Laszlo Ersek
2023-Feb-15 14:11 UTC
[Libguestfs] [libnbd PATCH v3 09/29] lib/utils: introduce async-signal-safe execvpe()
execvp() [01] is powerful:
- it performs PATH search [02] if necessary,
- it falls back to executing the file with the shell as a shell script in
case the underlying execv() or execve() fails with ENOEXEC.
However, execvp() is not async-signal-safe [03], and so we shouldn't call
it in a child process forked from a multi-threaded parent process [04],
which the libnbd client application may well be.
Introduce three APIs for safely emulating execvp() with execve():
- nbd_internal_execvpe_init(): to be called in the parent process, before
fork(). Allocate and format candidate pathnames for execution with
execve(), based on PATH. Allocate a buffer for the longer command line
that the shell script fallback needs.
- nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(): to be called in the child process. Try
the candidates formatted previously in sequence with execve(), as long
as execve() fails with errors related to pathname resolution /
inode-level file type / execution permission. Stop iterating on fatal
errors; if the fatal error is ENOEXEC, activate the shell script
fallback. As a small added feature, take the environment from an
explicit parameter (effectively imitating the GNU-specific execvpe()
function -- cf. commit dc64ac5cdd0b, "states: Use execvp instead of
execvpe", 2019-11-15).
- nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit(): to be called in the parent process, after
fork(). Release the resources allocated with
nbd_internal_execvpe_init().
The main idea with the above distribution of responsibilities is that any
pre-scanning of PATH -- which was suggested by Eric Blake -- should not
include activities that are performed by execve() anyway. I've considered
and abandoned two approaches:
- During scanning (i.e., in nbd_internal_execvpe_init()), check each
candidate with access(X_OK) [05].
I dropped this because the informative APPLICATION USAGE section of the
same specification [06] advises against it, saying "[a]n application
should instead attempt the action itself and handle the [EACCES] error
that occurs if the file is not accessible".
- During scanning, open each candidate with O_EXEC [07] until one open()
succeeds. Save the sole file descriptor for
nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(). In the latter, call fexecve() [08],
which is free of all error conditions that necessitate iteration over
candidates. Still implement the ENOEXEC (shell script) fallback.
I dropped this because (a) fexecve() is a quite recent interface
(highlighted by Eric); (b) for an application to open a file for
execution with fexecve(), it's more robust to pass O_EXEC to open() than
not to pass it, per APPLICATION USAGE [09], but on Linux/glibc, O_EXEC
does not seem supported, only O_PATH does [10].
Thus the chosen approach -- pre-generate filenames -- contains a small
TOCTTOU race (highlighted by Eric) after all, but it should be harmless.
Implementation-defined details:
- If PATH searching is necessary, but PATH is absent [01], then fall back
to confstr(_CS_PATH) [11], similarly to Linux/glibc execvpe() [12].
If PATH is set but empty ("set to null") [02], or PATH is unset and
confstr(_CS_PATH) fails or returns no information or returns the empty
string, we fail the initial scanning (!) with ENOENT. This is consistent
with bash's behavior on Linux/glibc:
$ PATH= ls
bash: ls: No such file or directory
Details chosen for unspecified behavior:
- Hardwire "/bin/sh" as the shell's pathname [01].
[01] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/execvp.html
[02]
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap08.html#tag_08_03
[03]
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/V2_chap02.html#tag_15_04_03_03
[04] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fork.html
[05] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html
[06]
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html#tag_16_09_07
[07] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/open.html
[08] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fexecve.html
[09]
https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fexecve.html#tag_16_111_07
[10] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html
[11] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/confstr.html
[12] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/execvpe.3.html
Suggested-by: Eric Blake <eblake at redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek at redhat.com>
---
lib/internal.h | 22 ++
lib/utils.c | 351 ++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 373 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/internal.h b/lib/internal.h
index 9c9021ed366e..8c4e32013e40 100644
--- a/lib/internal.h
+++ b/lib/internal.h
@@ -368,6 +368,18 @@ struct command {
uint32_t error; /* Local errno value */
};
+struct execvpe {
+ string_vector pathnames;
+
+ /* Note: "const_string_vector" is not a good type for
"sh_argv" below. Even if
+ * we reserved enough space in a "const_string_vector",
+ * const_string_vector_append() would still not be async-signal-safe, due to
+ * the underlying const_string_vector_insert() calling assert().
+ */
+ char **sh_argv;
+ size_t num_sh_args;
+};
+
/* Test if a callback is "null" or not, and set it to null. */
#define CALLBACK_IS_NULL(cb) ((cb).callback == NULL && (cb).free ==
NULL)
#define CALLBACK_IS_NOT_NULL(cb) (! CALLBACK_IS_NULL ((cb)))
@@ -540,4 +552,14 @@ extern void nbd_internal_fork_safe_assert (int result,
const char *file,
__func__, #expression))
#endif
+extern int nbd_internal_execvpe_init (struct execvpe *ctx, const char *file,
+ size_t num_args)
+ LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1, 2);
+extern void nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit (struct execvpe *ctx)
+ LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1);
+extern int nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe (struct execvpe *ctx,
+ const string_vector *argv,
+ char * const *envp)
+ LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1, 2, 3);
+
#endif /* LIBNBD_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/lib/utils.c b/lib/utils.c
index 5dd00f82e073..9a96ed6ed674 100644
--- a/lib/utils.c
+++ b/lib/utils.c
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
#include <limits.h>
#include "minmax.h"
+#include "checked-overflow.h"
#include "internal.h"
@@ -463,3 +464,353 @@ nbd_internal_fork_safe_assert (int result, const char
*file, long line,
xwrite (STDERR_FILENO, "' failed.\n", 10);
abort ();
}
+
+/* Returns the value of the PATH environment variable -- falling back to
+ * confstr(_CS_PATH) if PATH is absent -- as a dynamically allocated string. On
+ * failure, sets "errno" and returns NULL.
+ */
+static char *
+get_path (void)
+ LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_ALLOC_DEALLOC (free)
+{
+ char *path;
+ bool env_path_found;
+ size_t path_size, path_size2;
+
+ /* FIXME: lock the environment. */
+ path = getenv ("PATH");
+ if ((env_path_found = (path != NULL)))
+ path = strdup (path);
+ /* FIXME: unlock the environment. */
+
+ if (env_path_found) {
+ /* This handles out-of-memory as well. */
+ return path;
+ }
+
+ errno = 0;
+ path_size = confstr (_CS_PATH, NULL, 0);
+ if (path_size == 0) {
+ /* If _CS_PATH does not have a configuration-defined value, just store
+ * ENOENT to "errno".
+ */
+ if (errno == 0)
+ errno = ENOENT;
+
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ path = malloc (path_size);
+ if (path == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ path_size2 = confstr (_CS_PATH, path, path_size);
+ assert (path_size2 == path_size);
+ return path;
+}
+
+/* nbd_internal_execvpe_init() and nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() together
+ * present an execvp() alternative that is async-signal-safe.
+ *
+ * nbd_internal_execvpe_init() may only be called before fork(), for filling in
+ * the caller-allocated, uninitialized "ctx" structure. If
+ * nbd_internal_execvpe_init() succeeds, then fork() may be called.
