailing-list open for posting. I had a couple of problems with OpenSSH on Solaris 8/MU3 + recent patches. 1) When I tried to use scp from any other host, sshd on Solaris host crashed with SIGSEGV. Here's the stack trace: core 'core.sshd.7637' of 7637: ./sshd -d -d -d fefb393c strncpy (ffbee074, 5, 7, 0,

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=446 Summary: $LOGIN not set by openssh under AIX Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: -current Platform: All OS/Version: AIX Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org ReportedBy: mii at

I believe there is a bug in how AIX handles the KRB5CCNAME environment variable. The symptom occurs when a root user restarts sshd while they have KRB5CCNAME set; all of the resulting client connections will inherit the same KRB5CCNAME variable. This can occur if the admin uses 'ksu' or some other kerberized method of obtaining root privileges. Investigating this problem, I stumbled

Hello, in the BSD Authentication system the login script can request environment variables to be set/unset. The call to auth_close() in auth-passwd.c does change the current environment, but those changes are lost for the child environment. It would be really useful to add some kind of mechanism to get those changes into the child environment. I've added two possible solutions. Both

I am a recent convert to openssh. I am very pleased with it, and find it superior to ssh-1.2.27 in many ways (thanks for the good work). I recently found one piece missing from the current release. I have used the 'command' option in the authorized_keys file to restrict access. Using ssh-1.2.27 the original command was placed in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND envrionment variable. If

I'm not sure if this is useful to anyone, but I made a small patch to include the local IP address that the user connected to in the environment (the opposite of SSH_CLIENT). The variable is called SSH_LOCAL. -Eric -------------- next part -------------- *** openssh-2.9.9p2/canohost.c.bak Sun Jun 24 22:01:24 2001 --- openssh-2.9.9p2/canohost.c Fri Oct 12 16:52:09 2001 *************** ***

I am not 100% positive of the security implications of this, but I really can't see any potential for harm. If this patch is applied (I coded it against the now-current openssh-2.2.0p1), then if (a) the authorized_keys entry has command="whatever" to force a specific command, and also (b) the invoker specified some command on their ssh cmdline, then the invoked command will be

Attached is a patch which sets the SSH_AUTHKEY environment variable to be the remaining data at the end of an SSH key which is used for authentication. The motivation behind this is that there are time in which it's useful to know who is on the other end of the connection. For example, if I log in as root on a box, I'd like to be able to configure vi-specific settings, while another user

Good evening gentlemen, the attached patch against openssh 6.2p1 exposes remote forwarding ports to the remote shell: targethost % ssh -R 1234:localhost:22 controlhost controlhost % echo $SSH_REMOTE_FORWARDING_PORTS 1234 targethost % ssh -R 0:localhost:22 controlhost controlhost % echo $SSH_REMOTE_FORWARDING_PORTS 54294 targethost % ssh -R 0:localhost:22 -R

Dear Sirs, on my Linux (distribution Slackware 3.9), I have installed the ``openssh-1.2.2.tar.gz'' package into the /usr/local/bin directory. In the ``sshd.c'' file, the PATH variable is set up: child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH); (line no. 2405). I am unable to connect to my machine using scp. _PATH_STDPATH is

Hi, the following patch changes the Cygwin specific function copy_environment() to not restricting the strlen of a single environment variable to 512 byte. The PAM specific function do_pam_environment() (also in session.c) has the same problem but I don't know if that's important for PAM since only PAM specific environment variables are copied in that function. The below patch fixes

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101 ------- Additional Comments From wendyp at cray.com 2002-04-23 08:43 ------- updated patches for 22 april snapshot: --- session.c.orig Mon Apr 22 14:36:13 2002 +++ session.c Mon Apr 22 16:31:15 2002 @@ -64,6 +64,10 @@ #define is_winnt (GetVersion() < 0x80000000) #endif +#ifdef _CRAY +#include <tmpdir.h> +#endif /*

Specifying a RemoteForward of 0:example.com:1234 dynamically allocates the listen port on the server, and then reports it to ... the client! Where it is practically useless. Was this someone's idea of a joke? Presumably not--there are some technical obstacles to reporting it to the remote process. I'd like to help solve that problem. The natural way to me would be to extend the syntax

This issue has been discussed here and elsewhere a fair bit in the past year or so, but to re-address the issue... As of OpenSSH 2.9.something the ability to have an Xauthority located in /tmp was removed, with the following description in the ChangeLog : - markus at cvs.openbsd.org 2001/06/12 21:21:29 [session.c] remove xauth-cookie-in-tmp handling. use default $XAUTHORITY, since

http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=101 Summary: session.c modifications for correct UNICOS behavior Product: Portable OpenSSH Version: 3.0.2p1 Platform: Other OS/Version: other Status: NEW Severity: normal Priority: P2 Component: sshd AssignedTo: openssh-unix-dev at mindrot.org

I have found the following patches to be desirable for using sshd on a Tru64 UNIX system with the Kerberos 5 SIA module (libsia_krb5.so) from Heimdal. These patches do the following: 1) preserve context between the password authentication and the session setup phases. This is necessary because the Heimdal SIA module stores Kerberos context information as mechanism-specific data in