FreeBSD Security Advisories
2008-Jan-14 15:10 UTC
[FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc
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============================================================================FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc
Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: inet_network() buffer overflow
Category: core
Module: libc
Announced: 2008-01-14
Credits: Bjoern A. Zeeb and Nate Eldredge
Affects: FreeBSD 6.2
Corrected: 2008-01-14 22:57:45 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.0-PRERELEASE)
2008-01-14 22:55:54 UTC (RELENG_7_0, 7.0-RC2)
2008-01-14 22:56:05 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.3-PRERELEASE)
2008-01-14 22:56:18 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE)
2008-01-14 22:56:44 UTC (RELENG_6_2, 6.2-RELEASE-p10)
CVE Name: CVE-2008-0122
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The resolver is the part of libc that resolves hostnames (example.com) to
internet protocol (IP) addresses (192.0.2.1) and vice versa.
The inet_network() function returns an in_addr_t representing the network
address of the IP address given to inet_network() as a character string in
the dot-notation.
II. Problem Description
An off-by-one error in the inet_network() function could lead to memory
corruption with certain inputs.
III. Impact
For programs which passes untrusted data to inet_network(), an
attacker may be able to overwrite a region of memory with user defined
data by causing specially crafted input to be passed to
inet_network().
Depending on the region of memory the attacker is able to overwrite,
this might lead to a denial of service or potentially code execution
in the program using inet_network().
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7.0-PRERELEASE, or 6-STABLE, or
to the, RELENG_7_0, RELENG_6_3, or RELENG_6_2 security branch dated
after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.0, 6.3,
or 6.2 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:02/libc.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:02/libc.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile the operating system as described in
<URL: http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/makeworld.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_6
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.2.2.2
RELENG_6_3
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.3
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.3
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.2.2.1.4.1
RELENG_6_2
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.29.2.13
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.13.2.13
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.2.2.1.2.1
RELENG_7
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.4.2.1
RELENG_7_0
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.3.2.1
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.5.2.2
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.4.4.1
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0122
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc.asc
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FreeBSD Security Advisories
2008-Jan-14 15:10 UTC
FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc
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Hash: SHA1
============================================================================FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc
Security Advisory
The FreeBSD Project
Topic: inet_network() buffer overflow
Category: core
Module: libc
Announced: 2008-01-14
Credits: Bjoern A. Zeeb and Nate Eldredge
Affects: FreeBSD 6.2
Corrected: 2008-01-14 22:57:45 UTC (RELENG_7, 7.0-PRERELEASE)
2008-01-14 22:55:54 UTC (RELENG_7_0, 7.0-RC2)
2008-01-14 22:56:05 UTC (RELENG_6, 6.3-PRERELEASE)
2008-01-14 22:56:18 UTC (RELENG_6_3, 6.3-RELEASE)
2008-01-14 22:56:44 UTC (RELENG_6_2, 6.2-RELEASE-p10)
CVE Name: CVE-2008-0122
For general information regarding FreeBSD Security Advisories,
including descriptions of the fields above, security branches, and the
following sections, please visit <URL:http://security.FreeBSD.org/>.
I. Background
The resolver is the part of libc that resolves hostnames (example.com) to
internet protocol (IP) addresses (192.0.2.1) and vice versa.
The inet_network() function returns an in_addr_t representing the network
address of the IP address given to inet_network() as a character string in
the dot-notation.
II. Problem Description
An off-by-one error in the inet_network() function could lead to memory
corruption with certain inputs.
III. Impact
For programs which passes untrusted data to inet_network(), an
attacker may be able to overwrite a region of memory with user defined
data by causing specially crafted input to be passed to
inet_network().
Depending on the region of memory the attacker is able to overwrite,
this might lead to a denial of service or potentially code execution
in the program using inet_network().
IV. Workaround
No workaround is available.
V. Solution
Perform one of the following:
1) Upgrade your vulnerable system to 7.0-PRERELEASE, or 6-STABLE, or
to the, RELENG_7_0, RELENG_6_3, or RELENG_6_2 security branch dated
after the correction date.
2) To patch your present system:
The following patches have been verified to apply to FreeBSD 7.0, 6.3,
or 6.2 systems.
a) Download the relevant patch from the location below, and verify the
detached PGP signature using your PGP utility.
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:02/libc.patch
# fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:02/libc.patch.asc
b) Execute the following commands as root:
# cd /usr/src
# patch < /path/to/patch
c) Recompile the operating system as described in
<URL: http://www.freebsd.org/handbook/makeworld.html> and reboot the
system.
VI. Correction details
The following list contains the revision numbers of each file that was
corrected in FreeBSD.
Branch Revision
Path
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
RELENG_6
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.2.2.2
RELENG_6_3
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.37.2.3
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.15.2.3
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.2.2.1.4.1
RELENG_6_2
src/UPDATING 1.416.2.29.2.13
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.69.2.13.2.13
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.2.2.1.2.1
RELENG_7
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.4.2.1
RELENG_7_0
src/UPDATING 1.507.2.3.2.1
src/sys/conf/newvers.sh 1.72.2.5.2.2
src/lib/libc/inet/inet_network.c 1.4.4.1
- -------------------------------------------------------------------------
VII. References
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2008-0122
The latest revision of this advisory is available at
http://security.FreeBSD.org/advisories/FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc.asc
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At 06:09 PM 1/14/2008, FreeBSD Security Advisories wrote:>-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- >Hash: SHA1 > >============================================================================>FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc Security Advisory > The FreeBSD Project > >Topic: inet_network() buffer overflow > >For programs which passes untrusted data to inet_network(), an >attacker may be able to overwrite a region of memory with user defined >data by causing specially crafted input to be passed to >inet_network().For the "usual suspects" of applications running, (e.g. sendmail, apache, BIND etc) would it be possible to pass crafted packets through to this function remotely via those apps ? ie how easy is this to do ? ---Mike
>> Topic: inet_network() buffer overflow > > For the "usual suspects" of applications running, (e.g. sendmail, apache, > BIND etc) would it be possible to pass crafted packets through to this > function remotely via those apps ? ie how easy is this to do ?Speaking solely for sendmail, this issue does not appear to impact sendmail or any utilities/libraries in the sendmail distribution. Nothing in the sendmail distribution calls inet_network() or getnet*() (which appears to use inet_network() in libc).
Pietro Cerutti
2008-Jan-14 23:51 UTC
[FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc
> # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:02/libc.patchThe off-by-one error is still there.. -- Pietro Cerutti PGP Public Key: http://gahr.ch/pgp -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : http://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-security/attachments/20080115/2a53665e/signature.pgp
Pietro Cerutti
2008-Jan-15 02:27 UTC
[FreeBSD-Announce] FreeBSD Security Advisory FreeBSD-SA-08:02.libc
Pietro Cerutti wrote:>> # fetch http://security.FreeBSD.org/patches/SA-08:02/libc.patch > > The off-by-one error is still there.. >Errata corrige: the off-by-one error is in my head... -- Pietro Cerutti PGP Public Key: http://gahr.ch/pgp -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 187 bytes Desc: OpenPGP digital signature Url : http://lists.freebsd.org/pipermail/freebsd-security/attachments/20080115/f5dad351/signature.pgp