+ * Subsequently, in the child process, nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() may be
+ * called with the inherited "ctx" structure, while in the parent
process,
+ * nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit() must be called to uninitialize (evacuate) the
+ * "ctx" structure.
+ *
+ * On failure, "ctx" will not have been modified, "errno"
is set, and -1 is
+ * returned. Failures include:
+ *
+ * - Errors forwarded from underlying functions such as strdup(), confstr(),
+ * malloc(), string_vector_append().
+ *
+ * - ENOENT: "file" is an empty string.
+ *
+ * - ENOENT: "file" does not contain a <slash> "/"
character, the PATH
+ * environment variable is not set, and confstr() doesn't
associate a
+ * configuration-defined value with _CS_PATH.
+ *
+ * - ENOENT: "file" does not contain a <slash> "/"
character, and: (a) the PATH
+ * environment variable is set to the empty string, or (b) PATH is
not
+ * set, and confstr() outputs the empty string for _CS_PATH.
+ *
+ * - EOVERFLOW: the sizes or counts of necessary objects could not be
expressed.
+ *
+ * - EINVAL: "num_args" is less than 2.
+ *
+ * On success, the "ctx" structure will have been filled in, and 0 is
returned.
+ *
+ * - "pathnames" member:
+ *
+ * - All strings pointed-to by elements of the "pathnames"
string_vector
+ * member are owned by "pathnames".
+ *
+ * - If "file" contains a <slash> "/" character,
then the sole entry in
+ * "pathnames" is a copy of "file".
+ *
+ * - If "file" does not contain a <slash> "/"
character:
+ *
+ * Let "system path" be defined as the value of the PATH
environment
+ * variable, if the latter exists, and as the value output by confstr() for
+ * _CS_PATH otherwise. Per the ENOENT specifications above, "system
path" is
+ * a non-empty string. Let "system path" further be of the form
+ *
+ * <prefix_0> [n = 1]
+ *
+ * or
+ *
+ * <prefix_0>:<prefix_1>:...:<prefix_(n-1)> [n >= 2]
+ *
+ * where for each 0 <= i < n, <prefix_i> does not contain the
<colon> ":"
+ * character. In the (n = 1) case, <prefix_0> is never empty (see
ENOENT
+ * above), while in the (n >= 2) case, any individual <prefix_i>
may or may
+ * not be empty.
+ *
+ * The "pathnames" string_vector member has n elements; for each
0 <= i < n,
+ * element i is of the form
+ *
+ * suffix(curdir(<prefix_i>))file
+ *
+ * where
+ *
+ * curdir(x) := "." if x = ""
+ * curdir(x) := x otherwise
+ *
+ * and
+ *
+ * suffix(x) := x if "x" ends with a <slash>
"/"
+ * suffix(x) := x "/" otherwise
+ *
+ * This transformation implements the POSIX XBD / PATH environment variable
+ * semantics, creating candidate pathnames for execution by
+ * nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(). nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() will
+ * iterate over the candidate pathnames with execve() until execve()
+ * succeeds, or fails with an error that is due to neither pathname
+ * resolution, nor the candidate not being a regular file, nor the
candidate
+ * lacking execution permission.
+ *
+ * - The "sh_argv" array member will have at least (num_args + 1)
elements
+ * allocated, and none populated.
+ *
+ * (The minimum value of "num_args" is 2 -- see EINVAL above.
According to
+ * POSIX, "[t]he argument /arg0/ should point to a filename string that
is
+ * associated with the process being started by one of the /exec/
functions",
+ * plus "num_args" includes the null pointer that terminates the
argument
+ * list.)
+ *
+ * This allocation is made in anticipation of execve() failing for a
+ * particular candidate inside nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() with ENOEXEC
+ * ("[t]he new process image file has the appropriate access permission
but
+ * has an unrecognized format"). While that failure terminates the
iteration,
+ * the failed call
+ *
+ * execve (pathnames[i],
+ * { argv[0], argv[1], ..., NULL }, // (num_args >= 2) elements
+ * { envp[0], envp[1], ..., NULL })
+ *
+ * must be repeated as
+ *
+ * execve (<shell-path>,
+ * { argv[0], pathnames[i], // ((num_args + 1) >= 3)
+ argv[1], ..., NULL }, // elements
+ * { envp[0], envp[1], ..., NULL })
+ *
+ * for emulating execvp(). The allocation in the "sh_argv" member
makes it
+ * possible just to *link* the original "argv" elements and the
"pathnames[i]"
+ * candidate into the right positions.
+ *
+ * (POSIX leaves the shell pathname unspecified; "/bin/sh" should
be good
+ * enough.)
+ *
+ * The shell *binary* will see itself being executed under the name
"argv[0]",
+ * will receive "pathnames[i]" as the pathname of the shell
*script* to read
+ * and interpret ("command_file" in POSIX terminology), will expose
+ * "pathnames[i]" as the positional parameter $0 to the script, and
will
+ * forward "argv[1]" and the rest to the script as positional
parameters $1
+ * and onward.
+ */
+int
+nbd_internal_execvpe_init (struct execvpe *ctx, const char *file,
+ size_t num_args)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *sys_path;
+ string_vector pathnames;
+ char *pathname;
+ size_t num_sh_args;
+ char **sh_argv;
+ size_t sh_argv_bytes;
+
+ rc = -1;
+
+ if (file[0] == '\0') {
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* First phase. */
+ sys_path = NULL;
+ pathnames = (string_vector)empty_vector;
+
+ if (strchr (file, '/') == NULL) {
+ size_t file_len;
+ const char *sys_path_element, *scan;
+ bool finish;
+
+ sys_path = get_path ();
+ if (sys_path == NULL)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (sys_path[0] == '\0') {
+ errno = ENOENT;
+ goto free_sys_path;
+ }
+
+ pathname = NULL;
+ file_len = strlen (file);
+ sys_path_element = sys_path;
+ scan = sys_path;
+ do {
+ assert (sys_path_element <= scan);
+ finish = (*scan == '\0');
+ if (finish || *scan == ':') {
+ const char *sys_path_copy_start;
+ size_t sys_path_copy_size;
+ size_t sep_copy_size;
+ size_t pathname_size;
+ char *p;
+
+ if (scan == sys_path_element) {
+ sys_path_copy_start = ".";
+ sys_path_copy_size = 1;
+ } else {
+ sys_path_copy_start = sys_path_element;
+ sys_path_copy_size = scan - sys_path_element;
+ }
+
+ assert (sys_path_copy_size >= 1);
+ sep_copy_size = (sys_path_copy_start[sys_path_copy_size - 1] !=
'/');
+
+ if (ADD_OVERFLOW (sys_path_copy_size, sep_copy_size,
&pathname_size) ||
+ ADD_OVERFLOW (pathname_size, file_len, &pathname_size) ||
+ ADD_OVERFLOW (pathname_size, 1u, &pathname_size)) {
+ errno = EOVERFLOW;
+ goto empty_pathnames;
+ }
+
+ pathname = malloc (pathname_size);
+ if (pathname == NULL)
+ goto empty_pathnames;
+ p = pathname;
+
+ memcpy (p, sys_path_copy_start, sys_path_copy_size);
+ p += sys_path_copy_size;
+
+ memcpy (p, "/", sep_copy_size);
+ p += sep_copy_size;
+
+ memcpy (p, file, file_len);
+ p += file_len;
+
+ *p++ = '\0';
+
+ if (string_vector_append (&pathnames, pathname) == -1)
+ goto empty_pathnames;
+ /* Ownership transferred. */
+ pathname = NULL;
+
+ sys_path_element = scan + 1;
+ }
+
+ ++scan;
+ } while (!finish);
+ } else {
+ pathname = strdup (file);
+ if (pathname == NULL)
+ return rc;
+
+ if (string_vector_append (&pathnames, pathname) == -1)
+ goto empty_pathnames;
+ /* Ownership transferred. */
+ pathname = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Second phase. */
+ if (num_args < 2) {
+ errno = EINVAL;
+ goto empty_pathnames;
+ }
+ if (ADD_OVERFLOW (num_args, 1u, &num_sh_args) ||
+ MUL_OVERFLOW (num_sh_args, sizeof *sh_argv, &sh_argv_bytes)) {
