Heiko Schlittermann
2015-Oct-13 19:18 UTC
TLS communication director -> backend with X.509 cert checks?
Timo Sirainen <tss at iki.fi> (Di 13 Okt 2015 21:02:59 CEST): ?> > On connection setup from a client the director connects to the > > selected backend. But it seems (not checked in the source yet), > > that for SSL certificate verification the director doesn't know the > > original host name anymore. The certificate's CN gets compared to > > the IP address the director connects to. > > Right. The hostnames are lost immediately at director startup. I've never really thought about needing this functionality for director, since they're usually in the same trusted network with backends.. >That's it? "ususally". And additionally local policy says that we should use secured connections whenever credentials are transported ? And since the director uses either a master password or the credentials obtained from the client, we want to use secured connections. And using TLS w/o verified certs is better than nothing, but it's far from being perfect. I see: a) pass the host *names* to the director too, for CN verification purpose May be in struct mail_host could be a field for the original hostname we used to obtain the adress(es)? or b) allow some kind of certificate pinning, that is loose the implied relation CN <=> hostname> > Should I create certificates with IP address in SAN? (Any hint about the > > correct syntax for the openssl.conf is welcome). Or is there any chance > > that this is fixed already or will be fixed in the near future or even > > better, that it's my fault? > > I guess that could work for now. No idea about how to do such certificates.I'll try that, but I think it's not a solution as soon as we reach out for "official" certs. And because it puts more details about the infrastructure into the configuration than would be necessary. Best regards from Dresden/Germany Viele Gr??e aus Dresden Heiko Schlittermann -- SCHLITTERMANN.de ---------------------------- internet & unix support - Heiko Schlittermann, Dipl.-Ing. (TU) - {fon,fax}: +49.351.802998{1,3} - gnupg encrypted messages are welcome --------------- key ID: F69376CE - ! key id 7CBF764A and 972EAC9F are revoked since 2015-01 ------------ - -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 473 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <http://dovecot.org/pipermail/dovecot/attachments/20151013/6f845a4a/attachment.sig>
Timo Sirainen
2015-Oct-13 19:36 UTC
TLS communication director -> backend with X.509 cert checks?
On 13 Oct 2015, at 22:18, Heiko Schlittermann <hs at schlittermann.de> wrote:> > Timo Sirainen <tss at iki.fi> (Di 13 Okt 2015 21:02:59 CEST): > ? >>> On connection setup from a client the director connects to the >>> selected backend. But it seems (not checked in the source yet), >>> that for SSL certificate verification the director doesn't know the >>> original host name anymore. The certificate's CN gets compared to >>> the IP address the director connects to. >> >> Right. The hostnames are lost immediately at director startup. I've never really thought about needing this functionality for director, since they're usually in the same trusted network with backends.. >> > > That's it? "ususally". And additionally local policy says that we should use > secured connections whenever credentials are transported ? And since the > director uses either a master password or the credentials obtained from > the client, we want to use secured connections. And using TLS w/o > verified certs is better than nothing, but it's far from being perfect.I've been planning to add support for non-plaintext SASL for Dovecot proxy. Probably SCRAM-SHA1. That would avoid sending credentials in plaintext, although it wouldn't prevent other kind of MITM.> I see: > > a) pass the host *names* to the director too, for CN verification > purpose > > May be in struct mail_host could be a field for the original > hostname we used to obtain the adress(es)?Does the attached patch work? Compiles, but untested. -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: director-host.diff Type: application/octet-stream Size: 4143 bytes Desc: not available URL: <http://dovecot.org/pipermail/dovecot/attachments/20151013/1b1d227d/attachment-0001.obj> -------------- next part --------------
Heiko Schlittermann
2015-Oct-13 20:33 UTC
TLS communication director -> backend with X.509 cert checks?
Timo Sirainen <tss at iki.fi> (Di 13 Okt 2015 21:36:40 CEST): ?> > I see: > > > > a) pass the host *names* to the director too, for CN verification > > purpose > > > > May be in struct mail_host could be a field for the original > > hostname we used to obtain the adress(es)? > > Does the attached patch work? Compiles, but untested.I'm about to test it. Best regards from Dresden/Germany Viele Gr??e aus Dresden Heiko Schlittermann -- SCHLITTERMANN.de ---------------------------- internet & unix support - Heiko Schlittermann, Dipl.-Ing. (TU) - {fon,fax}: +49.351.802998{1,3} - gnupg encrypted messages are welcome --------------- key ID: F69376CE - ! key id 7CBF764A and 972EAC9F are revoked since 2015-01 ------------ - -------------- next part -------------- A non-text attachment was scrubbed... Name: signature.asc Type: application/pgp-signature Size: 473 bytes Desc: Digital signature URL: <http://dovecot.org/pipermail/dovecot/attachments/20151013/dd1fd0e3/attachment.sig>
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- TLS communication director -> backend with X.509 cert checks?
- TLS communication director -> backend with X.509 cert checks?
- TLS communication director -> backend with X.509 cert checks?
- TLS communication director -> backend with X.509 cert checks?
- TLS communication director -> backend with X.509 cert checks?