+ errno = EOVERFLOW;
+ goto empty_pathnames;
+ }
+ sh_argv = malloc (sh_argv_bytes);
+ if (sh_argv == NULL)
+ goto empty_pathnames;
+
+ /* Commit. */
+ ctx->pathnames = pathnames;
+ ctx->sh_argv = sh_argv;
+ ctx->num_sh_args = num_sh_args;
+ rc = 0;
+ /* Fall through, for freeing temporaries. */
+
+empty_pathnames:
+ if (rc == -1) {
+ free (pathname);
+ string_vector_empty (&pathnames);
+ }
+
+free_sys_path:
+ free (sys_path);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+void
+nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit (struct execvpe *ctx)
+{
+ free (ctx->sh_argv);
+ ctx->num_sh_args = 0;
+ string_vector_empty (&ctx->pathnames);
+}
+
+int
+nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe (struct execvpe *ctx, const string_vector *argv,
+ char * const *envp)
+{
+ size_t pathname_idx;
+
+ NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->pathnames.len > 0);
+
+ pathname_idx = 0;
+ do {
+ (void)execve (ctx->pathnames.ptr[pathname_idx], argv->ptr, envp);
+ if (errno != EACCES && errno != ELOOP && errno !=
ENAMETOOLONG &&
+ errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOTDIR)
+ break;
+
+ ++pathname_idx;
+ } while (pathname_idx < ctx->pathnames.len);
+
+ if (errno == ENOEXEC) {
+ char **sh_argp;
+ size_t argv_idx;
+
+ NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->num_sh_args >= argv->len);
+ NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->num_sh_args - argv->len == 1);
+
+ sh_argp = ctx->sh_argv;
+ *sh_argp++ = argv->ptr[0];
+ *sh_argp++ = ctx->pathnames.ptr[pathname_idx];
+ for (argv_idx = 1; argv_idx < argv->len; ++argv_idx)
+ *sh_argp++ = argv->ptr[argv_idx];
+
+ (void)execve ("/bin/sh", ctx->sh_argv, envp);
+ }
+
+ return -1;
+}
Eric Blake
2023-Feb-15 22:28 UTC
[Libguestfs] [libnbd PATCH v3 09/29] lib/utils: introduce async-signal-safe execvpe()
On Wed, Feb 15, 2023 at 03:11:38PM +0100, Laszlo Ersek wrote:> execvp() [01] is powerful:You KNOW this is going to be a juicy commit message when the first line contains a 2-digit footnote ;)> > - it performs PATH search [02] if necessary, > > - it falls back to executing the file with the shell as a shell script in > case the underlying execv() or execve() fails with ENOEXEC. > > However, execvp() is not async-signal-safe [03], and so we shouldn't call > it in a child process forked from a multi-threaded parent process [04], > which the libnbd client application may well be. > > Introduce three APIs for safely emulating execvp() with execve(): > > - nbd_internal_execvpe_init(): to be called in the parent process, before > fork(). Allocate and format candidate pathnames for execution with > execve(), based on PATH. Allocate a buffer for the longer command line > that the shell script fallback needs. > > - nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(): to be called in the child process. Try > the candidates formatted previously in sequence with execve(), as long > as execve() fails with errors related to pathname resolution / > inode-level file type / execution permission. Stop iterating on fatal > errors; if the fatal error is ENOEXEC, activate the shell script > fallback. As a small added feature, take the environment from an > explicit parameter (effectively imitating the GNU-specific execvpe() > function -- cf. commit dc64ac5cdd0b, "states: Use execvp instead of > execvpe", 2019-11-15). > > - nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit(): to be called in the parent process, after > fork(). Release the resources allocated with > nbd_internal_execvpe_init().Makes sense. A shame that it requires 3 functions, and that we have to duplicate so much work that libc would normally do for us if we don't care about async-safety, but I think the result is worth it.> > The main idea with the above distribution of responsibilities is that any > pre-scanning of PATH -- which was suggested by Eric Blake -- should not > include activities that are performed by execve() anyway. I've considered > and abandoned two approaches: > > - During scanning (i.e., in nbd_internal_execvpe_init()), check each > candidate with access(X_OK) [05]. > > I dropped this because the informative APPLICATION USAGE section of the > same specification [06] advises against it, saying "[a]n application > should instead attempt the action itself and handle the [EACCES] error > that occurs if the file is not accessible". > > - During scanning, open each candidate with O_EXEC [07] until one open() > succeeds. Save the sole file descriptor for > nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(). In the latter, call fexecve() [08], > which is free of all error conditions that necessitate iteration over > candidates. Still implement the ENOEXEC (shell script) fallback. > > I dropped this because (a) fexecve() is a quite recent interface > (highlighted by Eric); (b) for an application to open a file for > execution with fexecve(), it's more robust to pass O_EXEC to open() than > not to pass it, per APPLICATION USAGE [09], but on Linux/glibc, O_EXEC > does not seem supported, only O_PATH does [10]. > > Thus the chosen approach -- pre-generate filenames -- contains a smallAccidental double space.> TOCTTOU race (highlighted by Eric) after all, but it should be harmless.Yeah - if you are actively changing out binaries on PATH at the same time as anything else running in earnest on a production system, you've got more issues than just libnbd's potential race.> > Implementation-defined details: > > - If PATH searching is necessary, but PATH is absent [01], then fall back > to confstr(_CS_PATH) [11], similarly to Linux/glibc execvpe() [12]. > > If PATH is set but empty ("set to null") [02], or PATH is unset and > confstr(_CS_PATH) fails or returns no information or returns the empty > string, we fail the initial scanning (!) with ENOENT. This is consistent > with bash's behavior on Linux/glibc: > > $ PATH= ls > bash: ls: No such file or directory_Technically_, PATH= should behave identically to PATH=.; if you have an executable named './ls' in your working directory, bash WILL execute it! $ mkdir -p /tmp/blah $ cd /tmp/blah $ cp /bin/ls . $ PATH= ls -a . .. ls But whether you want to tweak this patch to actually comply with that corner case is up to you (no one in their right mind should set PATH to empty). Below, I'll refer to this as [1].> > Details chosen for unspecified behavior: > > - Hardwire "/bin/sh" as the shell's pathname [01]. > > [01] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/execvp.html > [02] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap08.html#tag_08_03 > [03] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/V2_chap02.html#tag_15_04_03_03 > [04] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fork.html > [05] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html > [06] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html#tag_16_09_07 > [07] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/open.html > [08] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fexecve.html > [09] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fexecve.html#tag_16_111_07 > [10] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html > [11] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/confstr.html > [12] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/execvpe.3.htmlVery useful bibliography.> > Suggested-by: Eric Blake <eblake at redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek at redhat.com> > --- > lib/internal.h | 22 ++ > lib/utils.c | 351 ++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 373 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/lib/internal.h b/lib/internal.h > index 9c9021ed366e..8c4e32013e40 100644 > --- a/lib/internal.h > +++ b/lib/internal.h > @@ -368,6 +368,18 @@ struct command { > uint32_t error; /* Local errno value */ > }; > > +struct execvpe { > + string_vector pathnames; > + > + /* Note: "const_string_vector" is not a good type for "sh_argv" below. Even if > + * we reserved enough space in a "const_string_vector", > + * const_string_vector_append() would still not be async-signal-safe, due to > + * the underlying const_string_vector_insert() calling assert(). > + */ > + char **sh_argv; > + size_t num_sh_args; > +}; > + > /* Test if a callback is "null" or not, and set it to null. */ > #define CALLBACK_IS_NULL(cb) ((cb).callback == NULL && (cb).free == NULL) > #define CALLBACK_IS_NOT_NULL(cb) (! CALLBACK_IS_NULL ((cb))) > @@ -540,4 +552,14 @@ extern void nbd_internal_fork_safe_assert (int result, const char *file, > __func__, #expression)) > #endif > > +extern int nbd_internal_execvpe_init (struct execvpe *ctx, const char *file, > + size_t num_args) > + LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1, 2); > +extern void nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit (struct execvpe *ctx) > + LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1); > +extern int nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe (struct execvpe *ctx, > + const string_vector *argv, > + char * const *envp) > + LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1, 2, 3);The interface looks good for now (if you can't tell, I'm doing a stream-of-consciousness review, and may have further comments about the interface once I see the implementation and/or usage).> + > #endif /* LIBNBD_INTERNAL_H */ > diff --git a/lib/utils.c b/lib/utils.c > index 5dd00f82e073..9a96ed6ed674 100644 > --- a/lib/utils.c > +++ b/lib/utils.c > @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ > #include <limits.h> > > #include "minmax.h" > +#include "checked-overflow.h" > > #include "internal.h" > > @@ -463,3 +464,353 @@ nbd_internal_fork_safe_assert (int result, const char *file, long line, > xwrite (STDERR_FILENO, "' failed.\n", 10); > abort (); > } > + > +/* Returns the value of the PATH environment variable -- falling back to > + * confstr(_CS_PATH) if PATH is absent -- as a dynamically allocated string. On > + * failure, sets "errno" and returns NULL. > + */ > +static char * > +get_path (void) > + LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_ALLOC_DEALLOC (free) > +{ > + char *path; > + bool env_path_found; > + size_t path_size, path_size2; > + > + /* FIXME: lock the environment. */ > + path = getenv ("PATH"); > + if ((env_path_found = (path != NULL))) > + path = strdup (path); > + /* FIXME: unlock the environment. */Are the FIXME comments still necessary? I know we discussed about getenv() being technically non-async-safe in POSIX, but that in all practical aspects, we consider that a multi-threaded app should be smart enough to never modify the environment in parallel with calling into a library like libnbd. At best, you could reword the comment to get rid of FIXME and instead just state our reasoning for why we don't bother with locking the environment: glibc and any other high-quality libc will not be modifying environ during getenv().> + > + if (env_path_found) { > + /* This handles out-of-memory as well. */ > + return path; > + }Clever, and definitely worth that comment.> + > + errno = 0; > + path_size = confstr (_CS_PATH, NULL, 0); > + if (path_size == 0) { > + /* If _CS_PATH does not have a configuration-defined value, just store > + * ENOENT to "errno". > + */ > + if (errno == 0) > + errno = ENOENT; > + > + return NULL; > + } > + > + path = malloc (path_size); > + if (path == NULL) > + return NULL; > + > + path_size2 = confstr (_CS_PATH, path, path_size); > + assert (path_size2 == path_size); > + return path; > +}Nice.> + > +/* nbd_internal_execvpe_init() and nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() together > + * present an execvp() alternative that is async-signal-safe. > + * > + * nbd_internal_execvpe_init() may only be called before fork(), for filling in > + * the caller-allocated, uninitialized "ctx" structure. If > + * nbd_internal_execvpe_init() succeeds, then fork() may be called. > + * Subsequently, in the child process, nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() may be > + * called with the inherited "ctx" structure, while in the parent process, > + * nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit() must be called to uninitialize (evacuate) the > + * "ctx" structure. > + * > + * On failure, "ctx" will not have been modified, "errno" is set, and -1 is > + * returned. Failures include: > + * > + * - Errors forwarded from underlying functions such as strdup(), confstr(), > + * malloc(), string_vector_append(). > + * > + * - ENOENT: "file" is an empty string. > + * > + * - ENOENT: "file" does not contain a <slash> "/" character, the PATH > + * environment variable is not set, and confstr() doesn't associate a > + * configuration-defined value with _CS_PATH. > + * > + * - ENOENT: "file" does not contain a <slash> "/" character, and: (a) the PATH > + * environment variable is set to the empty string, or (b) PATH is not > + * set, and confstr() outputs the empty string for _CS_PATH.[1] This might need tweaking if you treat empty PATH or _CS_PATH as equivalent to "." instead of an unconditional ENOENT.> + * > + * - EOVERFLOW: the sizes or counts of necessary objects could not be expressed. > + * > + * - EINVAL: "num_args" is less than 2. > + * > + * On success, the "ctx" structure will have been filled in, and 0 is returned. > + * > + * - "pathnames" member: > + * > + * - All strings pointed-to by elements of the "pathnames" string_vector > + * member are owned by "pathnames". > + * > + * - If "file" contains a <slash> "/" character, then the sole entry in > + * "pathnames" is a copy of "file". > + * > + * - If "file" does not contain a <slash> "/" character: > + * > + * Let "system path" be defined as the value of the PATH environment > + * variable, if the latter exists, and as the value output by confstr() for > + * _CS_PATH otherwise. Per the ENOENT specifications above, "system path" is > + * a non-empty string. Let "system path" further be of the form > + * > + * <prefix_0> [n = 1] > + * > + * or > + * > + * <prefix_0>:<prefix_1>:...:<prefix_(n-1)> [n >= 2] > + * > + * where for each 0 <= i < n, <prefix_i> does not contain the <colon> ":" > + * character. In the (n = 1) case, <prefix_0> is never empty (see ENOENT > + * above), while in the (n >= 2) case, any individual <prefix_i> may or may > + * not be empty.[1] And this simplifies if empty PATH can imply searching in ".".> + * > + * The "pathnames" string_vector member has n elements; for each 0 <= i < n, > + * element i is of the form > + * > + * suffix(curdir(<prefix_i>))file > + * > + * where > + * > + * curdir(x) := "." if x = "" > + * curdir(x) := x otherwise > + * > + * and > + * > + * suffix(x) := x if "x" ends with a <slash> "/" > + * suffix(x) := x "/" otherwise > + * > + * This transformation implements the POSIX XBD / PATH environment variable > + * semantics, creating candidate pathnames for execution by > + * nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(). nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() will > + * iterate over the candidate pathnames with execve() until execve() > + * succeeds, or fails with an error that is due to neither pathname > + * resolution, nor the candidate not being a regular file, nor the candidate > + * lacking execution permission. > + * > + * - The "sh_argv" array member will have at least (num_args + 1) elements > + * allocated, and none populated. > + * > + * (The minimum value of "num_args" is 2 -- see EINVAL above. According to > + * POSIX, "[t]he argument /arg0/ should point to a filename string that is > + * associated with the process being started by one of the /exec/ functions", > + * plus "num_args" includes the null pointer that terminates the argument > + * list.) > + * > + * This allocation is made in anticipation of execve() failing for a > + * particular candidate inside nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() with ENOEXEC > + * ("[t]he new process image file has the appropriate access permission but > + * has an unrecognized format"). While that failure terminates the iteration, > + * the failed call > + * > + * execve (pathnames[i], > + * { argv[0], argv[1], ..., NULL }, // (num_args >= 2) elements > + * { envp[0], envp[1], ..., NULL }) > + * > + * must be repeated as > + * > + * execve (<shell-path>, > + * { argv[0], pathnames[i], // ((num_args + 1) >= 3)Are we guaranteed that if we get to this fallback, pathnames[i] does not begin with '-' or '+'? Or is it possible to write PATH=/usr/bin:+my/evil/relative/path:... and/or the user to attempt to execute '+my/evil/name' which skips the PATH search because the binary name contains '/', such that the resulting argument to /bin/sh might need to be protected with an extra "--" argument to avoid being misinterpreted as options to the shell rather than the script name to be executed? Is the current working directory something we change between fork() and exec()? If so, should we canonicalize the entries in pathnames[] to always start with '/', so that the child process can reposition directories at will without changing the meaning of the pre-scanned candidates? (Note that canonicalizing names would automatically resolve my above question about safety in the presence of an unusual PATH or binary name beginning with [-+]). [2]> + argv[1], ..., NULL }, // elements > + * { envp[0], envp[1], ..., NULL }) > + * > + * for emulating execvp(). The allocation in the "sh_argv" member makes it > + * possible just to *link* the original "argv" elements and the "pathnames[i]" > + * candidate into the right positions. > + * > + * (POSIX leaves the shell pathname unspecified; "/bin/sh" should be good > + * enough.) > + * > + * The shell *binary* will see itself being executed under the name "argv[0]", > + * will receive "pathnames[i]" as the pathname of the shell *script* to read > + * and interpret ("command_file" in POSIX terminology), will expose > + * "pathnames[i]" as the positional parameter $0 to the script, and will > + * forward "argv[1]" and the rest to the script as positional parameters $1 > + * and onward. > + */ > +int > +nbd_internal_execvpe_init (struct execvpe *ctx, const char *file, > + size_t num_args)Should the interface take the proposed argv[] here pre-fork(), or are we trying to keep this interface generic enough where the child may alter some of the argv post-fork()? On the other hand, I already know we are altering the environment post-fork() (setting LISTEN_PIDcannot be done pre-fork, for starters), so keeping the selection of argv solely in the child rather than making the parent generate it pre-fork seems like the right division of labor.> +{ > + int rc; > + char *sys_path; > + string_vector pathnames; > + char *pathname; > + size_t num_sh_args; > + char **sh_argv; > + size_t sh_argv_bytes; > + > + rc = -1; > + > + if (file[0] == '\0') { > + errno = ENOENT; > + return rc; > + } > + > + /* First phase. */ > + sys_path = NULL; > + pathnames = (string_vector)empty_vector;Another point where we may want consistency on whether we do space after cast.> + > + if (strchr (file, '/') == NULL) { > + size_t file_len; > + const char *sys_path_element, *scan; > + bool finish; > + > + sys_path = get_path (); > + if (sys_path == NULL) > + return rc; > + > + if (sys_path[0] == '\0') { > + errno = ENOENT; > + goto free_sys_path; > + }[1] Here is where you would code up an empty PATH as being equivalent to ".", if we think it's worth having, probably by just dropping this condition and letting the do-loop below handle it.> + > + pathname = NULL; > + file_len = strlen (file); > + sys_path_element = sys_path; > + scan = sys_path; > + do { > + assert (sys_path_element <= scan); > + finish = (*scan == '\0'); > + if (finish || *scan == ':') { > + const char *sys_path_copy_start; > + size_t sys_path_copy_size; > + size_t sep_copy_size; > + size_t pathname_size; > + char *p; > + > + if (scan == sys_path_element) { > + sys_path_copy_start = "."; > + sys_path_copy_size = 1; > + } else { > + sys_path_copy_start = sys_path_element; > + sys_path_copy_size = scan - sys_path_element; > + } > + > + assert (sys_path_copy_size >= 1); > + sep_copy_size = (sys_path_copy_start[sys_path_copy_size - 1] != '/'); > + > + if (ADD_OVERFLOW (sys_path_copy_size, sep_copy_size, &pathname_size) || > + ADD_OVERFLOW (pathname_size, file_len, &pathname_size) || > + ADD_OVERFLOW (pathname_size, 1u, &pathname_size)) { > + errno = EOVERFLOW; > + goto empty_pathnames; > + }Since we are in the parent process during this _init() function, can't we just use asprintf() instead of concatenating it all out by hand?> + > + pathname = malloc (pathname_size); > + if (pathname == NULL) > + goto empty_pathnames; > + p = pathname; > + > + memcpy (p, sys_path_copy_start, sys_path_copy_size); > + p += sys_path_copy_size;[2] Here is where we would want to consider whether to (semi-)canonicalize any relative names into a corresponding absolute prefix, to avoid issues with a relative PATH element starting with [-+].> + > + memcpy (p, "/", sep_copy_size); > + p += sep_copy_size;Clever way to avoid turning PATH=/:/usr/bin:... into an attempt to execute "//binary" which is NOT the same as "/binary". But also possible if you use asprintf(..., "...%.*s...", ..., (int) sep_copy_size, "/", ...) or declare sep_copy_size as int to begin with (because we know it will only be 0 or 1).> + > + memcpy (p, file, file_len); > + p += file_len; > + > + *p++ = '\0'; > + > + if (string_vector_append (&pathnames, pathname) == -1) > + goto empty_pathnames; > + /* Ownership transferred. */ > + pathname = NULL; > + > + sys_path_element = scan + 1; > + } > + > + ++scan; > + } while (!finish); > + } else { > + pathname = strdup (file);[2] and here we'd have to canonicalize 'file' itself if we are worrying about the child changing directories and/or starting with a character that could change the behavior of /bin/sh if mistaken as an option instead of a script name.> + if (pathname == NULL) > + return rc; > + > + if (string_vector_append (&pathnames, pathname) == -1) > + goto empty_pathnames; > + /* Ownership transferred. */ > + pathname = NULL; > + } > + > + /* Second phase. */ > + if (num_args < 2) { > + errno = EINVAL; > + goto empty_pathnames; > + } > + if (ADD_OVERFLOW (num_args, 1u, &num_sh_args) || > + MUL_OVERFLOW (num_sh_args, sizeof *sh_argv, &sh_argv_bytes)) { > + errno = EOVERFLOW; > + goto empty_pathnames; > + } > + sh_argv = malloc (sh_argv_bytes); > + if (sh_argv == NULL) > + goto empty_pathnames;Should we prepopulate sh_argv[0] as a placeholder that can then be easily swapped to ctx->pathnames[i], where the child first attempts execve(pathnames[i], argv+1, env) with the ENOEXEC fallback to argv[0]=pathnames[i]; execve("/bin/sh", argv, env), rather than having to shuffle things in the child process? [3]> + > + /* Commit. */ > + ctx->pathnames = pathnames; > + ctx->sh_argv = sh_argv; > + ctx->num_sh_args = num_sh_args; > + rc = 0; > + /* Fall through, for freeing temporaries. */ > + > +empty_pathnames: > + if (rc == -1) { > + free (pathname); > + string_vector_empty (&pathnames); > + } > + > +free_sys_path: > + free (sys_path); > + > + return rc; > +} > + > +void > +nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit (struct execvpe *ctx) > +{ > + free (ctx->sh_argv); > + ctx->num_sh_args = 0; > + string_vector_empty (&ctx->pathnames); > +} > + > +int > +nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe (struct execvpe *ctx, const string_vector *argv, > + char * const *envp) > +{ > + size_t pathname_idx; > + > + NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->pathnames.len > 0); > + > + pathname_idx = 0; > + do { > + (void)execve (ctx->pathnames.ptr[pathname_idx], argv->ptr, envp); > + if (errno != EACCES && errno != ELOOP && errno != ENAMETOOLONG && > + errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOTDIR) > + break; > + > + ++pathname_idx; > + } while (pathname_idx < ctx->pathnames.len); > + > + if (errno == ENOEXEC) { > + char **sh_argp; > + size_t argv_idx; > + > + NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->num_sh_args >= argv->len); > + NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->num_sh_args - argv->len == 1); > + > + sh_argp = ctx->sh_argv; > + *sh_argp++ = argv->ptr[0]; > + *sh_argp++ = ctx->pathnames.ptr[pathname_idx]; > + for (argv_idx = 1; argv_idx < argv->len; ++argv_idx) > + *sh_argp++ = argv->ptr[argv_idx]; > + > + (void)execve ("/bin/sh", ctx->sh_argv, envp);[3] Oh, I see - the shuffle is still probably needed, because ctx->sh_argv is different than user's argv which does not have a pre-allocated filler slot that we can just swap out. Unless we decide that the _init() function should take argv itself rather than making the child do the work of shifting everything from one array to another, but then we are inconsistent for grabbing argv in the parent and env in the child.> + } > + > + return -1; > +} >Overall looks like nice work. Based on my review, you may decide to make further tweaks, but I didn't see any hard reason why we couldn't use the patch as-written if you don't think my review warrants changes. Thus: Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake at redhat.com> -- Eric Blake, Principal Software Engineer Red Hat, Inc. +1-919-301-3266 Virtualization: qemu.org | libvirt.org
Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-Feb-21 12:08 UTC
[Libguestfs] [libnbd PATCH v3 09/29] lib/utils: introduce async-signal-safe execvpe()
On Wed, Feb 15, 2023 at 03:11:38PM +0100, Laszlo Ersek wrote:> execvp() [01] is powerful: > > - it performs PATH search [02] if necessary, > > - it falls back to executing the file with the shell as a shell script in > case the underlying execv() or execve() fails with ENOEXEC. > > However, execvp() is not async-signal-safe [03], and so we shouldn't call > it in a child process forked from a multi-threaded parent process [04], > which the libnbd client application may well be.Is that actually a problem in the real world ? There are various things not technically listed as async-signal-safe by POSIX, which all sane impls none the less make safe, or are practically safe in any sane program using them. IIUC with execvp the risk would be that setenv makes any use of the environment potentially unsafe, and possibly execvp might use malloc which is also technically unsafe. Both of these factors would technically make your replacement unsafe too. Apps simply shouldn't ever call setenv once threads are created, and malloc() is safe in any impl that is relevant these days.> > Introduce three APIs for safely emulating execvp() with execve(): > > - nbd_internal_execvpe_init(): to be called in the parent process, before > fork(). Allocate and format candidate pathnames for execution with > execve(), based on PATH. Allocate a buffer for the longer command line > that the shell script fallback needs. > > - nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(): to be called in the child process. Try > the candidates formatted previously in sequence with execve(), as long > as execve() fails with errors related to pathname resolution / > inode-level file type / execution permission. Stop iterating on fatal > errors; if the fatal error is ENOEXEC, activate the shell script > fallback. As a small added feature, take the environment from an > explicit parameter (effectively imitating the GNU-specific execvpe() > function -- cf. commit dc64ac5cdd0b, "states: Use execvp instead of > execvpe", 2019-11-15). > > - nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit(): to be called in the parent process, after > fork(). Release the resources allocated with > nbd_internal_execvpe_init(). > > The main idea with the above distribution of responsibilities is that any > pre-scanning of PATH -- which was suggested by Eric Blake -- should not > include activities that are performed by execve() anyway. I've considered > and abandoned two approaches: > > - During scanning (i.e., in nbd_internal_execvpe_init()), check each > candidate with access(X_OK) [05]. > > I dropped this because the informative APPLICATION USAGE section of the > same specification [06] advises against it, saying "[a]n application > should instead attempt the action itself and handle the [EACCES] error > that occurs if the file is not accessible". > > - During scanning, open each candidate with O_EXEC [07] until one open() > succeeds. Save the sole file descriptor for > nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(). In the latter, call fexecve() [08], > which is free of all error conditions that necessitate iteration over > candidates. Still implement the ENOEXEC (shell script) fallback. > > I dropped this because (a) fexecve() is a quite recent interface > (highlighted by Eric); (b) for an application to open a file for > execution with fexecve(), it's more robust to pass O_EXEC to open() than > not to pass it, per APPLICATION USAGE [09], but on Linux/glibc, O_EXEC > does not seem supported, only O_PATH does [10]. > > Thus the chosen approach -- pre-generate filenames -- contains a small > TOCTTOU race (highlighted by Eric) after all, but it should be harmless. > > Implementation-defined details: > > - If PATH searching is necessary, but PATH is absent [01], then fall back > to confstr(_CS_PATH) [11], similarly to Linux/glibc execvpe() [12]. > > If PATH is set but empty ("set to null") [02], or PATH is unset and > confstr(_CS_PATH) fails or returns no information or returns the empty > string, we fail the initial scanning (!) with ENOENT. This is consistent > with bash's behavior on Linux/glibc: > > $ PATH= ls > bash: ls: No such file or directory > > Details chosen for unspecified behavior: > > - Hardwire "/bin/sh" as the shell's pathname [01]. > > [01] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/execvp.html > [02] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap08.html#tag_08_03 > [03] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/V2_chap02.html#tag_15_04_03_03 > [04] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fork.html > [05] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html > [06] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/access.html#tag_16_09_07 > [07] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/open.html > [08] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fexecve.html > [09] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fexecve.html#tag_16_111_07 > [10] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/open.2.html > [11] https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/confstr.html > [12] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/execvpe.3.html > > Suggested-by: Eric Blake <eblake at redhat.com> > Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek at redhat.com> > --- > lib/internal.h | 22 ++ > lib/utils.c | 351 ++++++++++++++++++++ > 2 files changed, 373 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/lib/internal.h b/lib/internal.h > index 9c9021ed366e..8c4e32013e40 100644 > --- a/lib/internal.h > +++ b/lib/internal.h > @@ -368,6 +368,18 @@ struct command { > uint32_t error; /* Local errno value */ > }; > > +struct execvpe { > + string_vector pathnames; > + > + /* Note: "const_string_vector" is not a good type for "sh_argv" below. Even if > + * we reserved enough space in a "const_string_vector", > + * const_string_vector_append() would still not be async-signal-safe, due to > + * the underlying const_string_vector_insert() calling assert(). > + */ > + char **sh_argv; > + size_t num_sh_args; > +}; > + > /* Test if a callback is "null" or not, and set it to null. */ > #define CALLBACK_IS_NULL(cb) ((cb).callback == NULL && (cb).free == NULL) > #define CALLBACK_IS_NOT_NULL(cb) (! CALLBACK_IS_NULL ((cb))) > @@ -540,4 +552,14 @@ extern void nbd_internal_fork_safe_assert (int result, const char *file, > __func__, #expression)) > #endif > > +extern int nbd_internal_execvpe_init (struct execvpe *ctx, const char *file, > + size_t num_args) > + LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1, 2); > +extern void nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit (struct execvpe *ctx) > + LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1); > +extern int nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe (struct execvpe *ctx, > + const string_vector *argv, > + char * const *envp) > + LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_NONNULL (1, 2, 3); > + > #endif /* LIBNBD_INTERNAL_H */ > diff --git a/lib/utils.c b/lib/utils.c > index 5dd00f82e073..9a96ed6ed674 100644 > --- a/lib/utils.c > +++ b/lib/utils.c > @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ > #include <limits.h> > > #include "minmax.h" > +#include "checked-overflow.h" > > #include "internal.h" > > @@ -463,3 +464,353 @@ nbd_internal_fork_safe_assert (int result, const char *file, long line, > xwrite (STDERR_FILENO, "' failed.\n", 10); > abort (); > } > + > +/* Returns the value of the PATH environment variable -- falling back to > + * confstr(_CS_PATH) if PATH is absent -- as a dynamically allocated string. On > + * failure, sets "errno" and returns NULL. > + */ > +static char * > +get_path (void) > + LIBNBD_ATTRIBUTE_ALLOC_DEALLOC (free) > +{ > + char *path; > + bool env_path_found; > + size_t path_size, path_size2; > + > + /* FIXME: lock the environment. */ > + path = getenv ("PATH"); > + if ((env_path_found = (path != NULL))) > + path = strdup (path); > + /* FIXME: unlock the environment. */ > + > + if (env_path_found) { > + /* This handles out-of-memory as well. */ > + return path; > + } > + > + errno = 0; > + path_size = confstr (_CS_PATH, NULL, 0); > + if (path_size == 0) { > + /* If _CS_PATH does not have a configuration-defined value, just store > + * ENOENT to "errno". > + */ > + if (errno == 0) > + errno = ENOENT; > + > + return NULL; > + } > + > + path = malloc (path_size); > + if (path == NULL) > + return NULL; > + > + path_size2 = confstr (_CS_PATH, path, path_size); > + assert (path_size2 == path_size); > + return path; > +} > + > +/* nbd_internal_execvpe_init() and nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() together > + * present an execvp() alternative that is async-signal-safe. > + * > + * nbd_internal_execvpe_init() may only be called before fork(), for filling in > + * the caller-allocated, uninitialized "ctx" structure. If > + * nbd_internal_execvpe_init() succeeds, then fork() may be called. > + * Subsequently, in the child process, nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() may be > + * called with the inherited "ctx" structure, while in the parent process, > + * nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit() must be called to uninitialize (evacuate) the > + * "ctx" structure. > + * > + * On failure, "ctx" will not have been modified, "errno" is set, and -1 is > + * returned. Failures include: > + * > + * - Errors forwarded from underlying functions such as strdup(), confstr(), > + * malloc(), string_vector_append(). > + * > + * - ENOENT: "file" is an empty string. > + * > + * - ENOENT: "file" does not contain a <slash> "/" character, the PATH > + * environment variable is not set, and confstr() doesn't associate a > + * configuration-defined value with _CS_PATH. > + * > + * - ENOENT: "file" does not contain a <slash> "/" character, and: (a) the PATH > + * environment variable is set to the empty string, or (b) PATH is not > + * set, and confstr() outputs the empty string for _CS_PATH. > + * > + * - EOVERFLOW: the sizes or counts of necessary objects could not be expressed. > + * > + * - EINVAL: "num_args" is less than 2. > + * > + * On success, the "ctx" structure will have been filled in, and 0 is returned. > + * > + * - "pathnames" member: > + * > + * - All strings pointed-to by elements of the "pathnames" string_vector > + * member are owned by "pathnames". > + * > + * - If "file" contains a <slash> "/" character, then the sole entry in > + * "pathnames" is a copy of "file". > + * > + * - If "file" does not contain a <slash> "/" character: > + * > + * Let "system path" be defined as the value of the PATH environment > + * variable, if the latter exists, and as the value output by confstr() for > + * _CS_PATH otherwise. Per the ENOENT specifications above, "system path" is > + * a non-empty string. Let "system path" further be of the form > + * > + * <prefix_0> [n = 1] > + * > + * or > + * > + * <prefix_0>:<prefix_1>:...:<prefix_(n-1)> [n >= 2] > + * > + * where for each 0 <= i < n, <prefix_i> does not contain the <colon> ":" > + * character. In the (n = 1) case, <prefix_0> is never empty (see ENOENT > + * above), while in the (n >= 2) case, any individual <prefix_i> may or may > + * not be empty. > + * > + * The "pathnames" string_vector member has n elements; for each 0 <= i < n, > + * element i is of the form > + * > + * suffix(curdir(<prefix_i>))file > + * > + * where > + * > + * curdir(x) := "." if x = "" > + * curdir(x) := x otherwise > + * > + * and > + * > + * suffix(x) := x if "x" ends with a <slash> "/" > + * suffix(x) := x "/" otherwise > + * > + * This transformation implements the POSIX XBD / PATH environment variable > + * semantics, creating candidate pathnames for execution by > + * nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe(). nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() will > + * iterate over the candidate pathnames with execve() until execve() > + * succeeds, or fails with an error that is due to neither pathname > + * resolution, nor the candidate not being a regular file, nor the candidate > + * lacking execution permission. > + * > + * - The "sh_argv" array member will have at least (num_args + 1) elements > + * allocated, and none populated. > + * > + * (The minimum value of "num_args" is 2 -- see EINVAL above. According to > + * POSIX, "[t]he argument /arg0/ should point to a filename string that is > + * associated with the process being started by one of the /exec/ functions", > + * plus "num_args" includes the null pointer that terminates the argument > + * list.) > + * > + * This allocation is made in anticipation of execve() failing for a > + * particular candidate inside nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe() with ENOEXEC > + * ("[t]he new process image file has the appropriate access permission but > + * has an unrecognized format"). While that failure terminates the iteration, > + * the failed call > + * > + * execve (pathnames[i], > + * { argv[0], argv[1], ..., NULL }, // (num_args >= 2) elements > + * { envp[0], envp[1], ..., NULL }) > + * > + * must be repeated as > + * > + * execve (<shell-path>, > + * { argv[0], pathnames[i], // ((num_args + 1) >= 3) > + argv[1], ..., NULL }, // elements > + * { envp[0], envp[1], ..., NULL }) > + * > + * for emulating execvp(). The allocation in the "sh_argv" member makes it > + * possible just to *link* the original "argv" elements and the "pathnames[i]" > + * candidate into the right positions. > + * > + * (POSIX leaves the shell pathname unspecified; "/bin/sh" should be good > + * enough.) > + * > + * The shell *binary* will see itself being executed under the name "argv[0]", > + * will receive "pathnames[i]" as the pathname of the shell *script* to read > + * and interpret ("command_file" in POSIX terminology), will expose > + * "pathnames[i]" as the positional parameter $0 to the script, and will > + * forward "argv[1]" and the rest to the script as positional parameters $1 > + * and onward. > + */ > +int > +nbd_internal_execvpe_init (struct execvpe *ctx, const char *file, > + size_t num_args) > +{ > + int rc; > + char *sys_path; > + string_vector pathnames; > + char *pathname; > + size_t num_sh_args; > + char **sh_argv; > + size_t sh_argv_bytes; > + > + rc = -1; > + > + if (file[0] == '\0') { > + errno = ENOENT; > + return rc; > + } > + > + /* First phase. */ > + sys_path = NULL; > + pathnames = (string_vector)empty_vector; > + > + if (strchr (file, '/') == NULL) { > + size_t file_len; > + const char *sys_path_element, *scan; > + bool finish; > + > + sys_path = get_path (); > + if (sys_path == NULL) > + return rc; > + > + if (sys_path[0] == '\0') { > + errno = ENOENT; > + goto free_sys_path; > + } > + > + pathname = NULL; > + file_len = strlen (file); > + sys_path_element = sys_path; > + scan = sys_path; > + do { > + assert (sys_path_element <= scan); > + finish = (*scan == '\0'); > + if (finish || *scan == ':') { > + const char *sys_path_copy_start; > + size_t sys_path_copy_size; > + size_t sep_copy_size; > + size_t pathname_size; > + char *p; > + > + if (scan == sys_path_element) { > + sys_path_copy_start = "."; > + sys_path_copy_size = 1; > + } else { > + sys_path_copy_start = sys_path_element; > + sys_path_copy_size = scan - sys_path_element; > + } > + > + assert (sys_path_copy_size >= 1); > + sep_copy_size = (sys_path_copy_start[sys_path_copy_size - 1] != '/'); > + > + if (ADD_OVERFLOW (sys_path_copy_size, sep_copy_size, &pathname_size) || > + ADD_OVERFLOW (pathname_size, file_len, &pathname_size) || > + ADD_OVERFLOW (pathname_size, 1u, &pathname_size)) { > + errno = EOVERFLOW; > + goto empty_pathnames; > + } > + > + pathname = malloc (pathname_size); > + if (pathname == NULL) > + goto empty_pathnames; > + p = pathname; > + > + memcpy (p, sys_path_copy_start, sys_path_copy_size); > + p += sys_path_copy_size; > + > + memcpy (p, "/", sep_copy_size); > + p += sep_copy_size; > + > + memcpy (p, file, file_len); > + p += file_len; > + > + *p++ = '\0'; > + > + if (string_vector_append (&pathnames, pathname) == -1) > + goto empty_pathnames; > + /* Ownership transferred. */ > + pathname = NULL; > + > + sys_path_element = scan + 1; > + } > + > + ++scan; > + } while (!finish); > + } else { > + pathname = strdup (file); > + if (pathname == NULL) > + return rc; > + > + if (string_vector_append (&pathnames, pathname) == -1) > + goto empty_pathnames; > + /* Ownership transferred. */ > + pathname = NULL; > + } > + > + /* Second phase. */ > + if (num_args < 2) { > + errno = EINVAL; > + goto empty_pathnames; > + } > + if (ADD_OVERFLOW (num_args, 1u, &num_sh_args) || > + MUL_OVERFLOW (num_sh_args, sizeof *sh_argv, &sh_argv_bytes)) { > + errno = EOVERFLOW; > + goto empty_pathnames; > + } > + sh_argv = malloc (sh_argv_bytes); > + if (sh_argv == NULL) > + goto empty_pathnames; > + > + /* Commit. */ > + ctx->pathnames = pathnames; > + ctx->sh_argv = sh_argv; > + ctx->num_sh_args = num_sh_args; > + rc = 0; > + /* Fall through, for freeing temporaries. */ > + > +empty_pathnames: > + if (rc == -1) { > + free (pathname); > + string_vector_empty (&pathnames); > + } > + > +free_sys_path: > + free (sys_path); > + > + return rc; > +} > + > +void > +nbd_internal_execvpe_uninit (struct execvpe *ctx) > +{ > + free (ctx->sh_argv); > + ctx->num_sh_args = 0; > + string_vector_empty (&ctx->pathnames); > +} > + > +int > +nbd_internal_fork_safe_execvpe (struct execvpe *ctx, const string_vector *argv, > + char * const *envp) > +{ > + size_t pathname_idx; > + > + NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->pathnames.len > 0); > + > + pathname_idx = 0; > + do { > + (void)execve (ctx->pathnames.ptr[pathname_idx], argv->ptr, envp); > + if (errno != EACCES && errno != ELOOP && errno != ENAMETOOLONG && > + errno != ENOENT && errno != ENOTDIR) > + break; > + > + ++pathname_idx; > + } while (pathname_idx < ctx->pathnames.len); > + > + if (errno == ENOEXEC) { > + char **sh_argp; > + size_t argv_idx; > + > + NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->num_sh_args >= argv->len); > + NBD_INTERNAL_FORK_SAFE_ASSERT (ctx->num_sh_args - argv->len == 1); > + > + sh_argp = ctx->sh_argv; > + *sh_argp++ = argv->ptr[0]; > + *sh_argp++ = ctx->pathnames.ptr[pathname_idx]; > + for (argv_idx = 1; argv_idx < argv->len; ++argv_idx) > + *sh_argp++ = argv->ptr[argv_idx]; > + > + (void)execve ("/bin/sh", ctx->sh_argv, envp); > + } > + > + return -1; > +} > > _______________________________________________ > Libguestfs mailing list > Libguestfs at redhat.com > https://listman.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/libguestfs >With regards, Daniel -- |: https://berrange.com -o- https://www.flickr.com/photos/dberrange :| |: https://libvirt.org -o- https://fstop138.berrange.com :| |: https://entangle-photo.org -o- https://www.instagram.com/dberrange :|